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INTRODUCTION
The new millennium brings new crimes. Witness two of the most
talked-about crimes of last year, the ILoveYou computer worm (in
terms of economic damage, perhaps the most devastating crime in
history, causing more than $11 billion in losses) and the denial-of-
service attacks on Yahoo!, eBay, E*Trade, and other sites (which
caused $1.2 billion in damage). These events suggest that a new
breed of crime has emerged over the past decade: cybercrime. This
umbrella term covers all sorts of crimes committed with computers-
from viruses to Trojan horses; from hacking into private e-mail to
undermining defense and intelligence systems; from electronic thefts
of bank accounts to disrupting web sites. Law has not necessarily
caught up with these crimes, as the recent dismissal of charges against
2the author of the ILoveYou worm demonstrates. How should the law
think about computer crime?
Some academics see cyberspace as a new area in which first
principles of law need to be rethought. David Johnson and David
Post, for example, contend that existing legal rules are not suitable for
the digital age and that governments should not necessarily impose
legal order on the internet.3 Others, in contrast, believe that a
I Russ Banham, Hacking 14 CFO MAG., Aug. 1, 2000, http://vww.cfo.com/
printarticle/1,1883,0111AD1874,00.html (describing the denial of service attacks as
"causing more than $1.2 billion in total losses"); Harvey Stark, eirus Signs Marketing
and Sales Contract and Readies for Expansion, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 1, 2000, 8/1/00 BWIRE
09:21:00 ("[T]he 'I Love You' virus caused estimated damages of US$11 billion
worldwide in May, 2000.").
See Philippines Drops Charges in "ILoveYou" Virus Cas4 at http://www.cnn.com/
2000/TECH/computing/08/21/computers.philippines.reut/index.html (Aug. 21,
2000).
3 See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, And How Shall the Net Be Governed?: A
Meditation on the Relative Virtues of Decentralized, Emergent Law, in COORDINATING THE
INTERNET 62, 68 (Brian Kahin & James H. Keller eds., 1997) (proposing a model for
internet governance based on "decentralized, emergent law" stemming from the
"voluntary acceptance of standards"); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
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computer is merely an instrument and that crime in cyberspace
should be regulated the same way as criminal acts in realspace 4 The
recent U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") report on cybercrime
typifies this approach.' I contend that neither view is correct and that
each camp slights important features that make cybercrime both
different from and similar to traditional crime.
Underlying the "cybercrime is not different" position is a worry
about a unique form of geographic substitution. The concern is that
disproportionately punishing activity in either realspace or cyberspace
will induce criminals to shift their activities to that sphere in which the
expected punishment is lower. For example, if the electronic theft of
one million dollars warrants five years imprisonment, and the physical
theft of one million dollars warrants ten years imprisonment,
B,,rderi-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1372-75 (1996); see also
Benjamin Wittes, Is Law Enforcement Ready for Cybercrime?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 10, 1994,
at I (discussing how some describe the internet as "'qualitatively different' from other
platform,, for crime" and how others, such as Stewart Baker, former general counsel at
the National Security Agency, believe that such a characterization is "broadly
speaking-rTong").
See. e.g., Catherine Th~rfse Clarke, From CrimlNet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an
Inclusive Apfoach to Policing the Evolving Criminal Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV.
191, 204-05 (1996) (discussing an informal survey of lawyers revealing that "most
lawers consider criminals on the 'net to be exactly the same as those outside the
'net"); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199 (1998)
(arguing that cyberspace can be regulated in many traditional ways); Christopher M.
Kelly, The Cyber~pace Separatism Fallacy, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 413, 414 (1999). In an
important middle approach, Larry Lessig contends that cyberspace can be regulated
through law and programming code. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CMBERSPACE 53-60 (1999).
Some courts have also suggested that crimes might be different in cyberspace
because there is a lack of tangible media, such as a briefcase that may be "stolen." See,
,'g., United States v. Carlin Communications, Inc., 815 F.2d 1367, 1371 (10th Cir.
1987) (declining to apply the federal obscenity statute to abusive or harassing phone
call% because such calls do not constitute "tangible objects" of commerce). Others
have disagreed. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 707 (6th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that computer image files are tangible and therefore subject to the
federal obscenity statute); United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1982).
The Justice Department believes that "substantive regulation of unlawful
conduct... should, as a rule, apply in the same way to conduct in the cyberworld as it
does to conduct in the physical world. If an activity is prohibited in the physical world
but not on the Internet, then the Internet becomes a safe haven for that unlawful
activity." U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER: THE CHALLENGE OF
UNLX UL CONDUCr INVOLVING THE USE OF THE INTERNET 11 (2000), available at
http://wwt.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlaful.htrn [hereinafter DOJ REPORT].
Current federal law, in general, embraces the view that there are no differences. See id.
at vi ("[Existing substantive federal laws generally do not distinguish between
unlawful conduct committed through the use of the Interet and the same conduct
committed through the use of other, more traditional means of communication.").
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criminals are likely to opt for the electronic theft. Such analysis is,
however, incomplete. Beccaria and Becker have observed that the
expected penalty for criminal activity is not only the sentence in the
criminal code, but also a function of the probability that one will get
caught.6 To the extent that cybercrimes are easier to get away with,
sentences might be increased to compensate for this lower probability.
In addition to the probability of being caught, another variable
overlooked by the "cybercrime is not different" camp is the
perpetration cost of engaging in crime. A bank robbery in realspace,
for example, consumes tremendous criminal resources. A robber has
to hire lookouts and firepower, garner inside knowledge about the
bank, and so on. Profits will be split among five, six, or even more
people. A computer theft, by contrast, involves fewer resources and
may even be accomplished by a single person sitting down at a
computer. Because cybercrime requires fewer resource inputs and
less investment to cause a given level of harm, the law might approach
these crimes differently.
These variations suggest that cyberspace is a unique medium for
three reasons. First, and most importantly, the use of computers and
other equipment is a cheaper means to perpetrate crime. Criminal
law must be concerned not only with punishing crime ex post, but
with creating ex ante barriers to inexpensive ways of carrying out
criminal activity. In this Article, this principle-which is generally
applicable in criminal law-will be called "cost deterrence." The idea
is that law should strive to channel crime into outlets that are more
costly to criminals. Cyberspace presents unique opportunities for
criminals to reduce their perpetration costs; the probability of success
in inflicting a certain level of harm while holding expenditures
constant is greater. Accordingly, the law should develop mechanisms
to neutralize these efficiency advantages.
Some neutralization techniques, however, risk punishing utility-
producing activities. For example, encryption has the potential to
further massive terrorism (which leads many in the law enforcement
community to advocate its criminalization) but also has the potential
to facilitate greater security in communication and thereby encourage
freedom (which leads many others to push for unfettered access to
the technology). This is a standard dilemma that the law encounters
6 Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 43, 57, 58 (Richard Bellamy ed., Richard Davies et al. trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169, 176 (1968).
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in the regulation of technology-call it the "dual-use problem." The
problem arises when an activity has both positive and negative uses
and forbidding the act forfeits the good uses. To help solve the
problem, I introduce a conventional tool, the sentencing
enhancement, as a mechanism that can selectively target improper
uses. Policyrnakers and academics have given little attention to
sentencing enhancements and lack a theory of when they should be
used. This Article endeavors to fill that gap, arguing that sentencing
enhancements are suited to certain acts that are not inherently
harmful to society and whose benefits depend on context. It shows,
for example, how enhancements provide a solution to the encryption
debate because they can be aimed at encryption's harmful
applications.
Second, cybercrime adds additional parties to the traditional
perpetrator-victim scenario of crime. In particular, much cybercrime
is carried out through the use of Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"),
such as America Online. Government should consider imposing
responsibilities on such third parties because doing so promotes cost
deterrence. Third parties can develop ways to make criminal activity
more expensive and may be able to do so in ways that the government
cannot accomplish directly. The same logic sometimes can apply to
victims of cybercrime; law can develop mechanisms to encourage
optimal victim behavior as well. As part of this discussion, this Article
shows how victim self-help depends on changing police behavior and
outlines a strategy to make police departments behave more like fire
departments (focusing more on warning and prevention and less on
chasing suspected perpetrators after they commit crimes).
Two features of cyberspace, however, suggest that these burden-
shifting strategies will be difficult to implement. The first, which
borrows from the New Economy theory of "network effects," contends
that interconnectivity is an important goal that should not be
sacrificed lightly. If potential victims and third parties like ISPs are
forced to take precautionary measures-from building strong firewalls
to forgoing communication with risky computer systems-these
measures may diminish the value of the internet. A strong public law
enforcement presence is necessary to prevent the net from
fragmenting into small regions accessible only to subsets of trusted
users with the right passkeys. A second feature that limits burden-
shifting arises from the asymmetric incentives between ISPs and their
users. Because an ISP derives little utility from providing access to a
risky subscriber, a legal regime that places liability on an ISP for the
100720011
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acts of its subscribers will quickly lead the ISP to purge risky ones from
its system. ISPs, as private entities, face no constitutional constraints
and little public accountability; the results of ISP liability may be
unfair and threaten the potential benefits of the net.
Third, and more generally, a host of thorny problems arise
because most activities that occur in cyberspace are invisible to third
parties-and sometimes even to second parties. In a space where
crimes are invisible, strategies that focus on trying to prevent crime by
maintaining public order, such as "broken windows" policing, are of
limited utility (though some insights can be adapted to cyberspace).
Social norms cannot operate as effectively to prevent crime on the net
because its users are not necessarily constrained by the values of
realspace.
On the other side of the ledger, the danger of overly aggressive
law enforcement is multiplied in cyberspace. Each new major
cybercrime leads law enforcement to push for changes to the
technical infrastructure to create better monitoring and tracing. If
these monitoring mechanisms are hidden in private hardware and
software, however, some contend that public accountability may be
undermined. A similar point can be made about enforcement by
police: Because police are invisible on the intemet, the potential for
entrapment or other forms of police misconduct may be greater. The
ultimate effect of this loss of police visibility may be to poison
legitimate activity on the net because confidence in communication
may be undermined. An internet user will not be sure that he is
talking to a friend and not a government interloper seeking evidence
of criminal activity.7 Because the technology of law enforcement is
not well understood among the public, citizens will fear the net and its
potential advantages will be stymied. Consider the public uproar over
a third prominent news item from this year: the discovery that the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") has a system, with the poorly
chosen title of "Carnivore," which allows it to examine private e-mails."
7 See McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 217 (D.D.C. 1998) (describing a case of
an officer who was discharged on the basis of the gays-in-the-military policy after the
government obtained his America Online e-mail and profile where he revealed his
homosexuality).
8 See infra note 187 (discussing exaggerated fears of Carnivore); see also Ted Bridis,
FBI Won't Provide Data on Carnivore Congress Requested, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2000, at B8
(discussing the FBI's refusal to disclose information about Carnivore to Congress);
Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL ST. J., July
11, 2000, at A3 (describing concerns regarding the FBI's use of Carnivore); David A.
Vise, Carnivore Going to Review U., WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2000, at A23 (reporting on the
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Nevertheless, the differences between crimes that take place in
cyberspace and those that occur in realspace should not obscure their
similarities. For example, if crime in cyberspace is easier to commit
due to technical prowess, then the law needs to consider how to treat
offline crimes that harness technical ability. Similarly, if acts in
cyberspace portend criminal activity in realspace, then this dangerous
complementarity can-if sufficiently strong-justify punishing acts in
cyberspace (an example might be electronic stalkers who may
graduate to stalking in realspace). This notion undoes the standard
idea that criminal punishment should be reserved only for acts that
are harmful; the point here is not that a certain act is itself harmful,
but that its commission will lead to a harmful act. Preventing the
former act is a mechanism the government may use to discourage the
commission of the latter.
The problem of cybercrime is really a larger one of how the law
deals with new technologies. Sometimes the law treats crimes that
employ new technologies as different and deserving of special
regulation (such as wire fraud, hijacking of airplanes, and grand theft
auto) and at other times it does not (crimes performed with
typewriters and most thefts, which carry the same penalty whether
accomplished with James Bond-style panache or by a simple break-in).
Lurking underneath this differential regulation is a complex
symbiotic relationship between technology and law.9 Computer crime
forces us to confront the role and limitations of criminal law, just as
criminal law forces us to reconceptualize the role and limitations of
technology.
After all, computer crime is not simply constrained by law.' °
Before Bob Ellickson's and Larry Lessig's pathbreaking work, many
scholars assumed that law was the primary mechanism for the
regulation of conduct. Ellickson and Lessig helped introduce a
second constraint, social norms. They showed how such norms can
regulate as effectively as law, or even more so." Lessig's recent work
Justice Department's plan to review Carnivore by means of a university study).
See CAROLYN MARVIN, WHEN OLD TECHNOLOGIES VERE NEW: THINKING ABOUT
ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 6, 88-97 (1988)
(suggesting that electricity and telephones modified crime control).f' See Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2416-20,
2447-55 (1997) (distinguishing among three forms of social regulation: legal
sanctions, monetary price, and social norms).
" See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT Lkw: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 943 (1995).
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has suggested a third form of regulation, system architecture, or
code. 1  Rather than relying on social pressure or legal sanctions,
Lessig explains how physical and electronic barriers can prevent
harmful acts. In realspace, installing lights on street corners can
prevent muggings and other forms of street crime, and placing
concrete barricades near inner-city highway ramps can prevent
suburbanites from quickly driving in and out to purchase drugs. In
cyberspace, internet browsers can be configured to prevent repeated
password entry attempts for sensitive web sites or could be coded to
prevent certain forms of encryption.
This Article suggests the presence of two other constraints,
physical harm and monetary cost. The risk of physical harm in
committing a crime is a rather obvious constraint, and one that is
lower with computer crime as compared to realspace crime.
Monetary costs, by contrast, are not generally thought of by criminal
scholars as a deterrent, and this omission is unfortunate. One reason
that computer crime is so dangerous is because it is so cheap to
perpetrate.
The legal system, I contend, should focus more on perpetration
costs. After all, unlike the probabilistic specter of legal sanction, these
costs are certain to be incurred by all who commit a crime. In some
ways, the legal system's current focus on legal sanctions at the expense
of monetary costs is ironic. Criminals tend to be gamblers-willing to
speculate on the chance that they will not be caught-and yet the
conventional wisdom is to set up a parlor from which to conduct the
wager instead of relying on fixed costs that elude speculation and
games of chance. Governments use the threat of jail time to deter
offenses even though they know that the bulk of offenders discount
the threat of long jail sentences because they have many years to live
due to their youth. The lack of high perpetration costs is one factor
that explains the rise in cybercrime. Indeed, the fact that some forms
of crime are cheap to commit weakens the power of social norms; the
ease of, for example, copying a CD leads many to think of it as an
innocent act.
Monetary costs, in short, may deter a different stratum of the
12 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 6.
13 See Fred Musante, Drug Trade Links Bridgeport and Its Suburbs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
1993, § 13, at 1 ("[Tlhe police department hopes to discourage the drug buyers by
placing concrete highway barriers... across dozens of intersections... that would
make it more difficult for outsiders to get in and out so easily."); Richard Weizel, A
Tentative Farewell to the Bridgeport Barriers, N.Y. TIME, July 5, 1998, § 14, at 1.
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population than law enforcement-those with less money. Suppose,
for example, that the majority of hackers are teenagers. Teenagers,
with their lower levels of disposable income, might be particularly
responsive to strategies that increase the monetary costs of crime. If
dangerous software programs such as hackers' tools were more
expensive, or if sensitive web sites charged low admission fees, these
forms of regulation may deter criminal wrongdoing in a way that
conventional law enforcement may not."' This strategy also suggests
that when sites such as Napster begin to charge fees for their use,
those fees might deter more crime than the speculative risk of a legal
sanction. Civil forfeiture of computers and equipment and
postconviction restrictions on computer use may also increase
perpetration costs and thereby prevent recidivism. Criminal law
scholars should incorporate monetary costs into their calculations
about optimal deterrence, just as they should recognize social norms
and architecture. This multifaceted strategy of regulation is
particularly important for those crimes whose offenders tend to be
heterogeneous.
Put a different way, the emergence of computer crime threatens
an implicit calculus that thus far has constrained realspace crime.
Computers make it easier for criminals to evade the constraints of
social norms (through pseudonymity and removal from the physical
site of the crime), legal sanctions (the probability of getting caught
may be reduced for similar reasons), and monetary costs (because the
resource inputs necessary to cause a given unit of harm are much
lower). The standard Beckerian solution to this problem is to
increase the legal sanction, but situating cybercrime within these
other constraints reveals other solutions. These other strategies might
be more effective because it may be difficult to increase the sanction
enough to compensate for a very low probability of getting caught.
Some examples of perpetration cost strategies have been given, so
the point will be illustrated by final examples of architectural
regulation. Government could redress the lowered constraints against
crime by enacting regulations that would prevent pseudonymity by
any of the following: (1) by regulating the Internet Protocol ("IP")
and software manufacturers (increasing the power of social norms as a
constraint on crime, as well as increasing the probability of getting
caught); (2) by insisting upon mechanisms that ensure electronic
I For more about the perverse incentive problem created by such regulation, as
well as a fuller discussion of the role of monetary costs in deterrence, see infra text
accompanying notes 101-07.
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tracing of computer signals to locate offenders (increasing the
probability of getting caught); or (3) by requiring targets to use
software-hardening measures to prevent hackers from interfering with
web sites (increasing the perpetration cost of committing these
computer crimes). Reasonable people can disagree about the wisdom
of each of these solutions; my point is only that because the
emergence of computers can reduce all five constraints to crime, our
legal solution cannot be blind to these other constraints and focus
willy-nilly on the legal sanction.
It is possible, indeed likely, that our blindness to these other
constraints is related to the phenomenon discussed earlier, the subtle
existence of second and third parties in crime control. After all, it is
difficult for the government to increase the monetary cost of crime
directly, and it is likewise difficult for government to modify
architecture. It can do so at times by fiat, but government shies away
from doing so because it is not situated to know which devices are
optimal in preventing crime at the cheapest cost. Mistakes made by
the government, by mandating the wrong device or strategy, can
impose huge deadweight losses. This Article is designed to show how
government, by modifying prosecution incentives and altering civil
liability and payment rules, can promote cost deterrence and
architectural solutions by harnessing second and third parties. These
parties enable government to do indirectly what it often has trouble
doing directly-change the perpetration cost of crime and modify
architecture in ways that prevent criminal acts.
At this stage, an important caveat is in order: this Article is a
general treatment of an immensely complicated subject matter. A
single article cannot attempt to answer all of the difficult questions
about cybercrime strategy. Sometimes it will only pose questions, and
other times it will only suggest possible frameworks for approaching
problems. This means that some subjects will be considered more
comprehensively than others, but selectivity is inevitable given the
newness of the field.
One practical consequence of this focus is that this Article must
make the simplifying assumption that a central purpose of the
criminal law is to deter crime. The Article places deontological
concepts to one side and concentrates on ways to make law operate
more efficiently in preventing crime. Under other theories of
punishment, different conclusions may follow. The purpose of this
initial Article is to focus on ways to deter cybercrime with reference to
the legal and nonlegal constraints on crime: harnessing first-party
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strategies (preventing offenders from committing acts by raising
perpetration costs and legal risks), second-party strategies
(encouraging victims to protect against attacks, thereby making it
more expensive for criminals to commit crimes and easier for them to
get caught), and third-party strategies (relying on ISPs and other
entities to monitor risky activity and forestall attacks through
architectural solutions). My future work will examine the threats
posed by law enforcement on the net. 5
This Article begins by analyzing the various types of crime that can
occur online. Virtually every aspect of human interaction-from bank
accounts to personal privacy, from the safety of women to the security
of our nation's military-is at risk. The Article then explores optimal
ways of preventing cybercrime. Moving beyond the conventional
strategy of increasing sanctions, the Article explores other constraints
on crime. Deterrence may be enhanced by manipulating these other
constraints because individuals may lack information about sanctions
or probabilities of detection or because they may not be responsive to
expected sanctions. At stake here is a theory of deterrence that is
focused not only on a criminal's attitudes and knowledge about the
law. Instead, law can harness other constraints like monetary price to
deter even those who ignore law.
I. WHAT IS CYBERCRIME?
The term "cybercrime" refers to the use of a computer to facilitate
or carry out a criminal offense. This can occur in three different ways.
First, a computer can be electronically attacked. We may further
subdivide this category by distinguishing among acts that involve (1)
unauthorized access to computer files and programs, (2) unauthorized
disruption of those files and programs, and (3) theft of an electronic
identity. An example of the first category is a break-in to Defense
Department Computers. An example of the second category is the
ILoveYou Worm. The third category, identity theft, occurs when a
person's or entity's identity is wrongfully appropriated. A web page
may be "page-jacked," for example, so that when you click onto a
financial service to read investment news, you receive spurious
information instead.16
The above crimes involve situations in which a computer is the
F, See Neal Kumar Katyal, Law Enforcement on the Net (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
P, See infra note 68 (discussing the page-jacking of the Bloomberg News Service).
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subject of an attack. A rather different type of computer crime occurs
when a computer is used to facilitate or carry out a traditional
offense. 17 For example, a computer might be used to distribute child
pornography over the internet or it might be used to create a massive
number of copies of a popular and copyrighted song. Complicated
insurance fraud, large check-kiting operations, and other
sophisticated forms of white collar crime rely on computers to run the
criminal operation. 8 In these cases, computers make it easier to carry
out a crime in realspace. In these circumstances, computers are tools
that expedite traditional offenses.' 9
As news reports suggest, cybercrime is becoming an increasingly
common form of criminal activity. The numbers are staggering. The
number of recorded computer security incidents grew from 6 in 1988
to more than 8000 in 1999.20 Theft on the internet caused $2 billion
in losses in the year 1995, a number that is much higher today.2' One
17Scott Charney & Kent Alexander, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 934
(1996).
18DONN B. PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME 98-100 (1983). Because of the
broad nature of crimes in cyberspace and the ease of committing them, there is no one
"type" of cybercriminal. Their profiles span the gamut of society. See Mark D. Rasch,
Criminal Law and the Internet, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 141, 142 (Joseph F. Rub, Jr. ed., 1996) ("[C]omputer
criminals are not of a discrete type. They range from the computer world equivalent
of a juvenile delinquent, the hacker or cyberpunk, to the sophisticated white-collar
embezzler attacking financial institution computers, and include cyberterrorists,
extortionists, spies, petty thieves and joyriders.").
19 Of course, sometimes an act will overlap categories. A boy who breaks into a
record label's stored computer recordings to listen to an unreleased song by his
favorite band, and who then decides to use Napster to distribute the song to his
friends, both commits unauthorized access and carries out a traditional offense. The
only important definitional principle at stake is to avoid unnecessarily forcing
expansion of the last category, traditional offenses. In today's society, virtually
everything has some nexus to a computer. Using WordPerfect to type a threat to the
President is rather different than using a computer program to place thousands of
copies of copyrighted material on the internet. Rasch, supra note 18, at 14244. In the
latter, the computer is achieving something that would be quite difficult to do without
computers-namely, rampant distribution of the illegal material. It is this use of
hardware and software that this Article addresses.
20 Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the HouseJudiciary Comm. and the CriminalJustice Oversight Subcomm. of
the S. Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), 2000 WL
232395 [hereinafter Cyberattack, Leahy].
21 MarkJ. Biros & Thomas F. Urban, II, New Computer Crime Statutes Close Loopholes,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at C3. A Computer Security Institute survey reports that
62% of companies have experienced computer break-ins, 51% reported financial
losses due to computer security problems, and 27% reported financial fraud.
Cybercrime: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
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company has found 100,000 instances of illegal activity on web sites in
one and a half yearsY22 New viruses are being launched at the rate of
ten to fifteen per day and over 2400 currently exist.23 Last year, there
were more than 22,000 confirmed attacks against Department of
Defense computers."1 It is no surprise that the FBI's caseload has
skyrocketed as a result of these trends.5
Yet many believe that cybercrime is still in its infancy, and that
criminals have not yet reached their potential.2 6 It could be said, akin
to early 1990s high technology companies, that criminals still lack an
adequate "business model" to achieve profit. This is likely to change.
As more targets in realspace are hardened against criminal acts, more
Mated Agencies of the S. Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. 74 (2000) [hereinafter
Cybercrime Hearing] (statement of Mark Rasch, Vice President, Global Integrity
Corporation). Theft of information and intellectual property has increased 15% from
1998 to the beginning of 2000. Id. Unauthorized access by an insider has increased
28% during that time and s)stem penetration by external parties has increased 32%.
Id.; see, also Burleson v. State, 802 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the
conviction of an employee for using a logic bomb to erase payroll data after he was
fired); Cybercrime Hearing, supra, at 17 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation) (stating that a 1999 Computer Security Institute/FBI survey
found that 55% of respondents reported malicious computer activity by corporate
insiders-disgruntled employees, computer technicians, and the like); Quentin Hardy,
Finns Are Hurt ly Break-Ins at Computers, WALL ST.J., Nov. 21, 1996, at B4 (reporting that
of 205 large American companies, half had their computers penetrated in the past year
and 84% of these companies assessed their damage at more than $50,000 per
incident).
k. Bobbi Nodell, Online Thieves Collide with the Law: A Look at How Copyright Theft Is
Being Handled in the Courts (July 23, 1998), at http://wv.msnbc.com/news/
178744.asp.
. Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before thej. Econ. Comm., 106th Cong.
(2000) (statement of Vinton Cerf, Senior Vice President, MCI Worldcom), 2000 WL
11068387 [hereinafter Cyberthreats, Cerf]. More than four million computer hosts were
affected by computer security incidents involving viruses in 1999 alone. Cyberattack,
Leahy, supra note 20.
.' Mathew Schwartz, For Hire: Hackers to Help Pentagon Prevent Attacks,
(Aug. 1, 2000), at http://v.cnn.com/2000/TECH/computing/08/01/
pentagon.at.defcon.idg/index.html.
Y'-, See Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the HouseJudiciay Comm. and the Criminal Justice Oversight Subcomm. of
the S.Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Michael A. Vatis, Director, FBI
National Infrastructure Protection Center), 2000 WL 234743 [hereinafter Cyberattack,
Vatis] (describing an "exponential[]" increase in caseload and stating that cases have
increased from 206 in 1997 to over 900 today); Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 23
(statement of LouisJ. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (same).
See Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before thej. Econ. Comm., 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Dr. Mark Graff, Sun Microsystems), 2000 WL 11068388
[hereinafter Cyberthreats, Graff] (pointing to the present lack of "sufficient economic or
martial incentive" as the reason for so few "substantial attacks against" the internet).
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geographic substitution from realspace to cyberspace will occur."' As
early as ten years ago, reports began to describe computer crime as
the "weapon of choice" among white-collar criminals."
Nevertheless, law enforcement has not responded adequately to
the threat. As one industry analyst put it, "law enforcement online
ranges from haphazard to nearly nonexistent."L 2 Erasure programs
destroy electronic footprints, making tracking very difficult and
facilitating a cybercriminal's escape 0 Although enforcement is weak,
federal law against cybercrime has been expanded. The current
federal computer crimes statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, prohibits certain
forms of unauthorized access (and prohibits exceeding authorized
access) to any "protected computer."3  "Protected computers," in
turn, include virtually every computer connected to the internet, for
the law protects any computer used across state lines. 2 Section 1030
prohibits access to a computer when access is used to obtain national
security information or financial records, intercept interstate
communications, manipulate government computers, defraud and
obtain anything worth $5000 or more, traffic in passwords, or extort
by threatening to damage a protected computer.33 The statute carries
27 See Katyal, supra note 10, at 2421 (describing geographic substitution as a
phenomenon occurring when crime moves away from a high-enforcement area to a
low-enforcement one).
28 Ray Quintanilla, Computer Crimes Newest Nemesis for Regulators, Police Departments
INVESTOR'S DAILY, Mar. 9, 1990, at 25.
29 Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 63 (statement ofJeff B. Richards, Executive
Director, Internet Alliance); see also Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't Care About
Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 477-78 (1997); Paul Korzseniowski,
Computers Made Plain-More Hackers, Viruses Have the FBI Leading Attack for Security
Funding, INVESTOR'S BUS. DAILY, July 21, 2000, at A4 (quoting an industry analyst as
stating that "'Iclomputer technology has been evolving so rapidly that government
enforcement agencies have not had the resources needed to keep pace"'). According
to one leading DOJ Computer Crime prosecutor, "[t]he chances of detection and
prosecution of computer hackers is very small." Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 80
(statement of Mark Rasch, Vice President, Global Integrity Corporation).
30 See Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 73 (statement of Mark Rasch, Vice
President, Global Integrity Corporation) (stating that computer hackers are becoming
increasingly sophisticated and creative, and therefore more difficult to detect and
prosecute); see also infra text accompanying note 183 (discussing the additional
difficulties of tracing electronic footprints when criminals use pseudonymous e-mail
addresses or weave their footprints through a series of computers).
31 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. IV 1998).
32 Id. § 1030(e) (2) (B).
3 Id. § 1030(a)(1)-(7). In 1994, Congress modified § 1030 to state that the
requisite mens rea was "intentional, knowing, and reckless," but that amendment was
further modified in 1996 to impose strict liability. See S. REP. No. 104-357, at 10-11
(revealing that Congress wanted to punish hackers who do not intentionally cause
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a mandatory-minimum sentence of six months. 4
The federal computer crimes statute is only the beginning of
government regulation. Criminal law scholars have not noticed that
when Vermont enacted a statute proscribing computer crime in 1999,
it became the fiftieth state to devote specific legislation to computer
crimes. The two activities that most states criminalize are (1)
unauthorized access to a computer with intent to do some further bad
act and (2) damage to computer-related property (including
intangible property). ' Put briefly, "unauthorized access with intent"
damage to computers but nevertheless commit "computer trespass"); see also United
States v. Sablan, 92 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the computer fraud
statute does not require proof that the defendant had an intention to damage
computer files); Haeji Hong, Note, Hacking Through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
31 U.C. DAVis L. RE,. 283, 284 (1997) (documenting changes made to the mens rea
requirement in § 1030).
A Perversely, § 1030's mandatory-minimum sentence has created an inverse
sentencing effect whereby prosecutors do not prosecute computer crime cases because
of the draconian minimum sentence. See Letter from Charles E. Schumer, United
States Senator, to Colleagues (Feb. 16, 2000) ("As a result [of the minimum sentence],
some prosecutors have declined to bring cases, knowing that the result would be
mandatory imprisonment."), available at http://wvw.cdt.org/policy/terrorism/
000216schumer.shtml.States use different and sometimes conflicting terminology in classifying
computer crimes. I am attempting to generalize the types of acts proscribed by these
statutes rather than simply adopting the names of the crimes (especially because the
same name is occasionally used by different states to capture different acts). The
statutes analyzed are ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-100 to -103 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.46.200(a)(3), 11.46.484(a)(5), 11.46.740, 11.46.985 (Lexis 2000); ARIZ. REV.
S AT. ANN. §§ 13-2301(E), 13-2316 (West 1989 & Supp. 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-
41-101 to -108 (Michie 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 502, 502.01, 1203.047 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-5.5-101 to -102 (1986 & Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-250 to -261 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§§ 931-939 (1999 & Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 815.01 -.07 (West 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. A' 16-9-90 to -94 (Lexis 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 708-890 to -893 (1993);
IDAI-O CODE §§ 18-2201 to -2202, 26-1220 (Michie 1997); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN.
5/16D-1 to -7 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-1-4, 35-43-2-3 (West
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 716A.1-.16 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-3755 (1995 & Supp. 2000); KYK REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 434.840-.860 (Michie 1999);
Lx. REx. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:73.1-.5 (West 1997 & Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, §§ 431-433 (West Supp. 2000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 146 (1996 & Supp.
2000); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, §§ 30, 33A, 120F (Law. Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 2000);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 752.791-.797 (West 1991 & Supp. 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.87-.891 (West 1987 & Supp. 2001); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-45-1 to -13 (1999);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.093-.099 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-6-310 to -311
(1999); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-1343 to -1348 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 205.473-
.513 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 638:16 to :34 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.38A-1 to -6, 2C:20-23 to -34 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 30-45-1 to -7 (Michie 2000); N.Y PENAL LAW §§ 156.00-.50 (McKinney 1999);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-453 to -458 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-08 (1997);
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criminalizes using a computer outside the scope of one's authority
when one has malevolent intent. One need not actually accomplish
what was intended, although success in the criminal enterprise would
usually affect the penalty imposed. 6 Also, depending on the state, the
person need not actually do anything after he has exceeded lawful
access.37 As long as the malevolent intent exists, a person commits this
crime the moment he exceeds his lawful access.$ "Damage to
computer-related property" is more straightforward. The crime has
been committed when a person damages a computer, computer
systems, computer data, computer programs, or other computer-
related property.
The patchwork of state laws reveals other patterns in criminalizing
certain computer-related activities. Many states designate the theft,
interruption, or denial of computer services as an independent
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2913.04(D) (Anderson 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§
1951-1958 (West Supp. 2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 164.125, 164.377 (1990 & Supp.
1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933 (West Supp. 2000); RI. GEN. LAws §§ 11-52-1
to -8 (1997 & Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-16-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. 1985 &
Supp. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 43-43B-1 to -8 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-14-601 to -603 (1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 33.01-.04 (Vernon & Supp.
2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-701 to -705 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4101-
4107 (Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-152.2 to .14 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2000);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.52.110-.130 (West 2000); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 61-3C-1
to -21 (Lexis 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 943.70 (West 1996); WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-3-501
to-505 (Lexis 1999).
36 For example, Alabama technically criminalizes only unauthorized access, but
the punishment for the crime (normally a Class A misdemeanor) is increased to a
Class C felony if the offense was committed, among other things, "for the purpose of
devising or executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain any property."
ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-102(d) (1)-(2) (1994).
37 Some states, such as California, specifically punish particular bad uses of data
obtained after an intruder secures access. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c) (1) (West
Supp. 2001) (criminalizing one who "[klnowingly accesses and without permission
alters, damages, deletes, destroys, or otherwise uses any data, computer, computer
system, or computer network in order to either (A) devise or execute any scheme or
artifice to defraud, deceive, or extort, or (B) wrongfully control or obtain money,
property, or data").
Other states also criminalize the unauthorized access of a computer, even if no
malevolent intent exists. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.200(a)(3) (Lexis 2000)
(specifying a reckless disregard standard for theft of computer services); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-3755(d) (2000) ("Computer trespass is intentionally, and without
authorization accessing or attempting to access any computer....").
The list of "bad acts" from which a prosecutor chooses what the cybercriminal
"intended" varies byjurisdiction. However, common "bad acts" include "[d]evising or
executing any scheme or artifice to defraud or extort," ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-
103(a)(1) (Michie 1997), and "wrongfully control[ling] or obtainfing] money,
property, or data," CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(c) (1) (B) (West Supp. 2001).
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crime. Some state statutes explicitly criminalize the introduction of
computer viruses and other bugs.0 Some states criminalize the
disclosure of passwords or other computer security information."' A
few statutes include e-mail crimes, typically punishing either harassing
or unsolicited bulk e-mail. 4' However, the difficulty in finding
cybercriminals, combined with the difficulty of enforcing state laws
across various jurisdictions, makes state prosecution almost
impossible."
Not only are federal and state government measures to prevent
cybercrime generally lacking, private industry has not kept up to the
task of securing its own data either. "Most have no system manager
[and] one person may handle dozens or hundreds of systems. [It is
hjard enough to keep the software current and users happy, let alone
' Connecticut's theft provision is representative: "A person is guilty of the
computer crime of theft of computer services when he accesses or causes to be
accessed or otherwise uses or causes to be used a computer system with the intent to
obtain unauthorized computer services." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-251 (c) (West
Supp. 2000). Delaware provides a good example of an interruption/denial provision:
"A person is guilty of the computer crime of interruption of computer services when
that person, without authorization, intentionally or recklessly disrupts or degrades or
causes the disruption or degradation of computer services or denies or causes the
denial of computer services to an authorized user or a computer system." DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 11, § 934 (1999).4" Maine's provision is a good example; a person is a criminal if he "[ijntentionally
or knowingly introduces or allows the introduction of a computer virus into any
computer resource, having no reasonable ground to believe that the person has the
right to do so." ME. REv%. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 433(1) (C) (West Supp. 2000).
E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3933(a) (3) (West Supp. 2000).
For example, Arkansas sanctions a person when, "[w]ith the purpose to
frighten, intimidate, threaten, abuse, or harass another person, he sends a message to
the person on an electronic mail or other computerized communications system and
in that message threatens to cause physical injury" or property damage or uses any
obscene, lewd, or profane language. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-41-108(a) (1) (Nfichie
1997). The constitutionality of at least a portion of this provision is certainly
questionable. The other tactic used by states is to criminalize the sending of
unsolicited bulk e-mail when the sender has forged his identity. For instance, Illinois
sanctions a person who "[f]alsifies or forges electronic mail transmission information
or other routing information in any manner in connection with the transmission of
unsolicited bulk electronic mail through or into the computer network of an
electronic mail provider or its subscribers." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16D-3(5)
(West 2000).Ji Se, DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 34 (noting serious barriers to state
prosecution, including lack of resources, long-arm jurisdiction, electronic surveillance,
and subpoena power); Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 30 (statement of Louis J.
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (explaining that state investigators
often lack the training necessary in cybercrime cases).
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watch for intruders breaking in or grabbing passwords."' While the
average computer has become more secure, the sheer explosion in
the number of computers-and society's reliance on them-has
meant that our overall security has dropped precipitously. In part,
this is because many crimes go undetected and unreported. 5
Due to the ever-increasing amounts ofjargon, a brief description
of some of the major forms of cybercrime may help facilitate the
theoretical discussion. My aim, again, is not to set out iron-clad
categories as much as it is to describe some of these crimes before
46
moving to the heart of the paper.
44 CLIFFORD STOLL, SILICON SNAKE OIL 107 (1995).
45 One government study deliberately attacked 38,000 government computers and
successfully penetrated 65% of them. Systems administrators detected only 4% of
those penetrations. Of the 4%, only 27% of them were reported. In other words,
there were only 267 reports by administrators arising from the successful penetration
of the 24,700 machines-about 1 report per 100 violations. Charney & Alexander,
supra note 17, at 936; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION SECURITY:
COMPUTER ATrAcKs AT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POSE INCREASING RISKS 2-3 (1996)
(summarizing defense risks from outside attacks). As the Former Director of the FBI
Computer Crime Squad put it, "You bring me a select group of 10 hackers and within
90 days, I'll bring this country to its knees." Chris O'Malley, Information Waniors of the
609th, POPULAR SCI.,July 1997, at 71, 72.
Another reason computer attacks are so easy is that computer operating systems
and other major software packages are still riddled with security flaws. Computer
crime can be prevented either with better government prosecution or with better
private software protection. Code can prevent cybercrime by closing weak areas and
bugs that hackers exploit to gain access to data. Yet this has not happened. As one
major industry representative puts it, "Looking under the hood of all the major
operating systems in use today, we find the same kinds of security flaws, coding errors,
and faulty assumptions programmers like myself were turning out in the Seventies and
Eighties." Cyberthreats, Graff, supra note 26.46 This Article does not directly focus on analogues to realspace crime that create
a harm solely or predominantly in cyberspace. For example, it will not directly deal
with the perplexing matter of whether one's computer identity can be harmed. The
most common example here is "virtual rape" of a person on the internet. See LESSIG,
supra note 4, at 75; Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace or How an Evil Clown, a Haitian
Trickster Spirit, Two Wizards, and a Cast of Dozens Turned a Database into a Society, 1994
ANN. StnRv. AM. L. 471 (providing a detailed account of the "virtual rape" that
occurred in Lambda Moo, a chat room). Such acts, while in no way similar to their
realspace counterparts, can have serious consequences in realspace. For example, they
may destroy internet communities, and these communities may be essential places for
learning, sharing, and the like. Virtual rape, and other such acts, can impose
psychological harm. Dibbell, supra, at 475-76. These electronic acts may also have
complementarity with their realspace counterparts, and the law accordingly might
intervene. See infra text accompanying notes 87-95.
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A. Unauthorized Access to Computer Programs and Files
Unauthorized access occurs whenever an actor achieves entry into
a target's files or programs without permission. The actor may be a
person or another computer, and the access may be achieved
electronically (through passwords and other mechanisms) or
physically (by, for example, breaking into a file cabinet and stealing a
personal identification number ("PIN")). Electronic access is by far
the more common threat, and it is perpetrated by those who steal
passwords, use computers to generate random passwords until entry is
accomplished, or use "trap doors" to enter a secure area. A trap
door is a fast way into a computer program that allows program
developers to bypass security protocols built into the program.
Programmers and software manufacturers place trap doors in
programs so that they can quickly modify the underlying code. But
these doors also permit anyone with a modest level of computer
sophistication to break into a computer and run it in any way he or
she sees fit. For example, a ubiquitous computer platform in the late
1980s-UNIX-contained a trap door that allowed anyone to break
into mainframe computer systems and run them from a remote
location. East German agents penetrated the University of California
at Berkeley's computers in one such attack.s The crime of
unauthorized access is one of simply imading another's workspace.
Causing harm to the files or programs or using the data improperly
are treated as separate crimes.
There are several different targets for unauthorized access;
broadly speaking, they may be categorized as the government,
individuals, or commercial entities. The government has vast
information on its computers, ranging from nuclear secrets to defense
planning contingencies and from human intelligence to law
enforcement information about criminal organizations. The specter
of a curious computer geek who gains access to sensitive computers-
popularized in the 1983 film "War Games"-is not fanciful, as such
attacks have occurred successfully on numerous occasions.
17 Passwords are commonly stolen through the use of "sniffer" programs. These
programs monitor a user's keystrokes, and transmit the information back to the host
computer that initiated the sniffer program. The electronic thief then has a full
transcript of the passwords necessary to achieve entry into a system. In 1994 as many as
11)0,000 sites were affected by sniffer attacks. DAVID ICOVE ETAL., COMPUTER CRIME: A
CRIMEFIGHTER'S I-lANDBOOK 51 (1995).
.Sret generally CLIFFORD STOLL, THE CUcKOO'S EGG: TRACKING A SPY THROUGH
THE MAZE OF COMPUTER ESPIONAGE (1989).
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Unauthorized access to such material can pose severe security risks.
By contrast, unauthorized access to an individual's personal files
presents a different set of harms. These harms are generally harms to
privacy, as personal files contain private and intimate thoughts. These
thoughts may be as personal as love letters, as banal as grocery lists, or
as tragic as unfinished drafts of law review articles. In any event, the
computer thief gains access to that information without permission.
Commercial access, by contrast, may place at risk a company's
proprietary information and trade secrets. There also may be
individual privacy interests at stake (such as personnel files), but the
interests here will largely be financial ones.
The different types of targets suggest that different motivations
may be at stake for each type of crime: to gain financial benefits
(copyright theft, trade secrets), 9 to benefit a foreign enemy
(espionage),50 to gain personal satisfaction (spying on a boyfriend or
enemy), to thwart law enforcement (by obtaining identities of
informants),5 or to exact revenge (a fired employee who wreaks
computer havoc).52 Additional targets may include hospitals and
49For example, a group dubbed "the phonemasters" broke into MCI and AT&T
computers to steal thousands of calling card numbers and then sold the numbers. The
numbers eventually wound up in the hands of Italian organized crime groups.
Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 17-18 (statement of Louis J. Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigations).
Chinese military thinking considers computer network attacks an important
means for waging warfare. Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before thef Econ.
Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Dr. Daniel T. Kuehl, National Defense
University), http://vww.ndu.edu/irmc/publications/congress2.htn [hereinafter
Cyberthreats, Kuehl). The Journal of Slavic Military Studies reveals that Russia has also
been developing an information warfare capacity. One Russian theorist suggested that
the potential "psychological impact on the United States would be huge if the financial
markets go down" due to cybercrime. Id.51 The Mafia families need computer capabilities for three reasons. First, they
engage in large scale business, whether operating a bank in Los Angeles or
running drugs in Florida. Therefore, like any large business, they need the
computers available to them through their legitimate business holdings.
Second, they need computer technology capabilities to engage in crime
against organizations that use computers. Third, national and state or
regional governments use computers in their organized crime investigation
and prosecution functions. Therefore, crime organizations need a technical
capability to attack those powerful tools, which can be so effective in tracking
them and their activities.
PARKER, supra note 18, at 108-09; seeJoshua C. Ramo, Crime Online: Mobsters Around the
World are Wiringfor the Future. Can the Cops Keep Up?, TIME, Sept. 23, 1996, at 32 (stating
that the Italian Mafia, Chinese gangs, Russian organized crime, and Colombian cartels
are employing computer hackers).
52 ICOVE ET AL., supra note 47, at 118.
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research institutions with important data.
If a criminal uses the fruits of an unauthorized access, the results
may be devastating. Military secrets could be turned over to terrorist
rogue states; people's most private thoughts could be placed on the
internet for all to see; a company's most cherished secrets-the
formula for Coca-Cola and the like-could be given to rival firms; 4
and assets may be shaved off for profit. Although these are four
separate types of activity, each shares the common nucleus of
unauthorized access combined with distribution of the information to
others.
B. Unauthoi'zed Disruption
Unauthorized disruption is the heart of what most people
consider cybercrime. It occurs when an entity, without permission,
interferes with the functionality of computer software or hardware. By
now, the lingo is familiar-viruses, worms, logic bombs, Trojan horses,
and denial-of-service attacks.
1. Viruses
A virus is a program that modifies other computer programs. The
modifications ensure that the infected program replicates the virus.
In other words, the original program (the analogue to a healthy cell)
is changed by the virus so that the virus can multiply. Once infected,
the program secretly requests the computer's operating system to add
a copy of the virus code to the target program.3 Once that computer
is connected to another computer, either through the internet, direct
computer connection, or even through a common floppy disk, the
'1 See Laura DiDio, A Menace to Society, NETWORK WoRLD, Feb. 6, 1989, at 71, 84
(describing how a computer virus attacked a large hospital and destroyed more than
forty percent of its patient records); Christopher Elliott, Experts To Classf, Computer
Viruses, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 10, 1991, at 2 (noting that an Italian
university lost one year of AIDS research data due to a computer virus).
.I Alternatively, the perpetrators of the theft could blackmail the victim for return
of the information. In January 2000, "a group of intruders based in the United
Kingdom broke into the computer systems of at least 12 multinational companies and
stole confidential files. The group issued ransom demands of up to 10 million [British
pounds] in exchange for the return of the files." Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy:
Hearing Before the]. Econ. Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Stephen E. Cross,
Director, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University), 2000 WL
11068413 [hereinafter Cyberthreats, Cross].
. Peter J. Denning, Computer Viruses, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATTAcK 285, 286-87
(PeterJ. Denning ed., 1990).
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virus may spread beyond the original host computer. A virus is not
inherently harmful-its harmfulness will depend on the additional
codes placed into the virus besides the code for self-replication. Some
viruses, however, have caused enormous damage."s
2. Worms
A worm is a stand-alone program that replicates itself. Both
worms and viruses self-replicate. The distinction is that while a virus
requires human action, from downloading a specific file to placing an
infected disk in a computer, a worm uses a computer network to
duplicate itself and does not require human activity for transmission.
The infamous ILoveYou bug shared elements of both viruses and
worms. It resembled a virus because it bred on a host computer's
hard drive, but was a worm because it reproduced without any
additional human input over a network. 57 More than one million
56A recent example is the Melissa virus, which became famous in March 1999.
Melissa infected its first victim when a reader of the pornographic alt.sex newsgroup
caught it. Jim Conley, Germ Warfare, ZiFF DAvIs SMART Bus. FOR NEW ECON., June 1,
2000, at 62, 65. Within days of this initial contact, Melissa infected more than one
hundred Fortune 1000 companies. Id. The virus operated by e-mailing a list of eighty
pornographic web sites to fifty e-mail addresses in the electronic address book of the
infected system. Id. The fifty recipients received e-mails with the subject line
"Important Message From..." and the virus automatically filled in the initial user's
name-so that it appeared that the recipient was receiving a message from his or her
friend, rather than from the Melissa culprit. Rose Simmons, Computer Users Fell Hard for
the Love Bug, ASBURY PARK PRESS, May 12, 2000, at 23. The e-mail systems of the fifty
recipient computers then were infected, and each passed the virus to fifty additional
addresses. Id. When this process was repeated over and over, the number of affected
computers increased dramatically. As a result, the virus caused many millions of
dollars in damage to computers worldwide; in the United States alone, the virus
affected 1.2 million computers in one-fifth of the country's largest businesses. Id.
David Smith pleaded guilty last December to state and federal charges associated with
his creation of the Melissa virus. Id.; see also John Snell, Think You've Seen Computer
Viruses? Hold onto Your Mouse, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Apr. 3, 2000, at 2E ("For
all the trouble Smith now finds himself in, there is no shortage of virus writers waiting
to follow the trail he blazed.").
57The ILoveYou bug was spread primarily through e-mail, but was also transmitted
through internet chat and company intranet systems. Here is how most users were
infected. First, a user would open an e-mail, entitled "ILOVEYOU," and its
attachment, entitled "LOVE-LETTER-FOR-YOU.TXT.vbs." Then the bug installed
itself in the computer's system. Once the machine was restarted, the bug spread by
mailing itself to everyone in the user's e-mail address book, using the popular
Microsoft Outlook Express. The bug then overwrote certain files with extensions such
as .jpg, .jpeg, .mp3, and .mp2, deleting them and leaving infected copies of the files in
the computer. The bug also used the Internet Explorer home page to download a
program that stole passwords and mailed them to e-mail addresses in the Philippines.
Finally, the bug changed the default home page to one of the four Web pages hosted
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computers in North America alone received a copy of the bug, and it
spread nine times faster than the Melissa virus. Most companies,
including AT&T Corp., Ford Motor Co., and Merrill Lynch & Co.,
shut down their e-mail systems to prevent a spread of the attack,
resulting in lost time and productivity. Government agencies were
also affected, including the Pentagon, the CIA, NASA, the Swiss
Government, Danish Parliament, and the British House of Commons.
Investigators traced the ILoveYou bug to several computer students in
the Philippines, but the case was ultimately dropped because the
Philippines had no applicable law against viruses or hacking. 8
3. Logic Bombs and Trojan Horses
A logic bomb tells a computer to execute a set of instructions at a
certain time under certain specified conditions."' Those commands
could be benign (a nice message from the programmer each year on
her birthday) or damaging (telling the hard disk to erase itself on May
Day). A logic bomb can lie undetected in software or hardware, ready
to be detonated when a series of events unfolds. Sometimes the logic
bomb will be used to help facilitate an attack in realspace, such as a
bank robber who shuts down bank security through software at 3:00
p.m. on a given Friday. Other times it may be used to demonstrate
someone's displeasure with a particular act, such as using Microsoft
by skyinet.net, a Philippine Internet Service Provider.
The perpetrators were discovered because one of them, Onel A. de Guzman, had
proposed a thesis to a professor exploring the ability to steal computer passwords. The
proposal was rejected because of its immorality. This helped link Philippine
investigators to de Guzman and another primary suspect, Michael Buen. The duo
posted the password-stealing program on the Web using an internet service provider in
Manila. That service provider, as well as another provider that Guzman and Buen
subsequently hacked into, had caller-identification technology, which allowed
technicians to pinpoint the phone number quickly. Foolish mistakes by the suspects
led investigators to an apartment owned by de Guzman's sister. A search of the
apartment produced little evidence since the original computers and disks had been
removed. See Any Idiot Can Make a irus, STRAITS TIMEs (Singapore), July 12, 2000;
John Schwmz, No Love for Computer Bugs, WASH. POST,July 5, 2000, atAl.
Philippines Drops Charges in "ILoveYou" Virus Case, supra note 2. Another example
of a worm was the "Joke" e-mail sent to about 13,000 people inJune 2000. This e-mail
said it was ajoke and when opened, said, "this is funny" or "funny." When the actual
attachment, titled "Life-Stages-.txt.shs" was opened, the worm spread much like the
ILoveYou bug. Another famous example is the Robert Morris case, in which a Cornell
student launched a worm that ultimately caused major computer havoc. See Ted
Eisenberg et al., The Cornell Commission: On Monis and the Worm, in COMPUTERS UNDER
ATr,CK, supra note 55, at 253, 254.
MICHELLE SLATALLA & JOSHUA QUITrTNER, MASTERS OF DECEPTION 75-76
(1995).
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Explorer, or using America Online to trade tobacco stocks.60 Infecting
software code with a logic bomb is a powerful way to magnify a crime
so that its effects are far greater than they would be were the crime
committed in realspace. The bomb resides in each version of the
software, and millions of copies might be sold, all ready to detonate at
a certain time. With a logic bomb, instead of just assaulting one
computer, an attacker can reach thousands or even millions at once.
A Trojan horse, by contrast, is a computer program that performs
some apparently useful function, but which also contains malicious
hidden code.! The malicious code may introduce a virus or other
computer bug or it may permit unauthorized access by an outside
user. Indeed, a Trojan horse is the most common way in which
62viruses are introduced into computer systems. A horse is generally
placed in a software program, although it may also be placed in
hardware, as was done in Sweden in the early 1980s.
4. Distributed Denial of Service
Distributed Denial of Service ("DDOS") attacks overwhelm web
sites and stop them from communicating with other computers. To
carry out a DDOS attack, an individual obtains unauthorized access to
a computer system and places software code on it that renders that
system a "Master." The individual also breaks into other networks to
place code that turns those systems into agents (known as "zombies"
or "slaves"). Each Master can control multiple agents. In both cases,
the network owners become third-party victims, for they are unaware
that dangerous tools have been placed on their systems. The Masters
are activated either remotely or by internal programming (such as a
command to begin an attack at a prescribed time) and are used to
send information to the agents. After receiving this information, the
agents make repeated requests to connect with the attack's ultimate
target, typically using a fictitious or "spoofed" IP address, so that the
recipient of the request cannot learn its true source. Acting in
unison, the agents generate a high volume of traffic from several
sources. This type of attack is referred to as a SYN flood (SYN is the
60 See, e.g., State v. Corcoran, 522 N.W.2d 226 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (involving a
computer programmer who, to guarantee that he would be paid to write a computer
program, inserted code in the program that erased data when the computer's clock
reached a specified time, and was subsequently prosecuted under the Wisconsin
Com uter Crimes Act).
Denning, supra note 55, at 286.
62 Id. at 288.
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initial effort by the sending computer to make a connection with the
destination computer). Due to the volume of SYN requests, the
destination computer becomes overwhelmed in its efforts to
acknowledge and complete transactions with each sending computer.
As a result, it loses all or most of its ability to serve legitimate
customers-thus the term Distributed Denial of Service. 6'
In February 2000, a fifteen-year-old Canadian youth known as
"MafiaBoy" allegedly used a DDOS attack to shut down popular
internet sites such as Yahoo!, Amazon.com, Buy.com, E*Trade,
CNN.com, and others. The youth used three computers to flood the
target sites, including a computer at the University of California.
MafiaBoy's attack revealed to many consumers the vulnerability of
internet business, thus contributing to a 258.44-point slide in the Dow
Jones Industrial Average and ending a string of record-high closes on
the NASDAQ Composite Index. It is typically very difficult to track
DDOS hackers because the flood of illegitimate requests comes from
remote computers, not the hacker's own computer. Indeed, MaflaBoy
set up "dummy" web sites to make the original source of the requests
even more difficult to trace. FBI agents only learned of MafiaBoy
through his bragging in internet chat rooms about shutting down the
world's leading internet sites; ' had he remained silent, he may never
have been caught.
C. Theft of Identity
Identity theft occurs when one's identity is wrongfully
appropriated by another. Some forms of identity theft via computer
are familiar. Joe may pose as Frank on Buy.com and use Frank's
credit card to purchase a stereo, or Frank may pose as Joe and send
hurtful e-mails to Joe's girlfriend to dissolve Joe's relationship. These
situations are computer versions of familiar crimes (credit card theft
and forged letters); cyberspace simply makes them easier to commit.
Other types of identity theft via computer, such as cross-site
scripting, IP spoofing, and pagejacking, do not have clear realspace
analogues. Cross-site scripting occurs when code is placed into a web
site to force it to send out information against the will of its owners.
See Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25 (commenting that "while attack tools [for
DDOS attacks] have become more sophisticated, they have also become easier to
use").
"I See Kevin Johnson et al., Online Boasting Leaves Trail, USA TODAY, Apr. 20, 2000,
at IA.
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With IP spoofing, a perpetrator, using software, impersonates a
computer trusted by the victim. As a result, the attacker computer-
believed by the victim computer to be a different, friendly computer-
achieves entry into sensitive areas or even control of the victim
computer by operating privileged protocols.r5 Page-jacking occurs
when a link, logo, or other internet address is reprogrammed to bring
a customer not to the intended site, but to some other one. For
example, if I click on the "Buy.corn" logo on the CNN web site, and it
brings me not to Buy.com, but rather to an internet gambling web
site, the page has been jacked.
D. Carrying Out a Traditional Offense
Computers can be used to carry out virtually any offense in
realspace, from furthering organized crime to manipulating stocks.'"'
Here, I will focus on four exemplars of criminal activity in this
category: pornography, copyright piracy, cyberstalking, and the illegal
sale of firearms. Each reveals the advantages, from the criminals'
perspective, of cybercrime-widespread, quick distribution and cost
minimization.
1. Child Pornography
Whereas a piece of child pornography once might have only
reached a few thousand people who bought a magazine, with the
internet it can reach millions very quickly.67 The child pornographer
in realspace is constrained by all kinds of production costs (film,
printing, distribution), but these constraints do not pose the same
difficulty to the pornographer in cyberspace. Ease of distribution is a
standard feature of cybercrime. Even financial crimes, such as stock
market manipulation, take advantage of this feature. For example,
someone holding XYZ stock will announce on message boards the
65 See Cyberthreats, Cross, supra note 54 (describing how "cross-site scripting" can
fool web browsers into running malicious code even on trustworthy sites).
66An increasing number of illegal drug traffickers... are also using the
Internet. With portable computers and online connections, illegal drug
traffickers can transmit text, audio, and video; track shipments; and engage in
financial transactions virtually anywhere in the world. In short,.. . drug
traffickers are turning to innovative technologies to conduct their businesses,
disguise their activities, and avoid law enforcement scrutiny.
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at D-2.
67 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 170; Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and
Economics in Cyberspace, 19 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 553, 556 (1999).
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likelihood of a hostile takeover of XYZ, thousands will read the
message and purchase XYZ, and the person who posted the messages
ill then quickly sell the stock at a high profit.
Child pornography also underscores the international aspect of
cyberspace, which permits transactions to occur when the buyer and
seller are thousands of miles apart. Criminal activity is thus
multijurisdictional, making law enforcement tougher. For example,
in 1997 a major computer child pornography ring operating in
twenty-one countries was uncovered. To bring law enforcement to
bear on the ring required an unprecedented level of cooperation
between the police and investigators in many different countries."-
Child pornographers may seek haven in countries that have no laws
against child pornography or no laws against the extraterritorial
distribution of such material. If so, the U.S. Government will have an
increasingly difficult time trying to gain jurisdiction over such
defendants, who need not even physically set foot on American soil to
distribute materials here.
Through computers, the way in which child pornography is
produced may be altered as well. Obviating the need to find live
children, producers may use their computers to draw such images
from scratch or may digitally alter photographs of clothed children so
that they appear nude. The question whether the law should extend
to depictions that do not involve live children forces us to confront its
very purpose: whether the law exists solely to protect minors, or,
among other things, to prevent related molestation, or because child
pornography is immoral.70
" For example, in April 1999, an e-mail posted on a Yahoo! message board under
the subject line "Buyout News" said that PairGain, a California company, was being
taken over by an Israeli company. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 1. The e-mail also
provided a link to what appeared to be a web site of Bloomberg News Service, which in
turn contained a lengthy story on the purported takeover. As the news spread, the
company's stock increased by more than thirty percent, and the trading volume grew
to nearly seven times its norm. Yet the story was false, and the web site was not actually
Bloomberg's site. W, hen the hoax was uncovered, the stock plummeted. Id.
I'll The operation simultaneously executed search warrants in seventeen countries.
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at C-1 n.3.
" Federal law currently forbids the distribution and possession of child
pornography, and the prohibition specifically includes computers. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-
2260 (1994 & Supp. R 1998). Even if the image is not one of an actual naked child,
but rather a computer-morphed or -manipulated image, it violates federal law. See
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. IV 1998) (defining "child pornography" to include any
visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct "whether made or
produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means," and even if it "has been created,
adapted, or modified"). The U.S. Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to
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The example of child pornography also sheds light on some of the
intermediate parties that exist in cyberspace. In particular, an ISP
may be used to transfer child pornography from one person to
another, particularly when the internet is used to create mass
distribution postings. For this reason, criminal law may usefully enlist
ISPs to aid in enforcement. Indeed, federal law currently requires
ISPs that become aware of an apparent violation of any federal child
exploitation statute to report the violation.7' In addition, law
enforcement is currently permitted to subpoena an ISP to provide
subscriber information to ascertain the identity of a child
pornographer who lurks behind the veneer of anonymity.
The net can also make it easier to be an informant. In realspace,
those with information about potential crimes are often afraid to give
that information to the police. Retaliation may ensue against one's
family, health, or property. Cyberspace can help prevent such
retaliation; not even the police, let alone the criminal, knows who
gave a tip. Moreover, tipping is as easy as writing an e-mail. Partially
for these reasons, the federal web site for child pornography tips,
CyberTipline, has received more than 8000 tips-in two years.'
Moreover, cyberspace partially melts the boundary between public
and private enforcement by enabling citizens to become not simply
informants, but also private enforcement agents. Take the example of
a forty-five-year-old housewife in Pennsylvania who routinely surfs the
net posing as a fourteen-year-old girl to see if she can trap a potential
pedophile. 7 She turns information she gathers over to the police,
who use it to open an investigation and bring a case.74 The mother is
decide whether this law comports with the First Amendment. See Reno v. Free Speech
Coalition, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nor. Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 13032(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1998) ("Whoever, while engaged in
providing an electronic communication service.., obtains knowledge of [a violation
of federal child pornography law] shall, as soon as reasonably possible, make a
report... to a law enforcement agency."); see also Child Abuse Reporting Designations
and Procedures, 28 C.F.R. § 81.1-.5 (2000) (designating agencies authorized to receive
and investigate reports of child abuse).
72 DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at G-5. The internet can also help law enforcement
develop a positive image in realspace. One police officer has created a web site
dedicated to New Orleans's Community Policing Initiative, and the site has been
credited with fostering better interactions between the police and residents. See Leslie
Williams, Officer Takes Community Policing to Cyberspace, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE,
May 2, 1996, at Al. Such a web site may permit better extraction of information from
tips and reports of illegal activity.
73 Maria Glod, Mom Hunts Pedophiles on Internet, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2000, at Al.
74 Id.
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able to pose as a girl due to the invisibility of the internet-with no
training.' In realspace, such posing would present significant
obstacles; someone with the necessary maturity would need to appear
to be younger than she is and would have to be taught physical
defense techniques to prevent retaliation should the suspect uncover
the ruse. By contrast, in cyberspace, everyone can play this role, for
better or worse.7 6 Indeed, CyberAngels-a 4000-member offshoot of
the Guardian Angels-patrols cyberspace for stalkers and child
pornography, and brings its findings to the police. 7 The CyberAngels
operate invisibly and electronically record each move of their
suspects. This raises numerous questions, from whether there is a
proper role for private citizens in law enforcement to whether police
investigations will be hindered when overlapping entities-both
private and public-are performing similar roles. 78
2. Copyright
Cyberspace has transformed intellectual property theft. Imagine,
for reasons best unknown, that it is 1980 and you want to pirate
Journey's "Escape" album. You would have to buy a legitimate copy,
buy expensive recording equipment to copy the album to tape or
audiocassette, and also reproduce the album cover and other
accompanying material. The whole process would be enormously
difficult. Copies of copies degrade quickly and have poor quality, but
without them, you would be stuck replaying "Escape" all the time (at
some cost to your sanity), and only able to copy the album about
7, Invisibility, however, is contingent upon the architecture of the net and other
factors, such as the cost of video and biometric devices.
7, My claim is not that such private action is impossible in realspace, only that it is
easier due to the advantages of cyberspace. Certain laws, such as Megan's Law, also
attempt to turn realspace citizens into deputy police officers by placing them in the
position to monitor convicted sex offenders. SeeAbril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender
Community Notfication Laws, 83 CL. L. REv. 885, 903-06 (1995) (describing the
emerging trend of community notification of sex offender registration whereby
"individuals may police their own communities to prevent sex crimes").
77 Glod, supra note 73 ("Thousands of volunteers worldwide have been rising up to
combat child pornography, stalkers and sexual predators on the Intemet.").
7N To take one example, a federal agent posed as a thirteen-year-old girl in a chat
room and an internet relationship eventually evolved between the agent and a middle-
aged man. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at C-6. They made plans to meet in realspace,
but the man postponed the meeting because he stated he was meeting another
underage girl. Out of concern for the new girl's safety, the agent requested an arrest
warrant for a lesser charge of conspiracy. The next day, the agent discovered that the
"victim" was an undercover officer from another state. Id.
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twenty-five times per day. Once you have your copies, you then would
have to decide how to sell them. Typically, the goods would be sold to
a wholesaler, who would then sell them to a retailer. (You, as the
producer, do not have the time to break away from flipping the album
over and over to sell the copies yourself.) But selling on the street is
highly visible; the police may see your operation and shut it down.
Moreover, the structure of the distribution scheme facilitates law
enforcement infiltration, whereby, for example, the police obtain the
cooperation of the retailer to make a case against the wholesaler, and
then use the cooperation of the wholesaler to make a case against the
79,person doing the copying.
In short, analog degradation, high copying costs, and the risk that
your co-conspirators will be flipped are hallmarks of the offline
distribution scheme. But not in the computer age. Even copies of
copies are now almost perfect. Copying costs are nil; you can simply
download the album once to your computer and post the material
once on the internet. Within minutes, your album could be
distributed across the planet. You would not need to bother with
wholesalers, retailers, and the like; you would be self-made, with no
one to extract extra costs or finger you down the road. Nor can your
customers-none of whom have ever seen you or know any personal
details about you-identify you. And even if law enforcement
infiltrated your site, they would not necessarily know your true
identity.0
This is not the world of fiction. Even before the MP3's popularity,
in 1998 music piracy caused an estimated loss of $300 million."' And
that year, before the advent of widespread distribution technology,
software piracy cost the United States some 109,000 jobs and $991
million in tax revenue.82 Microsoft lost more than $500 million last
year due to software theft. With Napster and the rise of other
innovative distribution systems, these numbers will only get worse."'
79 Id. at I-1.
0 Information, once unleashed on the internet, has the characteristics of a public
good in that it is tremendously nonexcludable and nonrivaIrous. But as America has
recognized since its founding, intellectual property rights must be preserved in order
to provide incentives to create new works.
81 DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-2. These numbers may be inaccurate insofar as
they may (1) undercount or overcount the possibility of undetected piracy, (2) assume
every pirated copy would have been sold, and (3) underestimate fair use.
92 Id.
83 In December 1997, Congress passed the No Electronic Theft ("NET") Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
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I want to take two aspects of copyright theft to foreshadow my
claims in this paper. The first concerns the role of profit in criminal
enterprise. In realspace transactions, the pirated CD is sold for
relatively untraceable cash on the street. In cyberspace, however, no
adequate profit model exists for pirates. The easiest way for a pirate
to get paid is through credit cards. But credit card transactions are
traceable. Law can harness credit card companies in the fight against
cybercrime by changing payment rules. For example, if law gave
cardholders the right to refuse to pay bills derived from illegal
transactions, credit card companies would scrutinize members of their
credit networks. The idea is to alter the profit stream from criminal
activity rather than the expected criminal sanction.
Second, because computer copyright crimes lack a hierarchical
distribution scheme, it is unlikely that law enforcement will find
itnesses to "flip" and use as cooperators who can inform on, or testify
against, the key culprits. In cyberspace, everyone is a potential big
fish, and the smaller fish-who might, in realspace, become
cooperators-have disappeared. As a result, the law should be
rethought. To the extent that Congress imposes high penalties on
United States Code), in an attempt to prevent theft of copyrighted materials. Under
the Act, the unauthorized distribution and reproduction of copyrighted works is a
felony, punishable by up to five years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b) (1) (Supp. IV
1998). Strikingly, the Act punishes distribution regardless of whether the distributor
was tr)ing to profit from it. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2) (Supp IV. 1998); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)
(describing the punishments applicable to a violation of § 506(a) (2)). Thus, even if
the material was placed on one's web site solely for pleasure-as a way of indicating to
friends what you are listening to this month-the law is violated.
The legislation was designed to remedy the purported defect in the criminal
copyright statute highlighted in the dismissal of an indictment in United States v.
LaMacclia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994). In LaMacchia, an MIT student operated
a bulletin board that allowed anyone to send or acquire copyrighted software
programs. The student's actions caused an estimated loss to copyright holders of over
one million dollars during the six-week period the system was in operation. Id. at 536-
37. The student could not be charged with violation of the criminal law protecting
copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 506, because he was not acting for commercial purpose or
private financial gain, an element of the criminal copyright offense. See LaMacchia, 871
F. Supp. at 542-43. Instead, he was charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. at 536; see also id. at 541-42. The
district court dismissed the indictment, finding copyright law to be the exclusive
remedy for protecting intellectual property rights from this kind of theft. Id. at 545.
In an example of prescriptive advicegiving, the district court invited Congress to
remedy this gap in the law. See id. ("One can envision ways that the copyright law
could be modified to permit such prosecution."); see also id. ("In sum, I agree with
Professor Nimmer that... 'absent a clear indication of Congressional intent, the
criminal laws of the United States do not reach copyright-related conduct.'" (quoting 3
NIMMERON COPYRIGHT § 15.05, at 15-20 (1993))).
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minor crimes undertaken by smaller actors to induce these actors to
flip (and not because of the underlying harmfulness of the acts), these
penalties may have to be modified. And to the extent that
prosecutorial tactics are derived from an impetus to flip witnesses,
these tactics may need modification too. Rather, punishment may
need to turn on the harmfulness of the underlying act.
Is there, then, no role at all for informants and cooperators in
cyberspace? On the contrary, the role should persist, but in a
different form. Current federal law generally permits downward
sentencing departures only for those who provide information about
an ongoing criminal case; 4 cybercriminals who have tried to seek a
lower sentence on the basis of cooperation with law enforcement to
prevent future attacks have been spurned.8' But this policy should be
changed, for this type of cyberspace cooperation carries social benefit
that makes it just as, if not more, valuable than traditional realspace
cooperation in which culprits are fingered and inculpated."s Because
cybercrime is so easy to commit, and much of the knowledge needed
to make it more difficult resides in private hands, government must
devise methods to extract such information from criminals. This is an
application of cost deterrence once again. The use of informants to
help design better computer systems and prevent crimes from
occurring is unlike the use of flipped witnesses in realspace. It
portends a proactive, not reactive, model of law enforcement.
3. Cyberstalking
Cyberstalking occurs when someone is threatened or harassed
online. The Justice Department believes that there may be hundreds
84 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1998) (allowing courts to
depart from the sentencing guidelines if "the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense").
85 See Interview withJennifer Granick, Criminal Lawyer (May 2, 2000) (stating that
in the course of defending many cybercriminals, she has requested such a departure
but it has always been refused). The famous phone phreak Captain Crunch, who
broke into most telephone systems in the 1970s, tried to get a lighter sentence by
revealing the extent of his assistance to the government. He claimed that he had
"volunteered to help the government plug leaks in its phone and computer systems."
PARKER, supra note 18, at 176-77. The court, however, refused his request. Id. at 177.86 The government has tried to recruit hackers to help it develop secure
countermeasures, even as recently as August 2000. See Schwartz, supra note 24
(describing the Pentagon's recruitment efforts at the annual Def Con hackers
convention).
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of thousands of cyberstalking incidents each year. 7 Stalking is
nothing new, but cyberstalking has some new features. An
anonymous stalker is harder to catch. Because the perpetrator does
not see the harm his actions inflict, the victim's reaction cannot cause
a change of heart. The lack of an in-person confrontation also makes
intent harder to presume or ascertain.
Current federal law makes it a crime to transmit any
communication in interstate or foreign commerce-including
communication over the internet-containing a threat of personal
injury." And a separate statute makes it a crime to use a
telecommunications device anonymously to annoy, abuse, harass, or
threaten any person. 9 The latter statute, however, applies only to
direct communications between perpetrator and victim and does not
apply to situations in which a perpetrator posts messages encouraging
third parties to harass or annoy a victim. For example, last year a
former security guard pled guilty, under California law, to stalking
and solicitation of sexual assault for using the internet to solicit a
rape. A woman had rejected the guard's romantic overtures, and, in
retaliation he impersonated her in chat rooms, posting her phone
number, address, and fake messages detailing how she fantasized
about being raped. As a result, on at least six occasions, at times late
at night, men knocked on her door saying they wanted to rape her.
How should the law think about this seniconspiracy between
men? There is often an implicit collusion between the publisher of
the message and the viewers of that message, as the example above
suggests. Take another real example, drawn from copyright: Is it a
conspiracy when a student places copyrighted programs on his web
site that may be copied by others?9' On the one hand, there is no real
conspiracy between the publisher and the viewer, as no true meeting
of the minds can be said to exist. It is difficult to know whether the
student intended for further copying to occur. On the other hand,
however, we can be sure he knew such further copying was possible,
for he had done it himself and thus knowingly created an opportunity
N7 See U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., 1999 REPORT ON C.BERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE
FOR L .W ENFORCEMENT AND INDUSTRY (1999), available at http://vww.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm [hereinafter CBERSTALKING REPORT].
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (1994).
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
In one highly publicized case, David LaMacchia was indicted for one count of
conspiring "with persons unknown" to violate the federal wire fraud statute. See supra
note 83.
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for numerous others to commit the same act. If the law seeks to deter
crime by foisting incentives for crime prevention on those in the best
position to undertake it, then one must consider whether liability
should be placed not only on those who post the messages but also on
those who host the messages: ISPs. Current federal law specifically
exempts ISPs from liability for cyberstalking, but perhaps this
provision needs to be rethought.2
The security guard example provides one illustration of
complementarity between cybercrime and crime in realspace.
Another example occurs when cyberstalkers escalate their behavior
into realspace stalking. The DOJ believes that, "as with physical
stalking, online harassment and threats may be a prelude to more
serious behavior, including physical violence."93 Anecdotal evidence
suggests similar complementarity in pedophilia cases as well, where
cybersex has escalated into attempts at actual sex.94
To the extent that the online world shapes tastes that eventually
culminate in realspace behavior, the law and internet institutions may
need to act. Even if there is no causality between cyberstalking and
realspace stalking, the two acts may still be heavily correlated. That is,
those who cyberstalk may also be likely to engage in realspace stalking.
If evidence in cyberspace is easier to gather (for example, the
permanent record left by a posting may be easier for law enforcement
to obtain than the footsteps heard by a victim in the dark one night),
the law might criminalize cyberstalking for two reasons, regardless of
whether cyberstalking is itself harmful. First, cyberstalking
investigations could provide evidence that would constitute probable
cause to search an apartment for evidence of realspace stalking.
92 "The definition of the term 'telecommunications device' in [47 U.S.C. §] 223
excludes 'interactive computer services.' The intent of the exclusion is to insulate the
service provider from liability." CYBERSTALKING REPORT, supra note 87, at n.10.
93 Id. It is possible that cyberstalking might function in some circumstances as a
substitute for stalking in realspace. This function would suggest that cyberstalking
ought to be legalized to prevent realspace stalkings (which are more harmful). I know
of no evidence that supports this point.
94 See Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403, 414 & n.74
(1996) (discussing the harm to children who "have been lured from their homes and
molested based on conversations in chat rooms on the Internet"); Barbara Kantrowitz,
Child Abuse in Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 18, 1994, at 40 (discussing the arrest of men
who used the internet in furtherance of their plans to molest children physically);
VincentJ. Schodolski, Online Anonymity Conducive to Vice, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 1995, at
19 (describing various men who met young children and teenagers online and used
their computers to arrange meetings in realspace that eventually culminated in rape).
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Second, cyberstalking investigations could allow police to alert a
cyberstalker that he or she is under suspicion and should curb his or
her behavior, particularly in realspace.5
4. Illegal Firearms Sales
The sale of illegal guns shares many of the features of cybercrime
we have already discussed: Anonymity facilitates transactions and
frustrates the ability of law enforcement to recruit informants and
cooperators, and invisibility allows evasion of law enforcement
(through, for example, use of a private, password-secured
chatroom)."" Gun sellers in cyberspace cannot conduct a trustworthy
background check even when legally required to do so. Furthermore,
cyberspace, due to its potential to bring people of like minds together,
will facilitate the meeting of illegal buyers and sellers in the first place,
despite the fact that they live in different states or even in different
countries. These facts do not make computerized gun sales
impossible to regulate because law enforcement may monitor
chatrooms and because the purchased guns must still be delivered in
realspace. On balance, however, law enforcement in this area is more
difficult in cyberspace.
Many cyberspace gun sales are detectable to at least one third
party: the web site or ISP involved. Accordingly, there may be room
to require ISPs and web sites that permit such transactions to monitor
them and to ensure their compliance with the law." There may be
private enforcement as well: web sites may refuse to permit gun
transactions (eBay currently maintains such a prohibition) or may
monitor customers through sophisticated realtime word searches.
These private countermeasures raise two questions: (1) How much
private, rather than public, law enforcement is optimal? (2) How
", The two points here, about the use of sweeping criminal laws to maximize
government search power and to create warning effects, are of general applicability
and contradict the standard notion in criminal law that punishment should be
calibrated to the harmfulness of an act.
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at E1-E3.For example, the Internet Gun Trafficking Act of 1999, S. 637, 106th Cong.,
introduced by Senator Schumer in March 1999, would require web site operators who
allow advertisements of firearms sales on their sites to obtain a license and to prohibit
buyers and sellers who access a licensed web site from identifying themselves to each
other (to keep them from evading the licensed operator by directly contacting one
another). It would require the web site to act as an intermediary to process the
transaction and ensure that the buyer and seller do not evade applicable legal
requirements.
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should these two types of enforcement be structured?
The four examples discussed thus far reveal the many similarities
between cybercrime and traditional criminal activity. Some of what
we call cybercrime is simply ordinary crime, and the use of a computer
is merely incidental to the criminal scheme. Nevertheless, these
similarities should not blind us to the significant differences between
cybercrime and crime in realspace.
II. TREATING CYBERcRIME DIFFERENTLY
A. First-Party Strategies
1. Five Constraints on Crime
Criminal law is not a species of law designed only to remedy past
wrongs; it also directs its attention to deterring future wrongdoing."
Legal scholars have recognized three main forms of regulation of
criminal behavior: law enforcement risks, social norms, and
architecture. Social norms strategies emphasize that police are not
always present and that internal morality (conscience) and external
enforcement (shaming) can deter crime. Architectural strategies
change the electronic and physical layout in ways that make crime
more difficult to carry out. Public spaces can be configured to
maximize visibility and ensure detection, and computer software can
be coded to control its use.9 Note that norms and architecture do not
98 See Katyal, supra note 10, at 2421 n.l 18, 2427-29 (citing empirical evidence for
the effectiveness of deterrence); Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence
Enhancements To Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343,
359 (1999) (finding that California's recent sentencing enhancements increased
deterrence and that they "may represent an effective means of reducing crime"); see
also Dennis Director, Law and Order for the Personal Computer, in CoMPUTERS UNDER
ATrACK, supra note 55, at 528, 546 (describing how a former computer fraud artist
'stopped hacking when he concluded that the penalties were too severe"); David
Landis, Sex, Laws & Cyberspace, USA TODAY, Aug. 9, 1994, at ID (stating that the
conviction of Robert and Carleen Thomas for distributing pornography online "hit the
on-line community like a cold shower" and quoting one adult Bulletin Board operator
as stating, "Everybody is scared .... We wish we knew what the rules are. If I knew
what the rules are, I certainly would follow them."). Deterrence may work better in
cyberspace because information costs are lower, making it easier for criminals to learn
about the law and its enforcement.
19 In reaspace physical architecture is also employed to prevent crime, such as
locks on doors and safes, and light to prevent nighttime burglaries. See, e.g., C.J.H.
Woodbury, The Barbarians of the Outside World, ELECTRICAL REv., Apr. 30, 1887, at 2
("[E]xtinguish the electric light while the sun is beneath the nadir, and crime would
riot.").
CRIAHNAL LA WIN CYBERSPA CE
necessarily require an offender to know the risk of getting caught or
the legal sanction involved. Thus, these forms of deterrence can still
work for those with utter disregard for, or ignorance about, the law.
Another constraint that creates deterrence regardless of
knowledge about the law is the physical risk from crime. One cost of
consuming illegal drugs is the health consequences (ranging from
illness due to substance adulteration to addiction). Robbing a bank in
realspace is not simply a matter of dollars and cents; it also risks
physical violence to the perpetrator, the bank officers, and the
public.'"' Reliance on physical risks to control crime raises troubling
moral issues and lacks the advantages of other constraints (such as
certainty of imposition). Nevertheless, the variable must be
understood, if for no other reason than to use it as a predictor of
crime. For example, one can predict that the incidence of computer
crime will rise compared to realspace crime because the former has
lower physical risks due to the invisibility and remoteness of
cyberspace.
In cyberspace, there are ways to adjust strategies that rely on
physical risk to minimize the moral problems. For example, the law
might authorize victims of cybercrime to retaliate against a
perpetrator's software and hardware, and such retaliation might be
confined to imminent self-defense. Alternatively, the law might
enable a broader right (such as permitting victims to install
nonreplicating viruses in perpetrators' systems several days after an
attack).
My claim in this Part is that criminal law scholars should
concentrate not only on legal sanctions and physical risks but also on
ways to increase the expense of committing crimes. This is the notion
behind cost deterrence."' If robbing a house and robbing a store
1- Some forms of deterrence consciously harness these physical risks, such as the
INS's recent strategy to close the flatlands border with Mexico, but leave the dangerous
mountain passes unguarded because the risk of death provides an adequate deterrent.
Susan Ferriss, Fox Seeks New Solution to Old Border Problens, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN, Aug.
20, 2000, at Al.
The aforementioned bank robbery example also forces us to understand what act
we are punishing and why. To the extent that a crime is penalized in a certain way
because of the risk of physical violence, similar acts in cyberspace may merit a lower
penalty. If bank robbery is punished by a minimum of five years because of the theft
and because of the risk of physical violence accompanying the theft, a cybertheft might
receive less than five )ears because only one of these two variables is present. Law must
then weigh the harmfulness of the act apart from its complementary crimes.
1") If the price of burglars' tools increases by $100, monetary costs increase but law
enforcement risks do not. Conversely, if police develop a way to tap and pinpoint cell
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produce equal profit, but the latter requires much more investment
by the criminal (in casing the store, hiring lookouts, etc.), the
expected sentence for the house robbery should be greater. Law
should capitalize on these costs and use them to maximize deterrence.
Price has been neglected by economists; even the writing in the wake
of Becker's famous article equates law enforcement risks with higher
cost, without discussing monetary cost as a deterrent. 1 2 If the law can
raise the cost of criminal activity to a would-be perpetrator, it may
deter some of that wrongdoing in the first place. Unlike the
speculative cost of prosecution, which criminals may wrongly discount
due to poor judgment about risk, criminals are certain to incur these
up-front monetary costs.
Because offenders vary in age, social standing, averseness to risk,
and income, the other constraints outlined above may prove useful.
Legal sanctions may be particularly effective at deterring wrongdoing
when offenders are relatively risk averse. They may also be effective in
deterring those individuals who invest in their reputations-who fear
the social stigma of lawbreaking. 03  There are, however, other
circumstances in which expected sentences should not be raised, such
as when diminishing returns exist or when higher sanctions seem
cruel and disproportionate and therefore immoral or unconstitu-
tional .°
phones, the law enforcement risk is raised while the monetary costs of crime may not
be-at least until an expensive untraceable cell phone is built and monetary costs are
raised. These examples demonstrate, however, that the line between monetary costs
and law enforcement risks is not always clear. Law enforcement risks can give rise to
monetary costs, and vice versa. A criminal may respond to the law enforcement risk of
phone taps by paying the extra monetary costs incurred by using secure phone lines or
the mails, just as a thief may need to borrow money from a third person to cover the
increase in the price of burglar's tools, and this third person may be induced to
cooperate with law enforcement.
02 Standard models of deterrence, such as those of Gary Becker and George
Stigler, focus not on cost deterrence, but on law enforcement risks (specifically, the
probability of being caught and the sanction imposed). Becker, supra note 6, at 169-
95; George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. EcON. 526, 527
(1970).
103 Stigma is only partially related to the length of sentence; there is a large
discontinuity between legal activity and activity that is illegal but which only merits low
amounts of jail time. For this and other reasons, there are diminishing returns to
larger sentences.
Generally speaking, just as with the other forms of constraint, monetary cost is
endogenous to the way in which law treats a given act. If an act is punished, the supply
of those offenders willing to commit the act may drop, and thus increase the cost of
inducing someone to commit it. The threat of legal sanctions may also force criminals
to incur monetary costs to avoid detection (from physical disguises to stealth software
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This is where the other constraints come in. For example,
changing a twenty-year sentence to twenty-five years for a particular
crime may have little effect on the criminal, whereas changing the
actual monetary costs of commission of the crime may significantly
promote deterrence. This is particularly so when law is trying to deter
a population of offenders that are relatively prone towards risk.
Computer crimes, for example, tend to be committed by reckless
youths who worry much less about jail time than about their social
standing and the money in their pocket."5 Increasing legal risks is a
somewhat bizarre way to deal with this problem. Instead, crimes could
be made more expensive by taxing dangerous software, charging small
admissions fees to enter sensitive web sites, and so on. If web sites
adopt fees for service, such as Napster, those fees might prevent more
criminal acts than would an increase in legal penalties because
teenagers are more sensitive to monetary price than legal risks.
Solutions that rely on social norms may also prove effective. Schools
could try to foster good computer practices and explain the harm of
computer crime to students. They can stigmatize offenders by doling
out punishments that produce shame, such as making them clean
bathrooms in orangejumpsuits and the like.
Across the broad field of criminal law, the heterogeneity of
offender populations plays out in other ways besides attitudes towards
risk. Perpetration costs will act as a larger constraint for poorer
offenders. "' When offenders are sensitive to their social standing,
strategies that rely on social norms and law enforcement risks will have
a greater impact.67  When offenders lack legal knowledge or
understanding of social mores, strategies that rely on architecture may
be more effective than those that rely on law. When offenders have
technical expertise that allows them to pierce architectural solutions,
then other constraints such as price and norms may be more effective.
and hardware). Monetary costs are often also endogenous to social norms and
architecture. If society condemns a certain act, the cost of getting someone to commit
it will be greater, and those who commit it will expend funds to avoid detection by
society. Furthermore, if code prevents criminals from carrying out certain forms of
crime, criminals may expend resources to hack the code.
P, See, e.g., Fiona Harvey, Hackers Chip in at Digital Security Event, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
4, 2000, at 5 ("Some kids think they can hack into a network, get caught, not do a jail
term because they're minors, and walk into a six-figure salary as a security expert.").
I.., See Kat)al, supra note 10, at 2416-19 (discussing how the price of a crime, rather
than the crime's attendant jail term, may be a greater deterrent for people with lower
incomes).
14 See id. at 2416 ("People who 'invest' a great deal in their reputations are likely
to forgo utility-producing acts that tarnish their social standing.").
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Many other variables will affect the choice of which strategies to use in
a given instance; these include the technical ability to detect and catch
criminals (high ability favors reliance on legal sanctions, while low
ability favors architecture) and the need for public governmental
judgment in applying the rule (which leads to the use of legal
sanctions and prosecutorial discretion), as opposed to nongovern-
mental private judgment in application (which leads to a focus on
norms).
Accurate assessments of optimal deterrence, therefore, should go
beyond legal sanctions to incorporate concepts of monetary cost,
social norms, physical risks, and architecture. Each strategy has
important distributional consequences and will target a different
population of offenders. As we shall see, however, they often carry
unique costs as well.
2. The Efficiency of Cybercrime
The advent of personal computers poses a significant threat to the
rule of law. That is because: (1) computers are a powerful substitute
for additional people in a criminal enterprise; (2) computers permit
anonymity and secure communications; and (3) cybercriminals are
often invisible, remote, and untraceable. Computers therefore have
the potential to reduce all five constraints on crime. With computers,
crime is cheaper to commit and criminals find it easier to escape
detection and apprehension. 08
a. Conspiracy's Demise
Before computers, a criminal typically needed to work with other
individuals to conduct serious criminal activity. Group crime arose for
obvious reasons, from economies of scale to specialization of the labor
pool. For example, it is nearly impossible for one person to rob a
bank successfully. Several individuals are needed to carry weapons
10s Many suggest that computers also help law enforcement because they allow the
police to coordinate and organize information. In general, the bulk of these
advantages accrue regardless of whether the crime takes place in cyberspace or
realspace. The advantages, therefore, do not affect my claim that cybercrime is
generally a cheaper way for a criminal to act. See Telephone Interview with Cliff Stoll
(May 1, 2000) ("There is no question that online crimes are much easier to commit
than offline ones."). The two advantages computers provide to law enforcement that
are unique to cybercrime are electronic tracing and powerful data searches. Both of
these advantages, however, are currently of dubious value to law enforcement. See infra
Part II.A.2.c.
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and provide firepower (economies of scale); someone needs to plan
the operation (a form of specialization of labor); another must serve
as a lookout (specialization again); and many people are needed to
carry the money. Working together with others, whether in the
criminal or corporate world, creates obvious efficiencies, as Ronald
Coase explains in his pathbreaking article about why firms develop."'
But computers change all this, and undermine the need for
criminal conspiracy. As discussed in Part I, a cyberthief can, by
herself, design a program to steal money from an electronic bank
account or data from the Defense Department, rather than enlist a
team to do so. A fraud artist can, by herself, send thousands of e-mails
to unsuspecting recipients to create a Ponzi scheme. A child
pornographer can create, store, and distribute images, and receive
royalties or access fees without assistance. In these situations, a
computer enables a single individual to launch a crime: No individual
in realspace could break and enter a physical premise, and remove
and steal the classified material without detection, perpetrate all the
aspects of a Ponzi scheme, or run a child pornography ring.
Cyberspace, however, is different. The electronic walls that secure
money and data are pierced, not by additional thugs, but, rather, by
additional computer power. In addition, cyberspace avoids the
physical constraints of realspace (a burglar can only carry away a
certain amount of loot and be in one place at a time).
Compare a computer to a co-conspirator, and the choice for even
a dim criminal is obvious. A computer can conduct many of the tasks
that co-conspirators used to undertake, from breaking and entering,
to managing assets and inventory, to keeping accounting records.
Additionally, a computer, unlike a co-conspirator, acts selflessly in that
it does not demand a percentage of the rewards from criminal activity,
and it is always loyal, without any bonding costs. A computer will not
betray a criminal's confidences-either to law enforcement or to
other criminals." (Not only are co-conspirators flipped, conspiracies
often yield tangible evidence for law enforcement, including phone
records between co-conspirators, wiretap information, and overheard
,- See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 390 (1937), reprinted in
FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMic APPROACH TO LAw 61 (Avery Wiener Katz ed., 1998).
1" The Supreme Court has recognized that a "genuine privilege... must be
recognized for the identity of persons supplying the government with information
concerning the commission of crimes. Communications of this kind ought to receive
encouragement." McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967) (citing 8 WIGMORE,
EVqDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (emphasis omitted)).
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conversations.) Computers also provide the near-perfect security
afforded by encryption; not only will they not choose to talk, but
computers will not be able to talk even if "interrogated."' Faced with
the choice between a computer that will not betray them and a live
person who might, criminals will pick the computer. These numerous
advantages make computers safer for criminals than additional co-
conspirators. In economic terms, computers are a shift from labor-
intensive to capital-intensive strategies and boast all the benefits of the
latter.
Thus, put most provocatively, old-fashioned conspiracy-costly
and susceptible to detection-is a good thing for law enforcement
because it raises monetary costs and law enforcement risks.
Admittedly, criminals in a conspiracy egg each other on, thereby
encouraging further criminal activity,"2 while computers, by contrast,
do not. Nevertheless, the benefits that computers provide to
individual criminals outweigh the limited magnification that occurs
from group crime. For this reason, criminal law might want to
penalize the use of a computer in crime. If the law treats an
agreement between Jones and Smith to engage in illegal activity as a
crime, why should it not equally treat Jones's use of a computer as a
species of crime? By substituting a computer for co-conspirators, a
culprit in a sense simply chooses to conspire with his computer. This
fact might justify treating a computer as a living entity, just as a
corporation is treated as a living entity in other areas of law, and
suggests that Jones should be punished for engaging in a quasi-
conspiracy with his computer. Federal law already punishes the use of
the mails and wires to facilitate a criminal offense; these technologies
are ones that permit co-conspirators to act in concert and magnify
their power." Computers are an even more powerful mechanism for
engaging in crime and their use also justifies the creation of a separate
i In one respect, computers may be less reliable than co-conspirators. If a
criminal records her activity on the computer, and law enforcement has the ability to
read it (by breaking the encryption regimes), a computer has no free will that would
prevent it from letting the police read and access those records. A human co-
conspirator, by contrast, may refuse to cooperate and may "forget" damaging details.
The growth of powerful encryption that law enforcement cannot crack, however, see
infra Part II.A.2.b, as well as the difficulty involved in finding a criminal loyal enough to
an enterprise to refuse to cooperate in the face of significant jail time, means that
computers on balance are far more helpful than the bulk of additional co-conspirators.
12 See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915); Developments in the
Law--Ciminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924-25 (1959) [hereinafter
Developments].16 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
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crime."'
One might object that a computer is not really like a co-
conspirator because, unlike a person, it can never be induced by a
sentencing departure to turn into a voluntary informant or
cooperator. The objection would stick if conspiracy law were only
intended to aid in extracting information from co-conspirators, but it
is not. Conspiracy law is primarily intended to punish and deter
conspiracies. Ironically, however, if the law sought to gain
information from conspirators, it should encourage conspiracies to
form and then devise mechanisms to harvest information from
members of the group."' Of course, this is not how the law works.
One might also object that the reason conspiracy is penalized is
that co-conspirators are bad men who convince each other to ignore
their consciences. That is why conspiracy is an inchoate crime-the
agreement itself is immoral, on this theory, even before it produces
harm. And there is no immorality in a computer's lending itself to
use in a crime; for it has no free will to refrain-so a computer is
hardly similar to a co-conspirator. The problem with this line of
reasoning is that the law cares not only about the agreement, but also
about its harms, so that a conspiracy to sell a marijuana cigarette
receives a much lower penalty than a conspiracy to blow up a
building-for the level of punishment for conspiracy slides with the
object of the conspiracy.lb This sliding provision suggests that
conspiracy law may be motivated, in part, by the desire to deter the
most harmful conspiracies from forming.
II There are other items, such as guns, that may also reduce the number of
conspirators necessary to commit a crime. Law generally punishes the use of these
items separately through sentencing enhancements and specific exclusions. See infra
text accompanying notes 146-66. Computers, however, will generally have a
multifaceted relationship with a criminal that more closely approximates the
relationship to a co-conspirator than a one-dimensional item like a gun will provide.
Nevertheless, the substitution between guns and conspirators may be an important fact
to consider in setting gun penalties.
W,' In a forthcoming work, I use this idea to suggest that the government can pay
conspirators for information of criminal wrongdoing and that such pay'ments should
be given in a t.ay that prevents law enforcement from knowing the identity of the
person providing the information.
1. The range of punishment for a conspiracy designed to undertake a particular
act (such as to blow up a building) is the same range of punishment that faces an
individual executing the act. For additional support for the view that conspiracy is
grounded in utilitarian theory, see RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANAL'SIS OF LAW 254
(5th ed. 1998) ("The special treatment of conspiracies makes sense because they are
more dangerous than one-man crimes... in being able to commit crimes more
efficiently ... by being able to take advantage of the division of labor.").
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If that is the case, then it makes sense to punish the use of a
computer to carry out a crime as if the computer were a quasi-
conspirator.17  Doing so will deter the greater damage computer
crime can incur per unit of investment in the enterprise. It will also
redress the substitution effects created by the lopsided punishment of
conspiracy in current law. In realspace, a crime accomplished with co-
conspirators receives criminal liability for both the underlying offense
and the conspiracy. The same crime, accomplished in cyberspace,
triggers only liability for the underlying offense. The result is
effectively to subsidize the use of computers in crime. The remedy is
to recognize that, because computers are substitutes for co-
conspirators, computer crime, like conspiracy, should trigger not only
basic liability for the underlying offense, but also conspiracy-like
liability for the use of computers in lieu of co-conspirators.
Treating computers as quasi-conspirators captures one of the
main benefits of conspiracy law: it targets inchoate conduct. The
Model Penal Code and its commentators justify realspace conspiracy
doctrine on the ground that it permits the government to intervene
against persons who are disposed to criminality."8 Because the harm
of computer crime is so great, providing government with a device to
prevent this harm by those truly disposed to commit it may be socially
optimal. The achievement of optimality would depend on whether
government could minimize error costs. Realspace conspiracy
doctrine's insistence on an agreement between real persons arguably
creates two potential safeguards to minimize error costs: (1) co-
conspirators can verify the existence of a conspiracy; and (2) the act of
reaching agreement with another person may be a stronger signal of
criminal intent than is typing some commands at a computer. Of
course, the presence of additional persons might make error costs
higher (those caught may unfairly blame innocents, unlike
117 Intent doctrines derived from realspace, where high transaction costs make it
difficult to persuade additional persons to join a conspiracy, may not apply in the low-
transaction-cost world of using a computer for nefarious ends. In addition, the
likelihood of harm from any single agreement between a computer and its user may be
less than that resulting from any single agreement between two corporeal beings
because the transaction costs are so low in the former setting. This may justify low
punishments for inchoate cybercrime conspiracies.
118 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 cmt. 1, at 387 (1985) (rationalizing conspiracy
law as a means of addressing "preparatory conduct" and "the special danger incident
to group activity"); Ian H. Dennis, The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy, 93 L.Q. 39, 40-44
(1977) (explaining that a rationale for conspiracy is that it allows the law to intervene
"before a contemplated crime had actually been committed"); Developments, supra note
112, at 923-25.
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computers) and realspace conspiracies may be easier to stop than
some computer crimes (such as viruses, which often spread far beyond
a writer's wildest dreams). Nevertheless, this militates in favor of
adopting a form of inchoate liability that attaches only once a very
substantial step in furtherance of a computer crime has been taken.""
In sum, the law might develop penalties for using computers to
aid a criminal offense. The case for criminalization proceeds from the
fact that computers and co-conspirators are substitutes for each other.
The solution proposed would not necessarily require treating
computers as full co-conspirators, but it would require eliminating the
law's current conceptualization of a computer as simply a method of
crime, not a type of (or substitute for) a participant in crime.20
b. Pseudonymity and Enoyption
Computers also confer massive efficiencies on the criminal by
hiding the perpetrator's identity and covering data streams. Digital
pseudonymity refers to the ability to cover one's true name while in
cyberspace. For example, my e-mail signature may be
nka9845@aol.com and my IP address may be a series of numbers that
match only an ISP. Without the ISP's cooperation, it is nearly
impossible to figure out who nka9845 is, and even more difficult to
pinpoint nka9845's location in realspace. Even masked or otherwise
disguised criminals in realspace may unwittingly indicate their height,
race, voice, and now their DNA. All of this helps law enforcement in
realspace, which is why police take so much time with witnesses,
II, Current federal law requires proof of only an agreement and an "overt act" to
sustain a conviction for conspiracy. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); United States v.
Lichenstein, 610 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1980). Law could borrow from attempt
liability, however, to impose a "substantial step" requirement before treating a
computer as a quasi-conspirator. As a well-known treatise explains:
[U]nder attempt law it must be shown that the defendant has taken ... a
.substantial step' toward commission of the crime .... Conspiracy law,
however, attacks inchoate crime at a far more incipient stage-the crime of
conspiracy is complete at the time of the agreement or (in some jurisdictions)
at the time of the first overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy by any party
thereto.
W IVNE R- LAFAVE & AusTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(c), at 530 (2d ed.
1986).
In some circumstances, the security of communication offered by computers
may facilitate conspiracy. If, on balance, computers did not increase criminal activity
but simply increased the number of conspirators (a possibility that almost certainly
would never come to pass) then it would convert this negative aspect of computer
crime into a positive one.
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employ sketch artists, and build DNA laboratories. This is not so in
cyberspace.
Cyberspace facilitates the commission of crimes by permitting
users to masquerade as other individuals or as an unknown entity.'!"
This enables, and at times exacerbates, all the crimes discussed in
Part I. Indeed, the February DDOS attacks would not have been
possible without pseudonymity."' Of course, in realspace, pay
telephones, cell phones, and regular mail offer users some degree of
anonymity, but these methods provide mostly point-to-point
communications between sender and recipient.' 3 On the internet,
however, one person can reach millions with a single message.
Encryption is the use of algorithms and other devices to encode
data so that it is unintelligible to users who lack the password or key to
decipher it. While encryption predates computers by thousands of124
years, computers have for the first time put encryption into broad
use. If you have ever written a document on WordPerfect and
"password protected" it, you have used a fairly powerful encryption
program. Encryption, obviously, can be used for much more
nefarious ends than simply coding a law review article. Ramzi Yousef,
who masterminded the World Trade Center bombing, used
encryption to store, on his laptop, detailed plans to destroy United
States airliners. 25  And many other terrorist networks, such as
HAMAS, the Abu Nidal organization, and Osama bin Laden's al
Qa'ida, are using encryption as well.1 26 Encryption has the potential to
threaten effective investigation and prosecution substantially.U
7
Accordingly, law enforcement has been worried about the rise of
1 See Cyber Threats and the U.S. Economy: Hearing Before theJ Econ. Comm., 106th
Cong. (2000) (statement of Dr. Fred Cohen, Principal Member of Technical Staff,
Sandia National Laboratory), 2000 WL 220592 [hereinafter Cyberthreats, Cohen]
("[Although creators of digital anonymizers] claim this is to assure personal privacy,
my experience tells me that it is used primarily to conceal criminal activities... ."); see
also Rasch, supra note 18, at 143.
122 Cyberthreats, Cohen, supra note 121 ("[T]he recent denial of service attacks
could have been defeated if it weren't for the ease of anonymity in the Internet.").
23 Charney & Alexander, supra note 17, at 943.
124 16 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRrrANNICA coyptoiogu, at 870 (1990) (stating that
Spartans used encryption to issue military commands as early as 400 B.C.).
2 Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25.
126 Id.
127 See Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 22 (statement of Louis J. Freeh,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) ("We are finding more and more...
computer media as well as stored data, where encryption has made the information
and the potential evidence all but worthless or unavailable . ").
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these technologies, and has offered, unsuccessfully, various proposals
to deal with it. One proposal, called the "Clipper Chip," would
require computer manufacturers to provide a backdoor entry that
would permit the police to read material stored on a computer.
Another proposal would outlaw encryption methods that law
enforcement cannot decipher.
12
The problem with these approaches is that encryption is often a
good thing. It lets people communicate securely, without fear of
interception by curious agents; secret communication often has social
value (just think of trade secrets, information from police informants,
and romantic messages). Encryption can thus prevent some forms of
cybercrime by preserving the confidentiality of data. It also permits
remote data networks to flourish and increases the level of trust on
the internet by permitting users to verify their identity.Y2 An
individual can use encryption to create a "digital signature" that is
unique to that user, assuring other individuals that a particular data
stream is coming from that user (and not an imposter).'38
This makes encryption, in Larry Lessig's useful phrase, Janus-
faced.13 "Cryptography 'surely is the best of technologies and the
worst of technologies. It will stop crimes and it will create new crimes.
It will undermine dictatorships, and it will drive them to new excesses.
It will make us all anonymous, and it will track our every
transaction."" , - Given this heaven-and-hell combination, it is easy to
understand why the U.S. government has had such a difficult time
trying to develop a workable proposal to address the issue.
Pseudonymity raises the same difficulties. Pseudonymity not only
provides refuge for criminals, it also provides a host of benefits to
legitimate users-benefits recognized by the Supreme Court forty1
years ago.' Political dissidents use pseudonymity to criticize
U" The ill-fated attempts by the Clinton Administration to deal with the
encryption issue are beyond the scope of this Article. Interested readers should
consult A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and
the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995), and Edward J. Radio, U.S. Encryption
Export Regulations Enter thw Twenty-First Century, COMPUTER LAW.,June 2000, at 31.
- See Cyberattack, Leahy, supra note 20 ("Encryption is an important tool in our
arsenal to protect the security of our computer information and networks.").
p, Cybercrine Hearing, supra note 21, at 64 (statement of Jeff B. Richards, Internet
Alliance).
'' LESSIG, supra note 4, at 36.
Id. (quoting STEWART A. BAKER & PAUL R. HuRsT, THE LIMITS OF TRUST:
CR PTOGRAPH; GOVERNMENTS, AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, at xv (1998)).). See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960) ("It is plain that anonymity has
sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes."); see also McIntyre v.
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oppressive regimes; even our Founders used the pseudonym "Publius"
in writing The Federalist. People may want to find out about
embarrassing products or obtain health information without fear that
their identities will be disclosed. Survivors of incest and child abuse
may want to meet electronically without fear that their identities will
become known. As Jerry Kang has suggested, pseudonymity may be
used to allow people to pose as having different genders or racial
identities and contribute to broader racial understanding."' And
these are just a few examples.1
5
The challenge for law is to develop a mechanism that permits the
good uses of encryption and pseudonymity to flourish, while
simultaneously discouraging the bad ones. Even if the brunt of the
current usage of such technologies is negative,"' government should
act with enough foresight to prevent crippling a technology that may
ultimately prove useful. This dual-use problem is a general one in
criminal law. The problem arises when broad categories of action are
neither inherently bad nor inherently good. Tension exists between
the law's desire to prohibit bad acts and its need to encourage positive
applications. In such a circumstance, the law should look not to the
act itself, but rather to the context surrounding that act.
Ordinary criminal law, however, tends to conceive of criminal
regulations as a binary choice: it punishes acts thought to be
inherently bad, such as the taking of human life, and ignores those
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) ("Anonymity is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority. It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights."
(citations omitted)).
: Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1147 (2000).
35 Stung from its encryption defeats, and recognizing the push-and-pull nature of
pseudonymity, the Clinton Administration shied away from any policy proposals
regarding digital pseudonymity. The Justice Department simply acknowledged that
pseudonymity can help criminals commit bad acts, but that there are often needs for
pseudonymity. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 33.
13 See, e.g., Cyberthreats, Cohen, supra note 121 ("[T]he ability to act with relative
anonymity in the internet is primarily being used for criminals to avoid attribution and
to hide their crimes."). Sometimes negative applications of a dual-use act will
undermine its positive applications. For example, pseudonymity can be welcome
because it allows people a forum to express themselves without sanction. Once
pseudonymity is used to target and attack people, however, those benefits of
pseudonymity are destroyed. When I was in law school, and someone pseudonymously
started viciously attacking other students in a bulletin board in cyberspace reserved for
class discussion, the free-ranging discussion that took place on the board-a discussion
enabled in part by pseudonymity--dried up. The account is detailed in LESSIG, supra
note 4, at 78-82. The lesson may be that government and private actors may need to
encroach on a right in cyberspace to allow that particular right to flourish.
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thought to be inherently good, such as sheltering the poor.137 But the
"inherent nature" of an act, on closer examination, often turns out to
be context-dependent. There are situations in which it is appropriate
to take life (for example, in times of war), and times when it is not
appropriate to shelter the poor (for example, if the poor person is a
felon). Criminal law responds to the problem of "inherently bad" acts
that are good in limited contexts by carving out tiny exceptions.'3
These exceptions fall into two categories, call them "licensing" and
"proven excuse." Licensing is an ex ante, government-granted
exception to a general prohibition, for example, the government's
implicit permission for an investigator to carry drugs to bait someone
into making a deal."' Proven excuse, in contrast, is an ex post
exception; it excuses a particular form of conduct only after it takes
place. Self-defense is an example. While murder is illegal, murder
that afterwards is proven to be in self-defense is permissible.
In general, a license works best when a prohibition would be read
too broadly and chill favorable conduct. Licenses are granted as a
result of an application process, which may reveal important
information about the applicant, allow tracking and monitoring of
applicants, provide a suspect list if a crime occurs, and educate the
applicant as to the law and its purpose (and as to crime and its
harms). In addition, a licensing scheme can penalize those who
1'7 There is a further modification which incorporates complementarity. If a given
act is neutral, but is complementary to an act that is bad, it may be appropriate to
punish the given act to avoid incidences of the bad one. This is particularly the case
when it is easier for law to detect and punish the neutral act than the other, bad one.
Supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
There is also a flipside to this complementarity account of bad acts. A given bad
act may have, as a complement, a good one. If so, law may not want to punish the bad
one because complementarity results in greater utility. If it could be shown that the
majority of intruders onto phone company networks cause little harm and actually
wind up becoming productive security consultants for the government and industry,
for example, law may not want to punish simple unauthorized access because the
activity generates net utility.
13' For acts that are inherently good, the law does not generally intervene.
Intervention would be too frequent in such circumstances (James Madison once stated
that "[slome degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing," 4
JONAT-LN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITuTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 571 (William S. Hein & Co. 2d ed. 1996)
(1891)), and it could be a disincentive to commit good acts.
'"' See, eg., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (holding that anti-gravity statute does not prohibit the government from
reducing a defendant's charge in exchange for cooperation: "we simply believe this
particular statute does not exist for the government").
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engage in conduct without a license, creating a separate crime that
can be used as a springboard for investigation, including search and
interrogation, into other problematic acts. 14"
Consider one licensing scheme-gun permits. A permit allows
the government to force disclosure of whether an applicant previously
committed a crime, or has other evidence of instability. 4' If a murder
takes place in a particular neighborhood, the police can examine gun
registry lists in that location to generate a list of potential suspects.
When a gun is bought, the government may require applicants to
attend a gun education program. Finally, when government is unable
to prove that a particular person committed a specific crime, it may
use a gun licensing infraction to search her premises for evidence of
the crime and apply leverage to obtain other valuable information
from her by offering a plea to the licensing infraction, thus learning
about her whereabouts and alibis or, possibly, about accomplices.
Returning to encryption, the government could require a license
before an individual uses cryptography. Such licenses could be
relatively pro forma, like drivers' licenses, but they would require an
individual to certify that these technologies would not be used to
further a violation of the law. A violation could result in the loss of
the license, a fine, or jail time. Such a scheme carries similar
advantages to those regarding guns. First, it would permit the
government to garner information about the applicant. Second,
licensing would create a list of possible suspects who use a particular
encryption algorithm (the mechanism police use to track .22 caliber
gunshots might be adaptable to PGP and other cryptography
programs). Third, licensing would require individuals to take a
140 The licensing regime calls into question Lessig's broad statement that law
regulates "through the threat of ex post sanction, while code, in constructing a social
world, regulates immediately." Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on
Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMM. L. CONSPECFUS 181, 184 (1997).
The internalization of the law's lessons and its effects on public morality suggest that
laws regulate ex ante just as code does. The fact that law can be broken and that an ex
post judgment system is necessary to vindicate infractions does not mean that law is
only an ex post system of constraint. Code, too, can be broken by hackers and its ex
ante effects neutralized. Law has an ex post vindication mechanism that code largely
lacks, but that does not mean law's power is confined to ex post circumstances.
141 While the application forms vary from state to state, they commonly ask
whether an applicant has been convicted of a crime, whether she is a fugitive from
justice, whether she has a mental illness, and whether she has been convicted of a
misdemeanor offense of domestic violence in state or federal court. See, e.g.,
MECKLENBURG COUNTY (N.C.) SHERIFF'S OFFICE, PISTOL/RIFLE/SHOTGUN PERMIT
APPLICATION (2001), available at http://www.co.mecklenburg.nc.us/cosheriff/
application.htm.
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solemn pledge not to engage in criminal activity, thereby reminding
people of the seriousness of a contravening act and creating some self-
deterrence. Finally, it would place under immediate suspicion those
individuals who use the technology without a license. Such suspicion
could eventually culminate in a prosecution, or it could be used as a
way for law enforcement to obtain information about other forms of
criminal activity. While criminals might try to avoid registration, there
may be ways to employ third parties, such as software sellers, to aid in
enforcement (akin to gun and car dealers today).
Licensing encryption, however, imposes serious transaction costs.
As anyone who has registered a car at the Department of Motor
Vehicles knows, it would force individuals to go through the painful
hassle of obtaining government permission. It would not necessarily
require each individual to obtain a license for simple encryption, such
as encrypting a credit card number when buying a T-shirt from
Gap.com."2 But it would force individuals who want to communicate
with each other in cipher to obtain a license. Some of those
individuals, such as political dissenters, may reasonably fear that the
government will use its knowledge that a license has been requested
to target them illegitimately, infringing on their constitutional rights
of speech and free association. Accordingly, there may need to be
acoustic separation between those who maintain the roster of licenses
and detectives who could target licensees. Separation would avoid
punishing those who opt in to the licensing scheme. The drawback is
that the separation would minimize the second advantage of licensing,
government tracking.
An alternative to licensing is to permit anyone to engage in the
conduct except a particular class (or classes) of people. No license
would be necessary; the government would simply specifically exclude
certain individuals from being able to act in a specific way. The
federal law that prohibits former felons and others from carrying
firearms is one example.1 43  Such strategies do not carry the
1Z This is because the web sites themselves could apply for encryption licenses on
behalf of themselves and their customers for such limited purposes. The number of
licenses permitted by the government could be limited, in order to allow it to monitor
adequately the legitimate users of encryption. The government might permit the
licenses to be sold on the open market (so long as the government receives notice of
the new seller's identity), in an attempt to permit the licenses to go to those who value
them the most. Infra text accompanying notes 173-74 (discussing advantages of market
pricing of a good over government price-setting).
Federal law precludes gun possession by felons, fugitives from justice, addicts,
those who have been adjudicated mentally ill or committed to a mental hospital, those
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educational advantages of licensing, nor do they allow the
government to gain information through the application process.
However, if the exclusions are popularly known, they may provide
third parties with a greater ability to warn law enforcement of
infractions. They may also be helpful in circumstances in which
individualistic licensing determinations are, or are thought to be,
riddled with prejudice or where case-by-case determinations impose
large deadweight losses because of their cost.
Licenses and specific exclusions work by targeting particular
people; a different accommodation can be reached by targeting
particular acts. Instead of giving specific individuals or classes of
individuals an exemption from a broad prohibition, the law might
impose various restrictions on the acts themselves. In the remaining
portion of this Part, I outline a few forms of criminal regulation and
suggest that this typology provides a useful way of thinking about some
of the perplexing problems in criminal law today.
Begin by thinking of the most obvious ways government can
address a particular activity: it can either create an outright prohibition
of the act or it can create an outright legalization of the act.
Cryptography can either be banned, or it can be legalized. Now let us
introduce some more complicated forms of regulation. Return to the
problem posed by dual-use technology: an outright prohibition cuts
too wide a swath, so government must devise alternate mechanisms.
What might they be? One strategy would prohibit specific uses by
cataloging the harmful uses and specifically banning them (for
example, cryptography cannot be used to further terrorism or drug
sales). A more general variant of this approach would simply outlaw
any use that furthers a crime. Encryption could be punished, for
example, when used to aid in the commission of any criminal offense.
(This is actually the tactic used by Nevada and Virginia in regulating
encryption.' 44) This approach, however, risks negative substitution
subject to a court order restraining them from being near an intimate partner, and
others. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994).
44 Nevada's statute on the unlawful use of encryption forbids a person from
willfully us[ing] or attempt[ing] to use encryption, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Commit, facilitate, further or promote any criminal offense;
(b) Aid, assist or encourage another person to commit any criminal
offense;
(c) Conceal the commission of any criminal offense;
(d) Conceal or protect the identity of a person who has committed any
criminal offense; or
(e) Delay, hinder or obstruct the administration of the law.
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effects and overinclusiveness. Substitution would occur because if the
use of encryption to further a federal offense was itself penalized-
with a five-year jail term, for example-then fewer criminals might use
encryption to further their offenses, but those that do would likely use
it to help commit the most serious of offenses. The law would be
overinclusive because it is wasteful to impose a five-year jail term for
the use of cryptography in committing a minor offense that itself
merits little or no jail time. This is why mandatory sentences, such as
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)'s mandatory five-year term for carrying or using a
gun to commit a drug offense, are inefficient and create negative
substitution effects.'"1
Instead, the law might attempt to deal with this problem by tying
the sentence to the underlying crime. This is what a standard
sentencing enhancement does. It adjusts a criminal sentence upward by
some percentage if various features are present. In current law, those
features often include the use of a firearm and obstruction ofjustice.
The Sentencing Guidelines state that one's sentence will increase two
levels if a firearm was involved in the commission of certain offenses.14 6
A two-level increase in one's sentence is equivalent to about a thirty
percent increase in the term of imprisonment. (Sentences double for
every six-level increase.)
A similar system of sentencing enhancements could be used to
regulate encryption or pseudonymity. That is, one's sentence for a
particular crime could increase by a specified percentage if encryption
or pseudonymity was used to facilitate the crime. Many courts have
described various enhancements as motivated by a desire to increase
deterrence, and a new paper by Professors Kessler and Levitt provide
NEX,. REv. STAT. A,%,,\. § 205.486 (Michie Supp. 1999). Vrirginia's statute states, "Any
person who willfully uses encryption to further any criminal activity shall be guilty of an
offense which is separate and distinct from the predicate criminal activity and
punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-152.15 (Michie Supp.
200).
I See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994).
I,. The use or presence of a firearm is probably the specific offense characteristic
enhancement most sprinkled throughout the Guidelines. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MNNNUAL (1998). For instance, a nonexhaustive list of the crimes for
which a firearm will enhance the sentence include: aggravated assault, § 2A2.2, minor
assault, § 2A2.3, obstructing or impeding officers, § 2A2.4, kidnapping, abduction, or
unlawful restraint, § 2A4.1, burglary of a residence or a structure other than a
residence, § 2B2.1, trespass, § 2B2.3, robbery, § 2B3.1, extortion by force or threat of
injury or serious damage, § 2B3.2, and offenses involving counterfeit bearer
obligations of the United States, § 2B5.1.
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empirical support for this proposition.' 47 For example, the Sentencing
Guidelines currently enhance a sentence by two levels when the
possession of child pornography "resulted from the defendant's use of
a computer."M'8 As the Ninth Circuit explained, because "it is difficult
to detect and prevent this traffic in cyberspace," the enhancement
provision "provides an extra deterrent to those inclined to pursue
illicit pictures in the anonymity of the computer world."
149
Suppose, however, that this regime was not satisfactory to law
enforcement because the police could never crack encryption
algorithms. Prosecutors would never be able to prove that a criminal
used encryption to further the criminal scheme; they would only have
a meaningless string of data bits and a defendant clinging to the Fifth
Amendment. Then, should this be an endemic feature of a standard
sentencing enhancement, the government might levy an
enhancement on particular people, not particular acts. The government
could increase the sentence for anyone convicted of a criminal
offense who is found to have used encryption. A defense to the
enhancement could be permitted if the defendant can prove that the
encryption did not aid in the commission of the offense, thus
legislatively flipping the burden of proof for the enhancement and
placing it on the defendant 5 ° The prosecution need only prove that
the defendant used encryption technology. Such an approach may be
justified by the difficulties involved in piercing the encryption code.
147 See Kessler & Levitt, supra note 98, at 358-60 (finding, based on an empirical
study, that California's sentencing enhancements produced deterrence); see also
United States v. Strange, 102 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 1996) ("While . . . this
[enhancement] could, in some cases, result in what might appear to be
disproportionate sentences, it is certainly within the province of Congress to resolve
that there is some deterrent value in exposing a drug trafficker to liability for the full
consequences,... of his own unlawful behavior."); United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d
1075, 1080-81 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that deterrence is the "animating policy" behind
enhancements for crimes committed with "sophisticated means"); United States v. Obi,
947 F.2d 1031, 1032 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) ("Congress, for purposes of
deterrence, intended that narcotics violators run the risk of sentencing enhancements
concerning other circumstances surrounding the crime.").
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.4(b) (3) (1998).
149 United States v. Fellow, 157 F.3d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998).
150 Put slightly differently, the law could be written to place a penalty default on
criminals who do not decrypt their transmissions. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE Lj. 87,
97-100 (1989) (discussing the enhancement of social welfare through penalty defaults,
which encourage the production of information). This is a standard mechanism that
the legislature can use in other areas to avoid difficulties created by the self-
incrimination privilege.
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The following chart recapitulates much of what has been stated
above (though a few items remain to be explained):
NAME DESCRIPTION EXAMPLE
1. Outright Penalizes an act, regardless "The use of encryption is forbidden,
Prohibition of particular use and punished by up to five years in
jail."
2. Prohibition Penalizes an act if it is done "The use of encryption to further
of Specific to further underlying any criminal act (defined elsewhere
Uses criminal activity in the code) is forbidden, and
punished by up to five years injail."
3. Sentencing Enhances a sentence for "The prior use of encryption by
Enhancement those convicted of any prior someone convicted of a federal
for Particular offense if that person offense will double a sentence,
Persons committed a particular act unless the defendant proves the
(even though that cryptography did not further any
particular act is not itself a criminal offense."
crime)
4. Standard Enhances a sentence for "The prior use of encryption by
Sentencing those convicted of any someone convicted of a federal
Enhancement offense if the particular act offense ill double a sentence, if the
was used to further that cryptography is used to further that
offense particular offense."
5. Licensing Permits only licensed users "To use encryption, an individual
to engage in the act; must apply for, and receive, a license
criminalizes use by from the government. The unli-
unlicensed individuals censed use of encryption is a felony."
6. Specific Permits anyone to engage "Anyone may use encryption except
Exclusions in an act except those those convicted of a previous
specifically excluded felony."
7. Detraction Provides downward "A defendant may receive a one-level
for Particular departure in any criminal dowmard departure for the use of
Good Act sentence if an individual is encryption, when accompanied by
found to have committed a no harmful use of encryption, in
specified act sentencing for any crime."
8. Detraction Provides downward "A defendant who provides
for departure in a criminal substantial assistance to the
Information sentence if the criminal government in breaking encryption
provides information that algorithms may receive roughly a
helps government prevent 30% reduction in his sentence."
future bad acts or provides
information helpful to
prosecuting a criminal case
1058 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1003
In today's legal debates, academics and policymakers generally
draw comparisons between outright prohibition and a few other, less
extreme variants of regulation. No systematic attention is given to the
role of sentencing enhancements. This is unfortunate, for neither the
government nor academics have realized that sentencing
enhancements can be a powerful way for the criminal code to achieve
a balance between competing aims."" Consideration of civil suits and
other pricing mechanisms will be deferred until the next Part, though
these strategies will promote deterrence as well.
1 2
When deciding among the array of criminal options, government
must determine whether all instances of an act need to be punished.
In making this determination, a key inquiry revolves around whether
or not government and individuals can distinguish between positive or
benign (A) and negative (A,) uses of the given act. If government
can structure a prohibition that only targets A., then it should do so.
An example is sexual intercourse, which is not targeted when it is
consensual, but is prohibited as rape when it is not. But there are two
reasons why this solution will not always be readily available. The first
occurs when informational asymmetries make it difficult for the law to
151 Even the Sentencing Commission, when drafting the Guidelines, gave little
thought to the appropriate use of enhancements. For inside accounts of the process,
see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Wtich
They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 8 (1988), and Ilene H. Nagel, Supreme Court Review:
Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 923 (1990).
152 As applied to offenders, criminal regulations are better at shaping tastes than
are civil ones, and criminal regulations have the added benefits of avoiding problems
with judgment-proof defendants. See Katyal, supra note 10, at 2442-47 (noting that
criminal law focuses less on constraining opportunities and more on minimizing the
desire to commit crimes). Due to the several disincentives to bringing civil suits,
criminal liability is more likely to deter wrongdoing in cyberspace. See Ian C. Ballon,
Pinning the Blame in Cyberspace: Towards a Coherent Theory for Imposing Vicarious Copyright,
Trademark and Tort Liability for Conduct Occurring over the Internet, 18 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 729, 734 (1996) ("Internet tortfeasors and infringers thus are likely to include
a high percentage of students and others who may not have the resources to satisfy
large judgments."); Pamela Samuelson, Can Hackers Be Sued for Damages Caused By
Computer Viruses?, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATrACK, supra note 55, at 479, 484
(acknowledging difficulty with criminal law, but stating that "criminal prosecution is
likely to be a more powerful legal deterrent to a hacker than a civil suit is"). This is
particularly so for pseudonymity and encryption, which are technologies that make it
difficult, if not impossible, for victims to sue those who cause harm. More generally,
the existence ofjudgment-proof defendants may provide an adequate explanation for
the use of criminal sanctions. If poorer defendants are placed in jail for their crimes, a
distributional equity problem arises if relatively wealthier people can pay to avoid jail.
Imprisonment not only answers the judgment-proof defendant problem but also
reduces distributional equity concerns.
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distinguish between positive and negative variants of the act in a given
instance. For example, it may be too difficult to prosecute someone
using cryptography because the messages are too difficult for
investigators to decrypt; prosecutors would not be able to prove a
given message is a harmful A, instead of a benign A, Strategy number
one, outright prohibition, may be the best way to prevent harm
(though the strategy discussed a moment ago, which reverses the
burden of proof, may work here as well).
The second reason concerns informational gaps between the
public and law enforcement. If individuals do not know whether a
given act falls on the positive or negative side of the line, then they
may be deterred from pursuing it. This is a classic problem in the free
speech context, but it applies elsewhere in law as well. In other words,
self-enforcement will convert a prohibition on A. into a general
prohibition on A,, + A,. Such self-enforcement does not require the
government to rule out prohibition. But it does mean that
government must investigate what other options can be combined
with a prohibition on A, to redress government's interference in the
market.' k¢
Again, consider encryption. If its dangers are sufficiently strong,
then the government must decide between prohibiting encryption
outright, and, more narrowly, prohibiting the use of encryption only
when encryption is furthering some criminal act. In making this
decision, the points above raise two questions: (1) Is an outright
prohibition necessary because the government will not be able to
prove that a given use falls on the A. side of the ledger (that is, that it
constitutes a use that furthered a criminal act)? (2) Will a prohibition
on A,, be understood by the public as a prohibition on Aband thereby
153 Some may think a third reason arises from concealment. If a given technology
allows near-perfect concealment of criminals, many would clamor for an outright
prohibition. If the technology is this powerful, however, of what use is an additional
penalty? The government should be indifferent between punishing A. or A, + A,, as
neither would permit the government to get its hands on criminals given the
perfection in the technology. There is one thing, however, that an outright ban does
that the targeted approach of strategy number two does not: It greatly diminishes the
existence of the lawful encryption industry. In so doing, it makes it more difficult for
users to find the technology and much easier for law enforcement to keep pace with
stronger %ariants of the technology. (In the international digital age, however,
individuals in other countries may seek to develop and transfer the technology to
criminals who will in turn use it for attacks in the United States.) To the extent that
the existence of the technology itself shapes tastes towards its use, minimizing its overt
appearance on the net may make law enforcement's job easier as well. The case for an
outright prohibition, therefore, is that it will retard its ubiquity and technical
development %is-a-vis law enforcement's countermeasures.
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chill legitimate use of the technology?
If the government has the expertise and technology to prove that
specific criminals have used encryption to further criminal offenses,
this will militate in favor of using a standard enhancement instead of
an outright ban. We will examine the question of when to use such
enhancements in a moment. Concentrate now on the second
question, for if chilling effects are a serious problem, then
government action to correct the skew may be necessary. The
government may use four forms of corrections. The first, and most
obvious, is to subsidize the legitimate use of encryption. 5 4 A second
way that criminal law may deal with the problem is to heighten the
intent requirement necessary to convict someone for the harmful use
of encryption. The problem with this modification is that it may be
difficult for prosecutors ever to prove that someone specifically
intended to use encryption to further a criminal offense.5'
The third and fourth forms of government action to correct the
skew are more subtle, and arise once the civil/criminal patchwork is
combined. The third alternative is to permit reduction of a criminal's
sentence-for any crime-through a downward departure if the
criminal is found to be using encryption only for legitimate purposes
(strategy number seven).156 The last alternative is for the government
to permit a downward departure if the criminal provides information
that is useful to the government (strategy number eight). If private
individuals provide assistance to law enforcement in breaking
different forms of encryption software, for example, the government
would reward those individuals with a reduction in their criminal
sentences. Such rewards can be given to informants in cash or
through other means, but giving rewards in the form of downward
departures in sentencing sometimes is more effective for a variety of
reasons. 57 In many cyberspace prosecutions, the defendant possesses
I5 For example, the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681-2719, provides that taxes on internet access will not be levied for three years,
but the exemption is only applicable to ISPs that offer customers filtering software to
limit access to material that parents find harmful to minors.
151 No witnesses may exist, and intent may be very difficult to divine from a cold
computer record. This fact led Congress to water down the intent requirement in the
computer crimes statute. See supra note 83.
This strategy, however, has the difficult problem of rewarding serious criminals
more than less serious ones or innocents.
157 Social stigma against defection may be lower, the threat of retaliation may be
reduced since the criminal will likely face jail time anyway, and a defendant may value
a reduction in jail time much more than he values a given amount of money. Cf
Michael Lee et al., Comment, Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for Legitimao,:
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information that can help government detect and prevent further
crimes; criminal law might adapt to this world by creating generalized
downward departures.'4 Such departures are a way to harvest valuable
information from criminal defendants and promote deterrence
through architecture and cost.
Now we return to the complicated question of when to use
sentencing enhancements. As noted above, sentencing enhance-
ments are a useful bridge device when a given act has both positive
and negative consequences. The Sentencing Guidelines, for example,
currently have an enhancement for being a leader1 5 Being a leader,
however, is generally a good thing in society and is thus an example of
the dual-use problem. Being a leader is only a problem when one is
the leader of a criminal enterprise or other nefarious group. Thus the
law does not attempt to prohibit leadership; instead it uses a standard
sentencing enhancement to increase punishments for those leaders
who manage a criminal enterprise. This permits legitimate leadership
to thrive and targets only the type of leadership that poses a criminal
threat.
Contrast the law's treatment of leadership with its outright
prohibition of murder. The dual-use lesson is that whenever law
prohibits an act, it must recognize that the act may have positive
A R'gulatoiy Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 839, 883 (1999) ("Existing literature
indicates that many within the hacking community would be willing to cooperate with
companies and government agencies if monetary rewards and public recognition were
offered for their skills and knowledge." (citation omitted)).
F One cost of such departures is that they encourage people to obtain
information that might one day be put to harmful uses, such as information regarding
the inner workings of a bank's firewalls. Because incentives already exist for people to
obtain this type of information (say, because of the monetary benefits that accrue to
those who can break a bank's firewalls), the law might consider such departures
nonetheless.
1, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a) (1998) (enhancing a
sentence for any criminal who was an "organizer or leader of a criminal activity that
involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive").
Two provisions in the existing Guidelines can be used to enhance sentences for
computer crime. Section 3B1.3 enhances a sentence for use of a "special skill" in
committing or concealing the offense. See United States v. Petersen, 98 F.3d 502, 506-
07 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the computer abilities of a defendant convicted of
computer fraud and other offenses supported the special skill adjustment despite the
defendant's lack of formal training or licensing). In addition, a common specific
offender characteristic is if the offense involved "more than minimal planning." See,
.c.g., § 2F1.1 (2)(A) ("Fraud and Deceit"); United States v. Palinkas, 938 F.2d 456, 462
(4th Cir. 1991) (applying enhancement because defendant was involved not only in
the creation of dummy supplier and buyer corporations but also in the development of
highly complex computer programs to conceal fraud).
20011 1061
1062 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 149:1003
consequences-thus the self-defense exception.'60 The related
substitution/marginal deterrence lesson is that law must recognize
that there are more and less harmful ways of carrying out that same
act. It is no surprise that even with murder, there are greater
penalties for those who kill police officers. 'b Permitting the range of
the enhancement to be determined by the underlying offense is
another way of addressing these problems. Enhancements have the
advantage of being pegged to a particular underlying offense so that
their penalties can slide with the harm created by those offenses.
The case for the sentencing enhancement for cryptography
therefore revolves around three arguments. First, encryption makes it
much easier for criminals to thwart law enforcement. Because the
expected sanction is a function of the probability of getting caught
multiplied by the magnitude of the penalty, a sentencing
enhancement corrects the "discount" offered by this new technology.
Second, a sentencing enhancement, like strategy number two, which
prohibits specific uses, selectively targets specific negative uses of
encryption, thus permitting legitimate uses of encryption to continue.
Third, a sentencing enhancement slides with the underlying offense,
so that the use of encryption to facilitate a bombing is treated much
more severely than the use of encryption to sell a marijuana joint.
There are certain acts whose disutility is a function of the way in which
that act is carried out. The use of 256-bit encryption to further the
sale of a joint imposes less harm to society than the use of 256-bit
encryption to plan a major terrorist operation.
Law must recognize this variance in harm because penalties
should accurately reflect the true disutility imposed by acts and
because substitution effects can arise when the law provides inaccurate
"discounts" to particular forms of criminal activity. If the penalty on
cryptography remains constant whether one uses it to sell one joint or
one thousand, people will use cryptography to sell one thousand.
This is the problem with Virginia's and Nevada's embrace of strategy
number two; by punishing the use of encryption to further criminal
offenses, punishment does not slide with the underlying crime and
thus creates improper substitution effects.'
2
C-0 See supra text accompanying note 139.
61 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNLES MANUAL § 3A1.2 (1998) (providing for three-
level, or near fifty percent increase in the sentence). There are also gradations, such
as first-degree, second-degree, and manslaughter, but on the whole the law treats
murder as an unmitigated evil.
162 See supra note 144.
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The Virginia and Nevada statutes could be modified, however, to
create separate offenses whose penalties slide with the underlying
crimes. In this respect, a strategy that prohibits specific uses can have
some of the benefits of a standard sentencing enhancement.
Enhancements have an advantage, however, that the former lack:
they are easy to understand. The street sign "speeding fines doubled
in construction zone" causes me to slow down far more than a sign
posting a range of dollar fines. Criminals will find it easier to
comprehend the simple command of doubling-for any of the litany
of possible crimes-than they would understand the complex schema
of sentencing ranges and multiple additional offenses. For example,
think of the mental staying power of the "three-strikes-you're-out"
laws."' (This is why there is a case to be made for such enhancements
even if one rejects the wisdom of the Sentencing Guidelines.)
A sentencing enhancement regime is also better suited to rapidly
evolving technology. Technology can quickly alter the probability of
detection, either positively or negatively. Because Congress is
notoriously slow to react to such changes (and often inaccurate when
it does react), the Sentencing Commission may be better suited to
devising and adjusting optimal penalties in a technologically changing
world.'" There are other advantages to enhancements as well: (1)
enhancements may be decided by judges who may have much more
technical familiarity as repeat players than dojuries;'f5 (2) the burden
of proof may be lower; and (3) the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply. These advantages may make it easier to determine reliably
whether a given use of encryption "furthered" an offense.
Sentencing enhancements have drawbacks as well. Perhaps the
most severe occurs when the dual-use activity makes detection by law
enforcement difficult. It is important to recognize that this is not an
argument that favors prohibition over an enhancement. If
'"' Treble damages are easy to understand and remember. It is not surprising that
law harnesses them in several contexts. See, e.g., Herbert J. Hovenkamp & Louis B.
Schwartz, Treble Damages and Antitrust Deterrence: A Dialogue, 18 ANTITRUST L. & ECON.
REX. 67, 68, 77 (1986) (outlining the deterrence theory of the treble damages
provision in antitrust); Michael J. Metzger, Note, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their
Mation to Substantive Law: Ramifications of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 20
VAL. U. L. REv. 575, 577 (1986) (arguing that Congress passed the treble damages
provision in the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 to maximize deterrence).
114 See infra note 198 and accompanying text (indicating that legislators may be
Slow to react to changes in technology that alter the probability of detection).1, But seeApprendi v. NewJersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363 (2000) (requiringjuries to
decide certain sentencing departures).
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cryptography provides criminals with a foolproof way to avoid being
caught, neither an enhancement nor a prohibition will be able to
overcome such an advantage. To the extent cryptography provides so
many benefits to criminals that no penalty can overcome them,
government should develop solutions that emphasize constraints such
as architecture and perpetration cost.
Even if encryption provides such overwhelming advantages to a
criminal, there may be a limited role for legal sanctions. One way to
do so is for law to focus not on bad acts, but on bad persons. This is
strategy number three, which targets bad actors and imposes a
sentencing enhancement on anyone convicted of an offense who
engaged in the dual-use act. If Joe is convicted for drug dealing, for
example, but is found to have used encryption, he would receive a
sentencing enhancement. (This is the inverse of a licensing and
specific exclusion regime.) Government could use the strategy to
target specific bad actors because such actors are more likely to use
the technology for harmful ends.
After all, difficult issues of proof may arise with the use of a
standard sentencing enhancement. It may be tough for the
government to prove that encryption "furthered" a criminal offense.
Indeed, it may be impossible for the government to decrypt any of the
message (and it might be inefficient for the government to spend its
resources trying to decrypt and prove these things). Furthermore,
each time the government seeks such an enhancement, it drains
judicial resources. The costs of individualistic determination may be
sufficiently great that the government may want to target bad actors
instead.'66 The case for strategy number three, therefore, is that
government determination imposes large deadweight losses
166 On the other hand, targeting bad actors risks barring all uses of encryption by
certain individuals. To the extent that this technology is one that the government
wants to encourage, such a strategy can be very harmful. People may fear that a
malicious government prosecutor may target them one day (for perjury, obstruction of
justice, or tax evasion) and that their encrypted love letters and legitimate stock
transactions might serve as the basis for a sentencing enhancement. It is this fear that
animates the standard sentencing enhancement and requires courts to sift through
and decide whether encryption furthered a particular offense. Part of the problem
can be minimized with burden-shifting strategies that do not criminalize all uses of
encryption but place the burden on the defendant to prove that cryptography did not
further the offense. This strategy, however, will nevertheless chill more conduct than
would an enhancement. This imbalance between preventing criminal
communications at the expense of chilling positive conduct may be magnified in
circumstances in which the underlying encrypted communication is relevant to a
prosecution, but the crime is not serious enough to warrant public exposure of the
communication. SeeWilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
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throughout the adjudicatory process and that reversing the
presumption of encryption as beneficial will require defendants to
decrypt their messages. Defendants will be forced to decrypt their
communications if government permits a defense to the
enhancement for those defendants who prove, perhaps privately to a
court-appointed special master, that encryption did not further
criminal activity.
Both standard enhancements and enhancements that otherwise
target bad actors are motivated by the belief that the government
cannot simply target generic acts, like encryption, as illegal. To do so
would harm society because of the dual-use problem. Each type of
enhancement tries to accommodate this concern by targeting bad
people instead of generic acts. The way enhancements define "bad
people" differs, but their underlying similarity is the attempt to
preserve legitimate uses of the technology without forgoing sanctions
on those uses that are harmful to society (through the medium of
targeting particular users). But enhancements do not directly
incorporate cost deterrence principles. They are really ways of raising
law enforcement risks.
How could the legal system promote cost deterrence? In some
areas, cost deterrence is quite easy because the government can try to
drive up the price of the illegal product. This is a common strategy
used with respect to illegal drugs. Because encryption is a dual-use
technology, however, a price increase (either through taxation or
making such software illegal and creating a black market) has negative
repercussions in that it prevents utility-generating applications. A
more sophisticated price strategy may be to tax encryption and then
rebate the tax to those who certify that they did not commit illegal acts
with the technology. 6' In other words, citizens would have to file a
pledge under oath that they did not use encryption before they would
be eligible for the rebate. The act of signing the statement may
generate awareness of the legal risks and may heighten the penalty for
using encryption. The upfront tax may also improve cost deterrence
by reducing the amount of money that can be invested in criminal
activity. This scheme would come closer to targeting bad applications,
but it could deter too much lawful encryption (due to high upfront
10 Section 1441 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, for example, requires tax
to be withheld on nonresident aliens and foreign corporations. I.RIC. § 1441 (1994 &
Supp. R7 1998). The withholding rate may be reduced, however, if the individual or
corporation files a certificate with the Internal Revenue Service stating applicability
and compliance with specific tax treaties. Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-4(b) (2) (2000).
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expenses, complexities of the rebate scheme, etc.).
A different approach to cost might be to use civil forfeiture laws.
If individuals engage in criminal activity with the help of encryption,
the government could bring a forfeiture proceeding that would seek
the computer and all software.168 Forfeiture laws, however, are not
always enforced. Just like legal sanctions, they depend on government
prosecutors to bring such cases. Unlike monetary costs, therefore,
forfeiture solutions appeal to those criminals who gamble on not
getting caught. The probability of forfeiture enforcement may be
higher, however, than that for criminal sanctions, as the standard of
proof is lower and prosecutors may be more willing to use such
mechanisms against low culpability defendants. 164 Indeed, for
adolescents who commit computer crimes, forfeiture laws offer much
promise as an intermediate solution between imprisonment and
letting them go free.
Indeed, there is some evidence that suggests that forfeiture laws
are better at deterring criminal activity than threats of imprisonment.
A top narcotics prosecutor in Washington, D.C. has stated that, in his
experience with nearly 1000 drug cases, the main penalty that
successfully deters drug dealers is not imprisonment, but the threat of
confiscating dealers' cars."O Forfeiture of a computer, following a
18 California provides for forfeiture of a computer, computer system, or computer
network, or any software or data residing thereon if it was used in violating the state's
computer crimes statute. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.01 (West Supp. 2001); see also N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-45-7 (Michie 2000) (providing for forfeiture in computer crimes).
169 See Macy v. One Pioneer CD-Rom Changer, 891 P.2d 600, 605 (Okla. Ct. App.
1994) (permitting forfeiture of hardware and software despite Fourth Amendment
questions). But see Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114
Stat. 202 (increasing protections against civil forfeiture and adopting a preponderance
of evidence standard).
170 Interview with DeMaurice Smith, Counsel to the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia (Mar. 12, 2000); see also Peter Carlson, Hell's Aged Angel the Bad
Biker Is 61 Now, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at C1 (quoting a former leader of the Hell's
Angels gang as stating that one of his three regrets in life was "'losing my right to own a
gun'").
Recent research has indicated that California's impoundment laws have had
positive results, significantly lowering the incidence of subsequent crashes and traffic
convictions for suspended/revoked drivers whose cars were impounded. See David J.
Deyoung, An Evaluation of the Specific Deterrent Effects of Vehicle Impoundment on Suspended.
Revoked, and Unlicensed Drivers in California, 31 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 45
(1999). Similar results have been reported from other regions. See, e.g., D.J. BEIRNESS
ET AL., EVALUATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LICENSE SUSPENSION AND VEHICLE
IMPOUNDMENT PROGRAMS IN MANITOBA 79-82 (1997); R.B. Voas et al., Temporary Vehicle
Impoundment in Ohio, 30 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 635 (1997); Ian Crosby,
Portland's Asset Forfeiture Program: The Effectiveness of Vehicle Seizure in Reducing Rearrest
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conviction for computer crime, may enhance the deterrent and
incapacitation effects of criminalization.17' Furthermore, stripping
former felons of their right to use computers for several years
following their release from prison can increase cost deterrence and
incapacitation even more. New crimes would require additional up-
front capital outlays and risk additional legal sanctions. Just as
panhandlers may experience a special sense of frustration when their
noses are pressed to the glass at Lespinasse, so too may former felons
feel a unique discomfort in seeing ubiquitous computers that they
may not touch. Computer crime thus would impose not only the cost
ofjail time, but also the enduring cost of losing one's computer, and
perhaps one's economic well-being.
One feature, therefore, of forfeiture is that it dramatically
increases the costs for anyone caught once. The first arrest is
probabilistic, but after that point, cost deterrence comes into play. To
maintain engagement in computer crime, a criminal will need to
incur new expenditures, such as buying a new computer and software.
These costs may not be dramatic, but they might be enough to deter
marginal criminals like teenagers from further criminal activity. Such
offenders might have higher elasticities of demand with regard to
monetary price than they do with regard to legal risks. When legal
risks are also raised through use restrictions, deterrence is further
promoted.
We have considered how the government may prevent bad
applications of dual-use technology. But how can it encourage good
ones? Suppose that the free market will not provide enough of these
goods, due to free rider problems, large up-front costs, or other
reasons. A host of civil and regulatory measures, such as tax breaks,
could spawrn these positive applications. I suggest that criminal law,
too, can play a modest role in this process, through the use of
strategies number seven and number eight.'72
Among "Probhm" Drunk Drivers, http://wivw.ncjrs.org/policing/port673.htm (1996)
(reprinted from POLICING IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: COMPARING FIRSTHAND
KNOWLEDGE TrH EXPERIENCE FROM THE WEST (Milan Pagon ed., 1996)).
171 If legal restrictions could make dangerous software (such as unbreakable
encryption and hackers' tools) difficult to obtain, this would increase search costs, as
criminals would have to invest more resources in obtaining such software or the skills
to program the software themselves. This is a further application of cost deterrence.
In addition, government subsidies might be used to develop countermeasures
to criminal conduct. As we shall see shortly, victims and third parties are often in the
best position to monitor and prevent criminal activity. Infra Part II.B-C. Government
may seek to subsidize technologies that permit these actors to carry out their
monitoring and thwarting tasks more effectively. If firewalls and anti-virus software are
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A powerful line of thought dating back to Hayek explains why the
market, not the government, should price goods. 73 According to this
argument, the market is best able to determine the true value of a
good, whereas the insulated government will inevitably make mistakes
because it lacks the proper knowledge about what people need and
what they value. Such thinking suggests that the government should
stay out of regulating technologies of vast commercial importance.
Doing so, the argument goes, poses enormous risks to the formation
and accumulation of capital. The view may have some merit, for those
setting criminal penalties in the government have no direct stake in
these commercial interests. 74 On the other hand, the dangers posed
by encryption are so severe that unfettered market control would be
far too risky. Again, the law must seek compromise in dual-use
situations.
Three potential compromise options suggest themselves: one is
conventional; the other two are more novel. The conventional variant
is simply to permit government to review the penalty scheme on
encryption each year. Congress could be required to hold hearings
and industry could lobby and testify for or against the way encryption
is being treated. Thinking of law as a dynamic enterprise, in which no
penalty need remain constant over the years, gives rise to this
possibility. If Congress delegates authority to the more responsive
Sentencing Commission, as I have proposed, government might strike
reasonable balances between competing aims (given the evolution of
technology at different points in time).
The two more novel ways to let individuals help set the price of
their conduct involve bidding systems. In the first, individuals could
a cheaper way to prevent harm in cyberspace than prosecution, the law might want to
rely more heavily on the former and less on the latter.
Some of the approaches outlined above also have the potential to liberate
policymakers from raising law enforcement objections to government activity.
Suppose, for example, that government decides that encryption should be subsidized
because of its important benefits to consumers and companies but resists subsidies due
to law enforcement fears. Combining strategy number seven with another approach,
such as sentencing enhancements, can remedy the imbalance created by the subsidy
and correct the incentives to use encryption for unlawful means.
173 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in INDIVIDUAMISM ANID
ECONOMIC ORDER 77, 83-86 (1948) (advocating a decentralized approach to market
regulation that leaves decisions to those most familiar with rapidly changing
circumstances).
174 The government of course has a stake in tax revenue, but it is not easy to create
a system that forces individual members of Congress or the Sentencing Commission to
internalize the cost of this forgone revenue.
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bid for the right to have an encryption license. The government
could make a case-by-case determination about the money necessary
to obtain the license. For example, former felons would have to pay a
higher amount than law-abiders. The government would still have the
power to decide whether to accept a particular bid, however, and it
would still be in the ultimate position to dictate the terms of the
exchange. On the downside, this would leave the government open
to charges of inefficiency (that the market, not the government,
should be responsible for the price) and unfairness (that the
government arbitrarily makes some groups or individuals pay more
for a license than it does others).
Both of these criticisms could be accommodated by allowing all
encryption licenses to be sold on the open market. The market would
then price the value of encryption, and the licenses in general would
be sold according to a nonarbitrary criterion, that is, sold to the
highest bidder. This system, however, forgoes so much government
control that it may not succeed. Terrorists such as Osama bin Laden
could amass a huge sum of money to buy a license on the open
market, while individual mom-and-pops who want the benefits of
encryption may be priced out of the market. Given this scenario, we
see that there are good reasons to insist on government control of
licenses, reasons that hearken back to the enormous danger posed by
encryption as well as distributional problems with the allocative
mechanism of price.
The other novel alternative is for government to accept criminal,
not monetary, bids. To receive a license to use encryption, an
individual would bid a specific sentencing enhancement if she is
caught using the technology to further a crime. For example, my bid
could be 100%, and that bid would signify that if I were caught using
encryption to commit a crime, my sentence would double (if I am
caught using cryptography to sell five grams of crack cocaine, my
sentence would increase from five years to ten). The bid would
remind citizens that the use of encryption to further a criminal
offense will result in a serious enhancement of their sentence. It
would give citizens a stake in the criminal process, one in which they
(not the government) are partially responsible for the sentence that
they receive. It would permit the government to make flexible
determinations based on the conduct of a particular person, allowing
the market to suggest, but not control, the ultimate price of the
conduct. It would also provide fairness to poorer citizens who want to
use encryption but do not have the resources to buy a license from the
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government or from an open-market allocative system.
Many will feel that this strategy is too novel. A more palatable
bidding system could have individuals bid not on additional jail time,
but instead on the degree to which they agree to be monitored by
independent, nongovernmental actors. A system could be developed
whereby a class of inspectors would periodically examine a user's
electronic traffic. The inspectors would not work for the government,
and individuals would be free to bid by the name of the inspector as
well as the frequency of inspection. This system, once again, would
capture many of the advantages of the other bidding systems, such as
warning citizens and making them stakeholders, and it may be fairer
than a one-size-fits-all approach. In a sense, what I am suggesting is a
customer-driven pricing model (Priceline.com meets criminal law)
instead of a seller-driven uniform one.
Today's criminal law scholars and policymakers tend to compare a
very limited set of options. They examine the benefits and drawbacks
of legalization by comparing them to outright prohibition, or perhaps
taxation schemes. In their more sophisticated variants, they compare
outright prohibition to civil tort suits. But there are many more
options, and many more comparisons. These options can be
combined in various ways so that the harmful effects of one strategy
may be mitigated by embracing another strategy simultaneously.
A return to the pseudonymity debate allows us to sum up. Society
should not forfeit the benefits of pseudonymity, but neither can
society afford the costs of unfettered pseudonymity. Unfortunately,
policymakers have vacillated between these two poles without regard
for the options in the middle. In particular, a sentencing
enhancement, in either of its varieties, would avoid the disincentive
created by an outright ban of pseudonymity and would selectively
target its most dangerous forms.1
75
In the early eighteenth century, England made it a capital offense
175 David Post, while recognizing the law enforcement problem created by
anonymity, proposes a solution which would legalize pseudonyms. David G. Post,
Pooling Intellectual Capital: Thoughts on Anonymity, Pseudonymity, and Limited Liability in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 161. Post does not explain what penalties, if any,
would accrue to those who use anonymity in communication. Additionally, the use of
pseudonymity would have much of the same law enforcement problem, insofar as it
would be quite difficult for law enforcement to decode a pseudonym. This problem
could be solved by requiring ISPs to maintain lists of realspace identities and accurate
decoding sheets, but Post does not suggest any such regime. In any event, an
enhancement allows more selective targeting and permits penalties to slide with the
severity of the underlying crime.
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to poach deer while being "blacked," that is, with one's face covered
in disguise.17  This punishment functioned as a severe sentencing
enhancement: simply poaching a deer was subject to a fine of £30 or
up to one year in prison, whereas using a disguise to poach meant
death. 77 Because deer were so large, they could not be taken quickly
unlike smaller animals, so "disguise was the poacher's first
protection."' 7  Modem-day America similarly should consider
increasing penalties when individuals commit computer crimes by
stealth, under the cover of pseudonyms, the modem-day equivalent to
disguise. The Supreme Court's latest decision on pseudonymity leaves
open the possibility for such regulation .1' Enhancements, in areas
such as pseudonymity and encryption, avoid the blunt edge of
prohibition by isolating the particular conduct deserving sanction.
c. Tracing and Escape
A separate form of reduced costs to the criminal in cyberspace is
the ease of escape. Because computer crime can be perpetrated by
anyone, even someone who has never set foot near the target, the
range of potential suspects is huge."" This is unlike traditional crime,
in which there is a high likelihood that a crime is committed by
someone known to or seen by either the victim or the community in
which the crime took place. A criminal in realspace has to be
physically present to rob a bank, but a cybercriminal can be across the
globe. This makes the crime easier to carrT out, easier to conceal, and
tougher to prosecute."
Despite some indications of the government's ability to trace
criminal suspects online, the truth is that tracing is very difficult. A
1" The Black Act, 1723, 9 Geo., c. 22 (Eng.), reprinted in E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS
AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OFTHE BLAcKACT app. 1, at 270-71 (1975).
177 THOMPSON, supra note 176, at 58-60. According to Thompson, the Act was
motilated primarily by class disputes. Id. at 190-97.
Id. at 57.
7 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); see also id. at 358
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other,
larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its
identity.").
I" DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 20; IcovE ET AL., supra note 47, at 118; see Rasch,
supra note 18, at 143-44.M Michael Gemignani, Viruses and Criminal Law, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATrAcK,
snpra note 55, at 489, 492.
1, See Intoret Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm. and the Criminal Justice Oversight Subcomm. of
the S. Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Senior
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criminal may leave behind a trail of electronic footprints, but the
footprints often end with a pseudonymous e-mail address from an ISP
that possesses no subscriber information. Moreover, finding the
footprints is often very difficult. Criminals can be sophisticated at
weaving their footprints through computers based in several
countries, which makes getting permission for real-time tracing very
difficult.8 3 Unlike a criminal who needs to escape down a particular
road, a criminal in cyberspace could be on any road, and these roads
are not linked together in any meaningful fashion. The internet
works by sending packets of data through whatever electronic pathway
it finds most efficient at a given time. The protocol moves these
packets a step closer to their destination, an electronic hop, without
trying to map out a particular course for the next node to use when
the packet arrives. Each hop ends in a host or router, which in turn
sends the information on to the next host. What's more, sometimes
large packets divide into smaller packets to be reassembled by the
end-user when all the packets show up. Sometimes packets never
arrive, due to network congestion and mistakes.
So far, I have suggested three problems with online tracing:
pseudonymity, weaving through various computer networks, and
packet-related problems. There are several additional difficulties.
One is that implementing a tracing order is difficult; since the
breakup of AT&T, long distance-calls and data transmissions are often
handled by several entities. These entities might even be based in
other countries, depending on the location of the perpetrator and on
whether or not weaving is being used. (The foreign location gives rise
to a number of constitutional and statutory questions in each country
about whether the transmission can be traced.) By the time the
relevant authorities grant their permission, the trail may be cold, as
ISPs and other entities may have deleted the information necessary to
perform the trace. Furthermore, curious administrators and company
officials may damage the trail by poking around. 84 Even if the
Staff Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology), 2000 WL 249419 [hereinafter
Cyberattack, Dempsey].
183 Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 20 (statement of LouisJ. Freeh, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation).
184 Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm. and the CriminalJustice Oversight Subcomm. of
the S. Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of "Mudge," Vice President of
Research and Development, @Stake, Inc.), 2000 WL 232400 ("People implicitly know
that they should not wander around a crime scene disturbing potential evidence.
Further, when called in to look at a crime scene the investigators will restrict
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transmission can be traced quickly before it is damaged, the trace may
dead-end into a cell phone line. As cellular phones become
commonplace, tracing has become even harder because criminals
view cellular phones as "disposable" and treat them like one-time pads
to be discarded after use. In addition, the technology to fake cell
phone locations and identities is becoming widespread.1 5 Even if calls
can be traced to a computer in a hard location, there is no guarantee
that the user of the computer is present18' Effective tracing capability
is also hampered by public reaction. Witness the public uproar over
Carnivore, and the earlier uproar over the Federal Intrusion
Detection Network ("FIDNet"), which would have used intrusion
detection software to monitor suspicious behavior on government
networks.'" Fears about privacy therefore also act as a constraint on
access .... Unfortunately, it is still the exception when dealing with filesystems and
transient data found on computers and networks."), available at http://
wwv.house.gov/judiciary/mudgO229.htm.
I,,' DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 28-31. The head of the DOJ's Criminal Division
has similarly stated:
While less sophisticated cybercriminals may leave electronic "fingerprints,"
more experienced criminals know how to conceal their tracks in cyberspace.
With the deployment of "anonynizer" software, it is increasingly difficult and
sometimes impossible to trace cybercriminals. At the same time, other
services available in some countries, such as pre-paid calling cards, lend
themselves to anonymous communications.
James K. Robinson, Remarks at the International Computer Crime Conference: "Internet as the
Sene of Crime" (May 29-31, 2000), http://wvv.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/
roboslo.htm.J1 In the Philippines ILoveYou investigation, for example, police readily traced
calls to an apartment in Manila, but the user that launched the virus attack was not
apparent. See D. Ian Hopper & Reuters Wire Service, Authorities Seek to Question Pair in
"Love Bug" Attack (May 11, 2000), http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASLANOW/southeast/
05/1l/ilove)ou ("[Authorities] noted, however, that anyone who had access to the
apartment and the computer could have created the virus.").
N1 ichaelJ. O'Neil &James X. Dempsey, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Threats
to Privao, and Other Civil Liberties and Concerns with Government Mandates on Industry, 12
DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 97, 125-28 (1999).
Fears of Carnivore have been exaggerated. Before Carnivore, if the FBI wanted to
tap someone's phone or read her e-mail, it required a court order under Title III, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Carnivore, contrary to press reports,
does not change this. All Carnivore does is filter e-mail based on the to and from lines
at the top of a message, so that law enforcement can obtain the addressing information
and content of e-mails sent by or received by a particular sender provided that a
federal judge has given Title III approval. "Carnivore" and the Fourth Amendment.
Hearing Before House Subcomm. on the Const., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Kevin
DiGregory, Deputy Assoc. Attorney Gen., United States Dep't of Justice), 2000 WL
23832328. Rather than the old system of using a human agent to sort through every e-
mail (which can pose more severe privacy risks), Carnivore culls addressing
information of those messages which are the subject of the Title IIIjudicial order. The
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tracing.
The upshot is that it is very difficult for law enforcement to find a
criminal after an attack, particularly when the criminal can be on any
road and evidence of her crime can be split into numerous
subparcels, each of which is not itself incriminating.'* Even in those
cases in which law enforcement has the technology and permission
under applicable law to trace an attack, the investigators must be
skilled at carrying out such a trace in order for it to be successful, and
they must have knowledge about how to preserve the data trails in
such a way that they will be admissible evidence in a criminal trial.' "
Regular and frequent training of law enforcement is a necessity, as is
up-to-date technological equipment. Government prosecutors and
police must also be trained in the application of constitutional and
statutory liberties in the internet context.9  Furthermore, the
contraband and materials can be physically stored anywhere on the
planet, making such evidence difficult to find and difficult to
introduce in a court. Incriminating files of a criminal organization,
such as the profits made from drug dealing, may be stored thousands
of miles away. Alternatively, the evidence could reside in the United
States but be moved abroad literally with a keystroke-whenever a
person or an entity comes under criminal suspicion. '  Computers
could also make it easier for criminals to disrupt law enforcement by
spying on informants and sabotaging networks.
system generates a log of every action it takes, and the FBI only uses it when ISPs do
not turn over addressing information. It is basically a souped-up packet sniffer, the
kind which private entities have been using for years.
8 Cyberthreats, Cross, supra note 54 (describing the complexity of tracing criminal
activity over the internet); WILLmi R. CHESWICK & STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, FIREw, _L~s
AND INTERNET SECURIT. REPELLING THE WILY HAcKER 20 (1994) (describing ways in
which materials can be delivered regardless of their provenance or address).
189 DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 12; STOLL, supra note 44, at 109 ("We're
accustomed to handling most forms of white-collar crime-we recognize the telltale
evidence .... Over the networks, these are impossible without sophisticated tools like
digital signatures or cryptographic keys.").
90 DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 28-29.
,91 Cybererime Hearing, supra note 21, at 60 (testimony ofJeff B. Richards, Executive
Director, The Internet Alliance).
192 DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 ("Vith scores of Internet-connected countries
around the world, the coordination challenges facing law enforcement are
tremendous. And any delay in an investigation is critical, as a criminal's trail often
ends as soon as he or she disconnects from the Internet."); Wittes, supra note 3
(explaining the ease with which large amounts of information can be moved around
electronically).
M See TSUTOMU SHIMOMURA & JOHN MARKOFF, TAKEDOWN 238 (1996)
(describing how hacker Kevin Mitnick disrupted law enforcement by changing police
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Because these factors lower the probability of successful
enforcement, it may be appropriate to offset this lowered probability
by increasing the magnitude of the criminal sanction. Doing so would
avoid substitution effects and result in balanced sanctions. Some may
reject this approach, arguing that computer crimes require a high
upfront investment in skills, thereby canceling out the efficiencies of
cybercrime. Whatever else may be said, it is highly unlikely that
computers-which have produced such complicated phenomena in
noncriminal society-would give criminals the exact balance of
benefits and costs necessary to moot each other out. The natural
desire for simplicity must not blind us to understanding these effects.
The upfront investment point, moreover, ignores a key feature of the
computer world: software. All that is really necessary for a cybercrime
to take place is that someone provides the tools-encoded in a
program-to surmount defenses. It is therefore not surprising that
programs such as hackers' tools are proliferating on the internet,
enabling even those without technical sophistication to commit
dangerous crimes.""
Cybercrime is thus somewhat different from regular crime in that
it initially requires sophistication and expertise, but that sophistication
and expertise can be given fully to others who lack it. Even though I
do not know how to code a word processing program, I am perfectly
happy to use WordPerfect to write this very Article. Similarly, a weak-
officers' phone numbers and credit reports). For example, a raid of the Cali cartel
headquarters in Columbia found two IBM mainframe computers that cross-checked
ever), phone call to the United States Embassy and Columbian Ministry of Defense
against phone books to discover the identities of informants. See supra note 51
(describing the mafia's use of computers to disrupt law enforcement).
4 Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25 ("While remote cracking once required a fair
amount of skill or computer knowledge, hackers can now download attack scripts and
protocols from the World Wide Web and launch them against victim sites. Thus while
attack tools have become more sophisticated, they have also become easier to use.");
C berthreats, Cross, supra note 54 (same).
Many web sites provide information and tutorials about how to commit computer
crime. See, e.g., Black Sun Research, Tutorials, http://blacksun.box.sk/tutorials.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2001) (teaching novice and more experienced hackers how to hone
their hacking skills); Happy Hacker, You Mean You Can Hack Without Breaking the Law,
http://xwi;.happyhacker.org (last modified Feb. 8, 2001) (relaying up-to-the-minute
hacker news and providing lessons in hacking). Also, anyone can buy programs such
as the "Elite Hackers Toolkit," "Hacker's Underworld," and "Master Hacker," all of
which contain programs to crack passwords, undermine firewalls, hijack information
packets, and launch viruses. I visited a commercial software sales site, Most Significant
Bits Corp., Shop Online for Computer Software, CD-ROM Titles At the Guaranteed Low,
http://w.nothingbutsoftare.com (1997-2000), on October 23, 2000, and found all
of the.se products for sale for prices between $12-$17.
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brained cybercriminal does not need to know much about the
technology in order to run an executable file. This gives a great deal
of power to computer programmers and suggests that the government
must treat them differently from program users because of the great
potential for programmers to use their techniques to bad ends. It also
suggests a further wrinkle in cyberspace regulation: government may
need to regulate even innocent software programmers who write
material that facilitates crime. The regulation of programmers will
pose a much greater problem in the new millennium, as the litigation
over Napster demonstrates. Because individual users are dispersed
across the country and around the globe, regulating software authors
may be necessary to curtail crime on the net. This is particularly so if
the widespread availability of hackers' tools and other dangerous
software shapes tastes towards crime.195
It is possible to envision a world in which the technological, legal,
and practical barriers to online tracing eventually dissolve. That world
appears far off, given architectural barriers such as disposable cell
phones, but it is possible. If tracing reached the point where it was
more effective than detection of realspace crimes, the analysis thus far
would need to be rethought.19 Penalties would need to be revised as
well, insofar as they were designed for an age in which crimes were
tougher to solve. For example, the District of Columbia recently
installed cameras to catch those who run red and yellow lights. Now
that getting away with running a light is virtually impossible, lots of
people are stuck with very large fines for the practice. 97 This is
because the high penalties were designed to compensate for the low
probability of enforcement. As technology increases that probability,
the sentences must adapt' 98 For the present, however, remoteness
and invisibility confer large advantages on cybercriminals and legal
195 SeeJON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 25
(1983); Katyal, supra note 10, at 2441-42 ("[W]hat people want may be a product of
what they can get.").
196 At least some of the benefits of tracing may be ones that help solve realspace
crimes. See supra note 108.
197 See Arthur Santana, Camera Read)--or Not, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2000, at C1
(describing the effectiveness of the camera system in "catching an average of 41 red-
light runners a day"); Arthur Santana, Seeing Red Over 'Gotcha' Camera, WASH. POST,
May 19, 2000, at Al (reporting "billing $1.5 million [to red-light runners] in just over
six months"); see also Sylvia Moreno, In Alexandria, Fail to Stop and Camera Goes Pop!,
WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1997, at Dl.
198 Interesting cross-institutional problems arise as legislatures may not be able to
act quickly enough to reflect changes in technology (which will often take effect
without legislative approval). The result may be serious overdeterrence.
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institutions need to address these changes.
I shall return to the theme of distance between criminal and
crime later in this paper. Remoteness not only lowers the probability
of the enforcement of criminal law, but also largely precludes the use
of social norms as a way to constrain deviant behavior and explains
why trendy theories of enforcement such as Broken Windows policing
need to be adapted to invisible crime on the net. Furthermore,
because the enforcement of criminal law, online tracing, is less visible
than cops on the beat, the government also faces challenges due to
the remoteness of its methods. Before delving into these issues, I shall
first examine the role of other parties besides law enforcement in
deterring cybercrime.
B. Second-Party Strategies of Victim Precaution
1. Optimal Victim Behavior
The existence of cost deterrence suggests that the government
should not rely exclusively on sanctions to prevent crime. The
government cannot be omniscient and omnipotent, nor would we
want it to be. For that reason, other entities must act to make crime
more costly; doing so reaches a more efficient result.Y9 Examples
from realspace include placing locks on doors and not leaving items
of value in plain sight. It is far cheaper to have each car built to
require a key for entry and use than it is for the government to try to
police the illegal entry and use of every vehicle in America. By
altering the extent of private protection, law can influence constraints
such as perpetration costs and architecture.
For some types of cybercrime, reliance on victim precaution is
optimal because the cost of government identification, investigation,
and prosecution of the crime is too great. For example, if many
computer bugs can be prevented with the use of simple software, such
as Symantec Anti-Virus, the software may prevent crime more cheaply
than relying on government enforcement of legal sanctions. Indeed,
many major crimes, such as MafiaBoy's DDOS attacks, can be
prevented with easy-to-use technology and common sense.0O
J,. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim" Optimal
Incentives for Private Precautions Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434 (1995). At
times, government prosecution may be warranted even when a victim did not take
precautions because prosecution yields social benefits that exceed its costs, including
the cost of diminished precautionary actions.
-- The Internet Engineering Task Force, as early asJanuary 1998, proposed a very
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If the cost of government prosecution is high, it may be
appropriate for the government to give priority to prosecuting those
cases in which the victim took adequate precautions (or, in extreme
cases, refusing to prosecute cases in which victims took no precautions
at all). Doing so will provide some incentive for potential victims to
take these precautions. And it will conserve government resources,
for investigating and prosecuting each of the millions of cybercrimes
is financially impossible."'
A powerful counterargument emphasizes the limited incentives
2012created by the government for victims to protect themselves. If a
victim is cavalier about the data on her computer and does not use
anti-virus software, why would the speculative threat of government
prosecution matter to her? If the threat of data loss is not enough to
encourage a person to take quick and easy precautions, the priorities
of prosecutors are not likely to make a difference either. This is a
standard problem with blame-the-victim strategies: government
prosecution is not valuable enough to a victim to induce the desirable
precautionary behavior.
But there is a rejoinder to the argument: the change in incentives
is not so much on the part of victims, as it is on the part of police.
Police are currently ex post machines, able to track down criminals
and investigate crime scenes. They are not focused on prevention so
much as they are on prosecution. This system makes sense in
realspace insofar as there is a finite amount of crime that can take
place at once, given corporeal constraints. But in cyberspace, where
the incidence of crime may be high and the ability to track
cybercriminals may be low, government may need to change its
simple way to preclude DDOS attacks. Cyberattack, Dempsey, supra note 182; see also
William L. Scherlis et al., Computer Emergency Response, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATTACK,
supra note 55, at 495, 495-96 (proposing that the common errors of lax password
policies and failure to use published fixes for security holes can be easily corrected).
201 The government already prioritizes computer facilities through its Key Asset
Initiative to designate those systems of particular importance to the United States.
Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25.
202 In suggesting a role for prosecutorial priority shifting, I intentionally do not
discuss government regulation of victim behavior, though such strategies should be
considered as well. Law-abiding entities may be more responsive to regulation
compared to computer criminals. However, government may not be sufficiently aware
of the cost of such safeguards, and regulation may thus interfere with established
market behavior in unpredictable ways. See infra Part II.B.2. Using ex post
prioritization of cases, by contrast, permits the class of entities who are potential
victims to evaluate their own level of risk, as well as the costs and benefits of additional
protection. Because prosecutors and police would be able to assess victim precaution
against industry-wide custom, it may be more efficient than a priori regulation.
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prosecution strategy towards warning potential victims of threats to
their computers.!"° The FBI has been quite good at warning computer
users about specific attacks once they learn about them, as with the
Melissa virus,20 but has not been particularly concerned with teaching
computer users about adequate safeguards ahead of time. Law
enforcement needs to think less like traditional police departments
and more like fire departments, emphasizing education and
appropriate computer hygiene in public outreach campaigns.
205
Providing warnings is not sexy stuff for police, who would much
rather be chasing criminals than giving speeches, and changing their
attitudes and inclinations will be quite difficult. A rule that permitted
police to open criminal cases only once they knew victims had taken
appropriate precaution, however, would help induce this shift in
police behavior. By coupling the desirable police activity (chasing
criminals) with the less desirable activity (giving warnings), police
would have incentives to pursue the latter.2 The warnings could be
educational, in that the police could discuss computer security threats,
common ways of preventing them, and the inability to open a criminal
case unless victims take certain basic forms of precaution.
Two differences must be considered between realspace and
cyberspace at this juncture. First, in realspace crime, the government
is reluctant to embrace measures that emphasize the power of victim
precaution because they unfairly penalize innocent third parties
instead of combating crime. In the computer context, by contrast,
there is quite a strong reason to induce victims to engage in
preventive measures. The government is unable to police the internet
in the same way it is able to police the city streets. Visibility of crime is
See Cyberthreats, Cross, supra note 54 (arguing that information, education, and
training are necessary to harden cyber targets and prevent crimes from occurring in
the first place); Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 63 (statement of Jeff B. Richards,
Executive Director, Internet Alliance).
"o Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25 (discussing how the Melissa Macro Virus was
treated under the FBI's two-fold response, "encompassing both warning and
investigation-to a virus spreading in the networks," and explaining that "[t]he NIPC
sent out warnings as soon as it had solid information on the virus and its effects; these
warnings helped alert the public and reduce the potential destructive impact of the
virus").
See Stakeout Press Briefing with Business and Technology Leaders Following Meeting
with President Clinton on Internet Security, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 15, 2000
(demonstrating that the industry advocates a similar position).
'" To create the correct incentives, the same police officer should be responsible
for the educational campaigns and the investigation of criminal wrongdoing at a
particular facility.
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low and much of the technical information necessary to forestall an
attack and to facilitate investigation of a crime resides only in the
hands of private entities.0 7 And the vast number of computer
attacks-and the potential for them to continue to multiply-suggest
that the government may need to change its model.
Governments should, in short, first prosecute those crimes in
which the victim engaged in the optimal level of precaution. If
resources and energy are left over, then the government should
investigate those other cases in which the victim did not take
preventive steps. Such a strategy changes the constraints of cost and
architecture, making cybercrime more expensive and more difficult to
carry out. Note again that these forms of deterrence work even when
criminals know nothing about the law and even when they believe
there is no chance of getting caught by police.
In order to do this effectively, government cannot simply treat all
victims as equal. It is not optimal for Chevy Chase Country Club to
take the same preventive measures as Chase Manhattan Bank. Too
much money would be spent preventing the crime and deadweight
losses would be incurred. To maximize efficiency, government could
use a formula that compares the cost of preventing the crime against
the potential monetary loss that an intrusion could generate. The
famous Learned Hand formula that every first-year torts student learns
might be applied in the area of criminal law on the internet.-l"
207 First, most of the victims of cyber crimes are private companies. Therefore,
successful investigation and prosecution of cyber crimes depends on private
victims reporting incidents to law enforcement and cooperating with the
investigators....
... Second, the network administrator at a victim company or ISP is critical
to the success of an investigation. Only that administrator knows the unique
configuration of her system, and she typically must work with an investigator to
find critical transactional data that will yield evidence of a criminal's activity.
Third, the private sector has the technical expertise that is often critical to
resolving an investigation.
Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25; see O'Neil & Dempsey, supra note 187, at 103 ("The
infrastructures at issue are largely privately owned. Those private owners have a
substantial economic stake in protecting their investments .... Those who own and
operate these systems are in the best position to understand and prioritize this range
of threats and what is necessary to mitigate them." (citations omitted)); Robinson,
supra note 185. In addition, victims must cooperate with the government after an
intrusion for effective prosecution. See Charney & Alexander, supra note 17, at 946
("[I] t is simply not possible for investigators and prosecutors to become instant experts
in every type of system, in light of the wide array of computers and operating systems
on the market.... [We will often need the victim to assist us in our efforts.").
208 For a description of the test, see infra text accompanying notes 223-26.
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Government should concentrate its resources and fight those crimes
in which victims could be considered nonnegligent. Unlike
entrenched areas of law, cybercrime is a new area and government has
a unique opportunity to influence the path by which potential victims
take precautionary behavior.
Second, the interlinkage of victims in cyberspace makes computer
crimes different from realspace ones. In realspace, when one victim
visibly self-protects, it does not advance the general welfare
tremendously; it simply displaces the crime. (A "Club" placed on a car
illustrates the point: it merely keeps that particular car from being
stolen"'") In cyberspace, by contrast, many forms of victim self-
precaution generate positive externalities by increasing the
perpetration costs of crime generally.2 0 The point is best understood
with reference to computer viruses .2 The ILoveYou virus, for
example, infects the root e-mail system and sends the virus to fifty
additional people, who in turn pass it on. Each inoculated computer
could prevent thousands of additional infections. (The virus analogy
is particularly apt. In public health this phenomenon is known as
"herd immunity"-the concept that even if my child is not vaccinated,
the vaccinations of others will prevent my child from being infected-
though, to my knowledge, computer experts have not borrowed the
term.)
There are other crimes in cyberspace where victim precaution is
See Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable
Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 QJ. ECON. 43, 44 (1998)
(providing other examples including "visible car alarms [and] home-security systems"
and distinguishing unobservable precautions such as Lojack). Many forms of self-
protection in cyberspace will be invisible. Those precautions that are visible or
otherwise apparent, however, may externalize crime onto those victims who take
comparatively less precaution.
There are some realspace analogues, such as merchants on a common
neighborhood block who discuss vagrants and suspicious characters or, perhaps, major
financial institutions which prepare plans to protect the physical security of their
infrastructure. Some cooperative victim precautions, such as common software,
nevertheless mean that the same vulnerability can exist in more than one system. In
the Cliff Stoll case, for example, a laboratory at Berkeley as well as an Army munitions
base in Alabama both ran the same commercial UNIX program, and the loophole in
security permitted the East German hackers to run computer programs at both sites, as
well as many other computers nationwide. STOLL, supra note 48; see infra note 271
(discussing the value of diversity in software and hardware).
AI Intenet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciay Comm. and the Criminal Justice Subcomm. of the S.
Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Katherine T. Fithen, Manager,
CERT Coordination Center), 2000 WL 249418 [hereinafter Cyberattack, Fithen]
("Everyone's security [on the internet] is intertwined.").
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socially optimal as well. For example, securing sites against intrusions
will prevent hackers from using these sites to attack other sites and
mask their trail. DDOS attacks become virtually impossible and the
difficulty of weaving one's electronic trail is increased. In sum, there
may be some crimes in cyberspace for which victim self-protection is
particularly important because it produces positive externalities that
advance general welfare. Because the benefits of victim precaution do
not inhere only to the victim, government may need to encourage this
precaution.
2. The Limits of Victim Precaution
Not all strategies for victim precaution are optimal. Many
methods will impose significant losses, and these losses must be
considered if the government prioritizes cases on the basis of victim
precaution. Indeed, a strong presence by law enforcement in
cyberspace is necessary precisely because victim precaution is
something to be feared, not welcomed, in many instances.
To understand the point, think about cities in which crime is
rampant. People lock their doors, are afraid to venture out in public,
and rush their children home from school without speaking to each
other. A community cannot flourish under conditions in which trust
has broken down. Instead, society atomizes and its residents live in
fear. These forms of victim self-protection, from bars on windows to
avoiding public spaces, impose substantial losses. And once societal
cohesion has broken down in this way, it is difficult for cohesion to
return.
The infancy of cyberspace presents the government with a unique
opportunity to prevent the net from mirroring our inner cities.
Without vigilant government protection and prosecution, two harms
may befall the internet. First, the internet could fragment into a
112
series of trusted networks for privileged users. Individual sites,
particularly new ones, will not let users access their information
without adequate assurance that they will refrain from hacking and
stealing private information. Accordingly, site managers will insist on
high assurances that a person accessing a site is legitimate and will
deny entry to those whose provenance is questionable. Unlike
commercial establishments in realspace, web sites need not open their
212 For a description of trusted networks, see Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How
Trusted Systems and Digital Poperty Rights Challenge Us To Rethink Digital Publishing, 12
BERKELEYTEcH. LJ. 137, 139-44 (1997).
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doors to anyone. The lack of regulation and due process characterize
these transactions. The marginal benefit from one extra customer of
dubious origin is exceeded by the damage a cyberthief can do to the
site. (In realspace, a similar phenomenon occurs, regrettably along
racial lines, when stores do not let "questionable" customers shop on
their premises.) This can stymie development of the internet and
make it difficult to secure the commercial and other advantages the
technology promises to provide. 3
The upshot of an over-reliance on victim precaution may be to
return us to the age of the electronic bulletin board. When I was
twelve years old, I used my Apple II to dial up various bulletin boards
across the country and electronically chat with different users and
swap programs. At no time would a board have more than ten people
on it, and rarely would any one board have more than a few files of
interest. No board was linked to the next one and there was no way of
searching the individual boards to know who or what was on the
others. With the connectivity of the internet, however, these
problems have dissolved. Instead of isolated enclaves, web sites on the
internet are linked together in ways that encourage users and
programs to work together. The countless hours spent dialing and
searching each board seriatim are over. Victim precaution can
undermine this trend and force technology to spiral backwards.
Too much reliance on victim precaution will also cause a second
phenomenon. Instead of denying access altogether, web sites will
build strong firewalls to prevent access to certain areas of their sites.
2
"
A firewall is like a tollgate. It requires all electronic traffic to request
entry by passing through the firewall. Without the proper
authorization, however, the firewall blocks traffic by using a filter or
"screen." It may also funnel the incoming traffic to designated areas.
Further detail is too complicated for our purposes here, what is
important is simply to understand that firewalls, properly built, allow
AA Even President Clinton recognized that protection against internet crime is
necessary to mine the internet for commercial opportunities. See Remarks Prior to a
Meeting with Technology Industry Leaders and Computer Security Experts and an
Exchange with Reporters, 36 WKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 308 (Feb. 15, 2000), available at
http://N,wwtv.cdt.org/security/000215whitehouse.shtm.
.11 Alternatively, sites could use intrusion detection systems to monitor their
networks and data. The problem is that the systems have so many false positives that
users eventually turn them off, and even when the systems are on, the warning typically
comes too late in the attack process. For a description of intrusion detection systems
and false positives, see Marcus Random, Intrusion Detection: Ideals, Expetations, and
P'alitieS, 15 COMPUTER SEC. J. 1, 2-3 (1999), available at http://wVw.gocsi.com/
intrus.htm.
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web sites to block any type of incoming or outgoing traffic they wish.1f'
A university that does not want its students to access certain
pornographic web sites with university computers can either publish a
regulation punishing such conduct or employ a filter to do it for
them. A neighborhood bank may be afraid of traffic from Israel
because of the high percentage of hackers there and can block all
incoming traffic originating in Israel.
Firewalls, however, impose large costs. These costs include:
hardware and software purchases, programmer time, hardware
maintenance and software upgrades, administrative setup and
training, inconveniences and lost business opportunities resulting
from a broken gateway or denial of services, and an inevitable loss in
connectivity.21 Such costs vary with the type of firewall selected. For
example, packet filters require quite complicated and up-to-date
information about ports on the internet. They may slow down the
domain name system and recognition of a site by other hosts and
make it more difficult for a site to communicate with the outside
217world . They also slow down local networks considerably, adding to
worker frustration and loss of productivity.
18
Any government inducement for firewalls, whether through
shifted prosecutorial strategies, contributory negligence in tort, or
taxation incentives, must take into account the variances in costs and
benefits that accrue to different users. The costs of firewalls are not
trivial. It can be said that the two chief advantages of the internet lie
in its ability to provide information rapidly and its potential to
connect users who previously were not connected. Both of these
advantages are undercut by widespread and strong firewalls.
In economic terms, the internet takes advantage of network
effects. A network effect occurs when the utility of a good increases
21 Firewalls come in three general varieties: packet filtering (which denies access
to packets based on their source or destination addresses or ports), circuit gateways
(which bypass areas of a site that cannot be accessed by outside traffic), and
application gateways (which employ filters within each individual application, such as
e-mail). An excellent description of the code necessary to build these walls is
contained in CHESWICK & BELLOVIN, supra note 188, at 85-118. See also Tom Sheldon,
General Firewall I'Wdte Paper (Nov. 1996), http://www.ntresearch.com/firewall.htm.
216 CHESWICK & BELLOVIN, supra note 188, at 51-52. Firewafls also need to be
updated to take account of new threats to the firewall as well as ways to exploit bugs in
the original program design. Id. at 83.
217 Id. at 62-64.
218 See id. at 74 (discussing the "performance penalty for packet filtering").
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with the number of other agents who are consuming the same good.
The internet's value lies, at least in part, in exploiting these network
effects. As more people come online, the value of the internet
increases. E-mail, for example, is more valuable to me this year than it
was last year because my mother has now learned how to use e-mail.
The standard phrase to capture this is "Metcalfe's Law"-that the
value of participation on a computer network grows exponentially with
the size of the network.2° While this is an exaggeration, the larger the
number of people online, in general, the greater the advantages there
are.
Certain forms of victim precaution, however, can undermine this
trend and create electronic balkanization. An example familiar to
even a novice user of the net concerns internet searches. Most of us
have conducted searches on sites such as Yahoo! or Google. I can type
my name into these engines and find a variety of information about
myself-from my college activities to law review articles I have written.
For a search engine to work, two levels of access are thus necessary.
The search engine itself requires access to individual sites in order to
search through and catalog the material, and an individual user
requires access to read the material on the site. Both levels require
trust between the two parties involved in each transaction. Without
trust between the engine and the individual web site, the engine
cannot catalog or search through the material.12' And even when
access is granted to the search engine, access may not be granted to
the individual user (for example, when Yahoo! brings up a hit on
., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
6,npatibility, 75 AM\i. ECON. REv. 424, 424 (1985); see also Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Systtms Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 94
("Because the value of membership [in a network] to one user is positively affected
when another user joins and enlarges the network, such markets are said to exhibit
'network effects,' or 'network externalities.'"); SJ. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,
Atwork Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133 (1994) (refining and
limiting the Katz & Shapiro concept).
George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP, Sept. 13, 1993, at 158,
160; se' also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Elacts, 86 CAXL. . REv. 479, 483-84 (1998). In one sense, however, the internet's value
decreases with additional users due to the technological limitations of bandwidth. The
more users there are on the net, the slower the internet's response time.
Some search engines use Web "spiders" to search automatically through
material and catalog it. Individual sites can generally prevent these spiders from
entering by altering their "robots.txt" file, but doing so has the cost of reducing the
amount of material that can be searched online. Martijn Koster, A Standard for
Rolbot Exrlusion, http://info.webcrawler.com/mak/projects/robots/norobots.html (last
xisited Nov. 2, 2000).
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certain newspapers, the newspaper may not let the user read the
article without registering) .22
But there is a third layer involved here, and it is this layer that may
be the most puzzling: the value of the network can be diminished by
too many users. If I want to chat with people about the history of the
year 1776, I do not want my chat to involve the one million people
online who know something about that year. Similarly, if I want to
search the web for information about the year 1776, it is not helpful to
retrieve 50,000 hits. People are not computers. They have limited
attention spans and weak multitasking capabilities. The value of the
internet lies not only in its ability to maintain vast amounts of material
and users, but also in its ability to filter and separate the data into an
accessible form. For such filtering to take place, trust between the
parties is essential. The search engine must have sufficient access to
each web site to ensure that its catalog reflects a semi-intelligent
understanding of the material; the individual user must let the search
engine know enough to conduct a proper search.
Any calculation of optimal victim precaution must therefore take
into account the harms imposed by such precaution. It is dangerous
to expect victims to do too much. And yet much legal scholarship
simply assumes away the problem. Consider torts. The famous
Learned Hand Test states that negligence depends on whether the
burden of private precautions exceeds that of the probability of an
223accident multiplied by the harm of that injury. In the case that gave
rise to the test, a ship had broken away from its tow and smashed into
224
a tanker. The ship owner sued the towing company, but the towing
company said that the ship owner was contributorily negligent for not
having an attendant on board.2 5  Hand sided with the towing
company, stating that the ship owner could have avoided the accident
2 For example, on the day the majority of Verizon Communications workers
returned to their jobs, I went to Yahoo! News, http://dailynews.yahoo.com/headlines,
to read about the strike. I found a link to a magazine article, The Guilded Rage,
published by the New York Times Magazine. When I clicked on the link, I was brought
not to the article itself, but to the New York Times registration page,
http://www.nytimes.com/auth/login?URL=http://ww.nytimes.com/ibrary/magazin
e/home/20000820mag-ethicist.html. Before the Times would grant me the privilege of
reading their article, they wanted information about me in exchange (including my
name, sex, age, household income, zip code, country of residence, and e-mail
address).
23 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
224 Id. at 171.
225 Id.
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by having placed an attendant on board.2" Hand, however, trained
his eye only on the cost of precautions to the ship owner. While this
limited focus may have been appropriate on the facts of that case, the
general formula needs revision.
When private precautions impose negative externalities (in that
they cause harm that is not borne exclusively by the precautionary
party), the Hand test will lead to a suboptimal result. Focusing only
on the victim's costs, without due regard for the cost of the
precautions to society, can skew reasoning. Computer crime is a nice
illustration of the point. If victims build firewalls that are too strong,
collective benefits will be undermined. As the Cornell Commission
Report on the Morris worm case states, a "community of scholars
should not have to build walls as high as the sky to protect a
reasonable expectation of privacy, particularly when such walls will
equally impede the free flow of information. 2 7
The government must therefore encourage the growth of
networks by preventing enough crime to stop electronic
balkanization. Just as in realspace, the police must provide a level of
security that permits people to live their lives on the net and expand
their communities. The fear of crime can stifle this human
outgrowth. The government cannot force people to trust each other,
nor can it force our computer networks to trust each other. The only
solution lies in the government eliminating enough intrusion to
pennit people to feel secure. Any strategies that rely on victim
precaution must be tempered by recognition of the value of network
effects.
3. The Emergence of a Special Form of Crime: Targeting Networks
This discussion of network effects and computer crime also
encourages a partial reconceptualization of what crime is. Traditional
criminal law focuses on crimes to individuals or property. This is an
atomized way of understanding crime. Instead, I suggest that certain
crimes target the human network and are, in ways, worse than other
crimes because they harm the community. This is true in realspace as
well as in cyberspace, but the language of cyberspace-which focuses
on networks and connectivity-allows us to see the point.
Some realspace crimes against networks are obvious. A bomb on a
major highway is designed to prevent people from traveling. Even
"' Id. at 174.
7 Eisenberg et al., supra note 58, at 258.
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though the damage is only to property, it has different effects than a
bomb detonated on a private road. Other realspace crimes against
networks are more subtle. Think of a shooting at a popular nightclub.
Before the shooting, connections between people flourished. People
went to the club to have a good time, to meet other people, and to
enjoy themselves. But the shooting undermined the trust in the club,
and the club eventually was forced to shut down.22' All of the benefits
the club once offered were now lost. Hate crimes, which target a
specific group, may also be understood as acts that undermine the
community and discourse between its heterogeneous groups. A
similar point might be made for rape as well.
What being human means is, in part, interconnecfivity. -' Those
crimes that undermine interconnectivity should be singled out for
special disfavor, in realspace as well as cyberspace. Cybercrimes such
as worms-which clog network connections-are obvious examples of
crimes against networks. These crimes are designed precisely to make
it more difficult for people to communicate with each other and are
analogous to the bombing of a highway in realspace. But there are
electronic counterparts to the more subtle forms of crime in public
spaces like club shootings. Clifford Stoll's experience with East
German hackers breaking into the Berkeley computer systems, for
example, demonstrated how a breakdown in trust can poison an
electronic community.2 0 Because both visibility and tangibility are
missing in cyberspace, individuals have even more of a need to trust
what they are seeing on their screens. When crimes target that trust,
the result can be to prevent people from coming onto the net and to
prevent those that do from sharing information. As one researcher
put it:
During the Internet worm attack I experienced problems in my research
collaboration with U.S. colleagues when they suddenly stopped
answering my messages. The only way to have a truly international
28 This is how a club named Kilimanjaro, near my house, in the Adams-Morgan
neighborhood of Washington, D.C., was shut down. See Ken Ringle, The Woes of
Kilimanjaro, WASH. POsT, Sept. 25, 1995, at BI ("'The publicity around th[e] shooting
scared everybody away.'").
229 See ARISTOTLE, THE PoLTIcs, bk. I, ch.2, at 5 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1958) (n.d.) (describing humans as zoon politikon or "social animals").
230 See STOLL, supra note 48, at 313 ("I learned what our networks are. I had
thought of them as a complicated technical device, a tangle of wires and circuits. But
they're much more than that-a fragile community of people, bonded together by
trust and cooperation. If that trust is broken, the community will vanish forever.");
supra text accompanying note 48.
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research community is for network communication to be reliable. If it is
not, then scientists will tend to stick to cooperating with people in their
local community even more than they do now.
A network is, after all, more than the sum of its individual parts.
Economic theory predicts that cooperation will yield collective payoffs
that are much greater than those derived when individuals only
pursue self-interest.3 2  A computer network like the internet is
nothing more than a structure for this cooperation. Each user derives
benefits that exceed those she would otherwise receive, provided that
everyone else is similarly cooperating. The trouble with cooperation
in practice is that it is very difficult to achieve because the individual
gains from defection exceed those derived from cooperation, which is
a standard collective action problem.z 3 The internet, for example,
could not have been built privately because every entity would have
waited for another entity to build it first, hoping to free-ride off of the
other's hard work. It took the government's sponsorship to build the
internet.
Now that this network exists, some forms of computer crime can
be understood simply as defections from the cooperative protocols of
the net. Computer worms, for example, undermine the positive
externalities of the network by making it more difficult for individuals
to receive benefits from cooperation. While the payoffs to the
criminal may be large (such as when she own a virus-protection
software firm or if she has some other interest in preventing
communications), the collectivity suffers. The enforcement of
computer crime statutes, then, is a way to prevent this harm to the
collective network and an attempt to preserve the network's
cooperative protocols.
Crimes that target the network, therefore, should be treated
differently because they impose a special harm. This harm is not
victim-centered, but community-centered, and explains why victims
alone should not be able to make decisions about whom to prosecute.
We punish not simply because of the harm to the individual victim,
but because the crime fragments trust in the community, thereby
reducing social cohesion and creating atomization. Just as the law
i' Jakob Nielsen, Disrupting Communities, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATTACK, supra
note 55, at 524-25.
i- See ROBERT R- PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMIERIC N COMNMUNIr 288 (2000) ("High levels of trust and citizen participation
operate through a %,ariety of mechanisms to produce socially desirable outcomes.").
2 ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-9 (1984).
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must worry about private self-help measures that impede
interconnectivity, so too it must worry about private actors who try to
sabotage interconnectivity for their own nefarious reasons. Again,
while this concept is not one unique to cyberspace, thinking in
computer terms, such as network effects, helps us understand it.
4. New De Minimis Crime
Realspace crime control generally depends upon victims to detect
and report a crime after it occurs. If John uses a housecleaner to
clean his house and that cleaner steals his diamond watch, effective
prosecution can occur only once John notices and reports the theft.
However, detection and reporting are influenced by the size of the
theft-a larger theft is obviously more likely to be reported than a
small one (John will detect and report the theft of his diamond watch,
but not the theft of pennies left on the floor). Accordingly, the
triviality of an offense influences the probability of enforcement. It
also may influence whether or not a crime has been committed at all;
the de minimis doctrine precludes minor offenses from being
considered criminal.
In cyberspace, however, crimes are likely to be skewed and
apportioned among many instead of few. Rather than stealing
millions from a single bank account, a cyberthief can work by stealing
pennies, or even slivers of pennies, from millions of accounts. In so
doing, the thief bets that the victims will not notice the missing sliver
or have a sufficient incentive to report the matter even if they do
notice a discrepancy. Credit card fraud is another example of this
type of theft. Instead of stealing one person's credit card number by
overhearing it, a cyberthief will steal thousands at once, using each
card only a single time so that the crime has a higher chance of going
unreported.M  These types of activities have been dubbed "salami"
attacks because the perpetrator is shaving off an imperceptibly small
piece of the larger asset.
The existence of salami attacks brings into focus a problem with
George Stigler's deterrence analysis. In Stigler's classic article, he
argues that the theft of $1000 is more than twice as harmful as the
theft of $500.Y35 This conclusion might be backwards; because smaller
thefts are more difficult to detect, they impose more social disutility
234 John Markoff, Discovey of Internet Flaws Is Setback for On-Line Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 11, 1995, atAl.
235 Stigler, supra note 102, at 529.
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than larger ones. One measure of a crime's disutility must be whether
its harms are likely to be remedied.
Because victims of crimes in cyberspace are unlikely to notice
these types of thefts, and even less likely to report them, law
enforcement needs to develop a new model of policing that does not
depend as heavily on victims. Instead, the law will need to depend
more on institutions that maintain accounts of potential victims, such
as banks. These institutions, which monitor multiple accounts, will
almost always stand in a better position to detect these forms of theft.
For example, they may employ computer hardware and software to
trigger alerts whenever a series of accounts is being changed at
once. 1.'3 Moreover, accounts could be remotely backed up and
checked periodically against current account information to detect
discrepancies.
But all of this places law enforcement in uncharted territory. It
cannot know what the best, or cheapest, form of protection is for an
entity such as a bank. Mandating the use of any particular form of
software or hardware is bound to impose deadweight losses given
standard failures of bureaucracy, from expertise to capture.37 Despite
these difficulties, it may be possible for lawmakers to create incentives
for these entities to detect and report cybercrime. For example, if
Jones loses his Visa card and reports it to the company, Jones is only
responsible for a small fee, even if a thief uses it to charge thousands
of dollars. This strategy places the burden on Visa to create a
mechanism that cuts off false charges as quickly as possible. A later
Part of this Article proposes similar burden-shifting strategies to create
better monitoring among ISPs. Doing so may offset a cybercriminal's
ability to conduct simultaneously many thousands of thefts without
substantially risking victim detection and reporting.
5. Supersleuth Victims and Electronic Vigilantism
There is, however, a very different role that some victims play in
SSeePARKER, supra note 18, at 92 ("Victims [of Salami acts] have usually lost so
little individually that they are unwilling to expend much effort to solve the case.
Specialized detection routines can be built into the suspect program, or snapshot
storage listings could be obtained at crucial times in suspect program production
runs."); GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC BANKING: EXPERIENCES REPORTED BY
BAXNKS IN IMPLEMENTING ON-LINE BANKING 14-15 (1998) (stating that some banks use
intrusion detection software to foil attacks).
i7 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 220, at 542-44 (criticizing government
standard-setting).
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some cyberspace crimes. Rather than being passive victims, they
become supersleuths, using their computer power to detect, report,
and sometimes even punish cybercriminals. For example, when last
year's DDOS attacks took place, companies such as eBay aggressively
detected them and developed countermeasures. The upshot was that
within ninety minutes eBay had developed a filter that permitted the
company's web site to function normally again. Other targets of the
DDOS attacks joined together to share information about the attacks
and to work out solutions.
The emergence of these supersleuth victims heralds new potential
for victim-oriented prevention strategies. If there are many victims of
a crime in realspace, it is not easy for them to organize. Collective
action problems loom, and self-help is quite difficult (particularly
when helping augment someone else's security might displace a crime
onto your own business or home). In cyberspace, by contrast, it is
easier for victims to organize, even as an attack is happening. For
example, they can patch firewalls, exchange virus software, and discuss
the perpetrator's attack patterns. Indeed, because of the
interdependence of the network, it may be optimal for sites to
cooperate with each other. If the barriers to victim precaution are
lower in cyberspace, then cost deterrence may be more efficient than
legal sanctions. This is because victims can prevent cybercrime more
cheaply by increasing perpetration costs than the government can
through threats of prosecution.
It is therefore possible to envision that cyberspace may alter the
relationship between public power and private power, and place more
in the hands of the latter. This is not altogether a welcome
development. The law enforcement function arises, in part, because
society fears private self-help measures. The law, by affording an
amount of retribution to the victims of crime, attempts to quell their
impulses to take matters into their own hands. But the law is slow,
sometimes inefficient, riddled with due process, and often frustrating.
Cyberspace is the antithesis of this. Instead of waiting months or even
years, ISPs can enact their own forms of crime prevention and justice
virtually instantaneously.
We shall call this the asymmetric incentives problem, and it is another
general quandary in law. The problem arises when the law places
burdens on actors that are accommodated by forgoing a benefit with
large positive externalities. Here are two examples drawn from
238 Cyberattack, Dempsey, supra note 182.
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realspace. A very robust "hostile environment" test for employment
discrimination could lead businesses to terminate any questionable
employees, as the benefit from one questionable employee is dwarfed
by the liability of a potential lawsuit.2" A standard of care that imposes
drastic liability on employers for torts committed by their employees
may lead employers not to hire anyone with even the slightest blemish
on their records. A general feature in these two cases is that the
burdens placed by the law disregard the way in which law-abiding
cautious entities are likely to react.
Reliance on victims to fight cybercrime raises similar issues. If the
law places high liability on these parties, the asymmetric incentive
problem predicts that they will react by denying entry to questionable
users. If Chase Manhattan suspects that someone with a password into
the bank system may be a thief, it will deny him access, even on the
flimsiest of suspicions. Indeed, the problem is much greater than
simply booting an individual user off of a web site. Because that user
can simply resurface by opening another e-mail account, some web
sites do not just cut off access by a user, they also eliminate access by
other users of the same domain system.1 It will be difficult for the
market to prevent these forms of electronic vigilantism when these
entities justify their decisions on the basis of protecting other
customers. Further, these actions have severe costs. Individuals may
be unfairly dismissed, their electronic identities ruined, data may be
lost, and interconnectivity may suffer.24'
- SeeJEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 79-84 (2000).
If Georgetown University is getting too much spain from AOL, it may try to cut
off e-mail sent from AOL, with obvious costs to the users of AOL who want to
communicate with the Georgetown community. See MAPS RBL Project, Mail Abuse
Pi'rvention S)stem Realtime Blackhole List, at http://maps.vix.com/rbl (last visited Feb. 18,
2001). The UDP, or Usenet Death Penalty, is another mechanism to accomplish this
blocking on Usenet message groups. When UDP is imposed against an ISP, it will
block all messages originating from that ISP. Usenet/Cancel FAQ at http://
wwwv.landfield.com/faqs/usenet/cancel-faq (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
The asymmetric incentives problem is one example of a suboptimal self-help
strategy. We have already encountered another form of suboptimal self-help,
fragmentation on the net and overprotection of web sites. Just as some stores in
realspace do not let certain groups of individuals shop in their stores out of a mistaken
fear of shoplifting, so too may web sites raise unnecessary restrictions upon entry.
These forms of negative self-help suggest that these third parties should not necessarily
be given an absolute property right to exclude other users. As Calabresi and Melamed
suggest, property rules are appropriate when negotiation costs are lower than the
administrative cost of a government adjudication. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
IARV. L. REv. 1089, 1106-10 (1972). But distributional inequities may arise when one
entity is given the power to dictate the terms of a transaction, thus precluding effective
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The way in which poor law enforcement on the net is contributing
to bad forms of self-help on the part of victims and institutions, or
electronic vigilantism, is one piece of the phenomenon we began
examining in this Part. Whether the net balkanizes into various
enclaves for privileged users, whether a deadweight loss producing an
arms race between hackers and victims ensues, and whether
institutions will act as private enforcers without due process, or other
protections, all depend in part on how the law treats cybercrime. One
crucial element, alluded to several times in this Part, concerns the role
of third parties.
C. Third-Party Strategies of Scanning, Coding, and Norm Enforcement
Unlike crimes in realspace, electronic crimes often involve the
assistance of innocent third parties. The author of the ILoveYou
worm, for example, used an ISP in the Philippines to spread the
disease. Similarly, many computer crimes depend upon credit card
companies to provide them the revenue necessary for the crimes to be
profitable. This forces us to ask whether lawmakers should develop
mechanisms to harness credit card companies as third party
intermediaries in preventing cybercrime. One novel way the law
could accomplish this is by giving cardholders the right to refuse
payment to the card company for illegal transactions. Card
companies would then be forced to examine businesses and their
products before extending credit arrangements to them.
Even when third parties are not present, they may be in a position
to prevent cybercrimes from happening. Here, the chief examples
concern programmers and hardware manufacturers. These entities
can either pursue destructive ends, such as writing dangerous software
like hackers' tools, or they can pursue positive goals, such as building
protocols into programs to foil computer attacks. While there are
some analogues to these third parties in realspace, their existence in
cyberspace is ubiquitous and raises the question of what legal devices
optimally situate them in preventing crime. The existence of these
third parties is the flipside of the lack of co-conspirators in
cybercrime-they are innocent entities that can prevent crime before
negotiation. AOL and E*Trade will always be in a position to boot off any potentially
risky customers, and this market power means that a liability rule is preferable.
Because individual customers may be judgment proof, it may be better to structure the
liability rule so that customers could sue to have their membership reinstated, rather
than giving customers the right to intrude (and permitting the other entities to sue
later).
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it happens. Moreover, as repeat institutional players, they may be
242
more responsive to legal risks than are individual users.
1. Internet Service Providers
In cyberspace, there are many reasons to think ISPs may prevent
crime at a cheaper cost than the government. In part, this is because
the speed of criminal activity in cyberspace suggests legal sanctions
will be less effective than cost-deterrence and architectural strategies.
The internet gives a criminal the resources to start up a criminal
enterprise very quickly, access to millions of potential targets, the
technology to reach those targets within moments, and the ability to
terminate the enterprise instantaneously. 243  Complicating law
enforcement even further is the fact that the criminal may weave his
crime through computers in several countries, making investigation
even more difficult.'4 While multilateral cooperation among
To the extent that government strategies focused on offenders, be they legal
sanctions, perpetration cost, or architecture, result in overdeterrence and chill socially
beneficial activity, third-party methods are particularly useful. Because many third
parties have, comparatively speaking, legal and technical sophistication, they may avoid
overreacting to government initiatives.
. As Senator Schumer puts it, "[O]ur laws-even our computer laws-are set up
for a world that travels at subsonic speed while hacking crimes move at the speed of
light." Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the HouseJudiciary Comm. and the CriminalJustice Oversight Subcomm. of
the S. Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Senator Charles Schumer),
http://wwv.house.gov/judiciary/schu0229.htm; see also Cybercrime Hearing, supra note
21, at 63 (statement of Jeff B. Richards, Executive Director, Internet Alliance)
(claiming that law enforcement must act in "Internet time").
4 As one FBI official puts it:
[T]he cyber environment is borderless, affords easy anonymity and methods
of concealment to bad actors, and provides new tools to engage in criminal
activity.... To deal with this problem, law enforcement must retool its work
force, its equipment, and its own information infrastructure. It must also
forge new partnerships with private industry, other agencies, and our
international counterparts.
Cyberattack, Vatis, supra note 25.
The United States has Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with only a few nations,
and the notion of computer crime does not exist in many countries abroad, thereby
preventing extradition. Cybercrime Hearing, supra note 21, at 28 (statement of Louis J.
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). If a country does not punish
computer crime, this will often prevent extradition due to the dual criminality
doctrine. For example, in 1992 Swiss hackers attacked the San Diego Supercomputer
center. The Swiss refused to cooperate with American authorities because of dual
criminality, the trail grew cold, and the case was never solved. DOJ REPORT, supra note
5, at 41-42.
Cybercrime also brings the notion of extraterritorial regulation to our attention.
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governments sounds nice in theory, it is very difficult to achieve in
practice. As a result, it may be more efficient for third parties to stop
cybercrime from happening rather than to rely on prosecution after a
crime takes place.
In a rich article, Reinier Kraakman analyzed the role of third
parties in enforcement.245 He examined three strategies:
chaperoning conduct, bouncing offenders, and whistleblowing. Each
of these strategies has potential for ISPs. First, ISPs can chaperone
subscribers by monitoring their conduct. ISPs could randomly
monitor web traffic to critically important sites, such as military
computers. They may scan web sites hosted on their networks for
illegal programs, from pirated software to hackers' tools. ISPs can
scan e-mail for viruses, thus stopping their spread.246 ISPs could also
develop sophisticated hacker profiles that permit them to surveil large
numbers of users and pick out those who look suspicious because they
repeatedly try to enter certain sites.241 Unlike the old kinds of profiles
that invariably and odiously focused on stigmatizing traits such as race
or class, the new cyberprofiles will focus on one's acts. This has the
potential to revolutionize the fight against crime.
Second, ISPs could bounce risky subscribers by purging them from
the network altogether. They could, for example, bar customers from
opening accounts without realspace identification, such as drivers'
Larry Lessig explains the prohibition of crimes committed abroad on the ground that
someone who engages in criminal activity in other countries is more likely to engage in
it upon return to America. LESSiG, supra note 4, at 191. This explanation, however,
omits a more fundamental reason for criminal law to cover extraterritorial acts. The
law prevents certain crimes abroad not only because of the complementary
relationship with crimes that might eventually take place domestically (which is
Lessig's point), but also because such crimes reflect poorly on the world's opinion of
the United States and its population. From this perspective, the government regulates
crimes in order to preserve and protect the reputations of U.S. citizens.
245 Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
2 See Barbara Cole-Gomolski, E-Mail Getting a Scan from Server, COMPUTERWORLD,
Nov. 24, 1997, at 53 (discussing server-based scanning programs that detect viruses
before they reach the end-user's desktop); Christopher Lindquist, You ve Got (Dirty)
Mai4 COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 13, 2000, at 72; Juan Carlos Perez, ENS
Offers E-Mail Virus Scanning, at http://www.computerworld.com/cwi/story/
0,1199,NAV47_ST024841,00.htm (July 15, 1996) (discussing an ISP's e-mail scanning
service that detects and quarantines infected files); Sarah L. Roberts, First Line of
Defense, at http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/features/utility/emalav/_.open.htm (Apr. 8,
1997) (reviewing and testing various e-mail anti-virus gateway applications).
247 According to Dr. Fred Cohen, the person who, in 1983, coined the term
"computer virus," internet crime can be stopped by creating generic threat profiles.
Cyberthreats, Cohen, supra note 121.
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licenses, thus crippling digital anonymity. Third, ISPs could act as
whistleblowers and report instances of computer crime. The trouble
with whistleblowing, as Kraakman points out, is that it often imposes
large costs because it forces targets to hire legal counsel and expend
resources. , In cyberspace, however, the reporting requirement
might be most effective when ISPs report their findings not to the
police, but to private entities. For example, ISPs could create tiers of
trustworthiness and place each subscriber in a specific tier based on
activity patterns. That tier would be furnished to those web sites and
users interacting with a particular subscriber, and the sites and other
users can thus decide whether to engage in transactions given the risk
designation. But there are obvious costs to this strategy, including
harms from false negatives and positives.
Fourlh, and moving beyond Kraakman's three categories to usher
architecture into the analysis, ISPs could build software and hardware
constraints into their systems. They may, for example, ensure that
electronic traffic carries a specific source address consistent with the
assigned address (a technique called egress filtering). ISPs might go
further and only accept traffic from authorized sources (a technique
called ingress filtering).2" Or ISPs could configure their systems to
prevent subscribers from repeatedly trying to log in using different
passwords. "
Fifth, ISPs could use methods that make it easier for law
enforcement to investigate cybercrime. These techniques would not
only help solve crime ex post, they would also help deter crime ex
ante. For example, ISPs could preserve data trails for long periods of
time, thus enabling the government to trace electronic signals. ;" Or
they could agree to pierce digital anonymity upon a sufficient showing
Kraakman, supra note 245, at 59. ISPs must currently notify authorities if
incidents of child exploitation come to their attention. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 13032 (Lexis
2000).
111 'ebtrattack, Fithen, supra note 211. While ISPs have claimed that ingress
filtering "wiould make their systems unmanageable or too slow, such networks as the
@Home Network now operated by AT&T, which is [at a] far higher speed than the vast
majority of ISP connections today, have adopted this practice with great success and
without apparent management or cost effects." Cyberthreats, Cohen, supra note 121.
-" These strategies raise transparency concerns, and will be discussed infra text
accompanying notes 265-71
-11 Data-preservation letters pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f) permit the
government to request that an ISP "take all necessary steps to preserve records and
other evidence in its possession pending issuance of a court order or other process."
18 U.S.C. § 2703(f)(1) (Supp. AV 1998). Such records are to be preserved for ninety
days, and the period can be renewed for another ninety days. Id. § 2703(f) (2).
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by the government of the need to do so.2
Should law require ISPs to use these five strategies? Not always,
because following the strategies may incur deadweight losses that
outweigh their utility. Just as with victim precaution, ISPs are not
always the cheapest cost avoiders. Virus scanning software, for
example, is costly, may slow systems down considerably, and can
threaten individual privacy interests. ISPs that require subscriber
information might pose a threat to privacy, either because they might
leak the material themselves or because a rogue employee or hacker
might do so. If ISPs were liable for pirated material on their networks,
they might more vigilantly police subscribers to the point where
privacy would be eroded . And the perception, often unwarranted,
that the government has broad surveillance powers may exacerbate
the public's fears of loss of privacy. This is one example of the
asymmetric incentive problem as applied to ISPs. If ISPs are liable for
the sins of their users, they will purge anyone about whom they have
the slightest suspicion of committing criminal wrongdoing. When
AOL suspects that Smith spread a virus, even unintentionally, it will
eliminate Smith because the benefit to AOL of one additional
customer will be outweighed by the risk of harboring a virus-spreader.
The point of these quick examples is not to suggest that third-
party deterrence is always inappropriate, but simply to caution that
there are tough calculations to work out. Because government is
usually unlikely to have information about optimal third-party
precaution, it should not use sanctions to force ISPs to engage in
particular forms of prevention. (Some European countries, by
contrast, consider it a crime to operate a computer center without
adequate security precautions. 2) The government is likely to over- or
252 The government could, for example, use contract law as a way of enhancing
compliance with criminal law. It could require that contracts between an ISP and a
subscriber contain a provision permitting the ISP to expose the real identity of a user
after a sufficient government request. Such contractual relationships would not
emerge in a free market due to free rider problems. A Dutch proposal, by contrast,
would punish an ISP that could not identify the actual offender in certain cybercrime
cases. Ulrich Sieber, Responsibility of Internet Provider-A Comparative Legal Study with
RecommendationsforFuture Legal Policy, 15 COMP. L. & SEC. REP. 291, 302 (1999).
253 An Australian High Court decision suggests that ISPs will be liable for copyright
infringement on its networks. Telstra Corp. v. Australasian Performing Right Ass'n, 71
A.L.J.R. 1312, 1319 (Austl. 1997); see also Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co.,
No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (holding Prodigy
liable for defamation because its editorial control over statements "opened it up to a
greater liability than.., other computer networks that make no such choice").
254 Sieber, supra note 252, at 293-96.
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underestimate the costs and benefits of prevention, and this runs the
risk of either prompting actors to forgo utility-producing activity or
inducing them to take wasteful precautions.
Government thus should recognize that it lacks information about
proper third-party crime prevention. Yet ISPs may at times be the
cheapest cost avoiders, and forgoing their assistance risks
inefficiencies and a loss in deterrence.55 (For example, the State of
New York recently brought an indictment against an ISP that failed to
prevent its members from accessing child pornography; bringing this
single action might do more to reduce child pornography than
bringing numerous actions against the ISP's customers. 2 6) The
difficulty lies in writing legal rules that recognize this efficiency. The
common solution to the lack of government information is to use the
tort system and a standard of "due care."237 Forcing every ISP to
determine the costs and benefits of due care, however, imposes the
deadweight loss of each ISP having to run such calculations. Instead,
government may subsidize the development of a common set of
standards partially devised by industry. The failure to adhere to these
standards could give rise to civil liability.25s  An ISP could be
responsible for a small portion of damages caused by a subscriber if
the damage could have been prevented with due care; such due care
would be defined by industry standards.
This is one method to create downstream liability for ISPs that do
not take reasonable care. The case for doing so is that ISPs do not
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (stating
that in "situations in which the imposition of vicarious liability is manifestly just, the
'contributory' infringer [is] in a position to control the use of copyrighted works by
others and [has] authorized the use without permission from the copyright owner"
(citations omitted)).
See BufiNETEnters Guilty Plea in Porn Case, BuFFALO NEWS, Feb. 17, 2001, at A7.
Due care, however, can be difficult to define. It should include all the factors
in the Hand formula, see supra text accompanying note 223, as well as the social costs of
third-party precaution.
Larry Lessig has suggested that ISPs could create disincentives for people
yiewving inappropriate sites, such as "slowing the response time for a certain kind of
senice it wants to discourage." LESSIG, supra note 4, at 71. Lessig's idea here is largely
critical, but it can be used to explore the ways in which ISPs might be used to fight
cybercrime. Because no one ISP has an incentive to reduce criminal activity, a serious
free rider problem exists; any ISP that tries to reduce crime through slowing down
response times or verifying identities would simply leave a would-be criminal to switch
service providers. If the government, however, required ISPs to monitor subscribers,
the free rider problem would be minimized. ISPs may be in the best position to
monitor criminal behavior since they are most familiar with traffic patterns, identities,
and other important information.
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have market incentives to behave as gatekeepers and that for them to
behave in this way generates positive externalities.2'5  These
externalities, which increase perpetration costs and architectural
barriers to crime, are important because legal sanctions provide only a
portion of deterrence. Government regulation of ISPs is necessary to
avoid free riding (for example, CompuServe might not install virus-
filtering software because it hopes that AOL will) and to bring about
efficient third-party prevention. This is why relying on custom will not
yield an efficient result; custom may arise because of a race to the
bottom rather than because it is optimal.
Nonetheless, any use of the tort system must account for the
asymmetric incentive problem. Placing burdens on ISPs risks
balkanizing the net and inducing ISPs to purge risky users. Again,
these results might be worth the cost; the point is simply that this can
become part of the price tag. It is therefore necessary that
assessments of ISP liability incorporate the full social cost of
prevention before they are employed. A formula that simply
compares an ISP's cost of prevention against the harm of the crime
would ignore these other important costs. Lowering the amount of
damages, say to a fraction of the ultimate harm, may be one way to
maintain security incentives without incurring suboptimal
preventative costs.
But the costs of third-party prevention mechanisms must not blind
us to the fact that ISPs will often be essential in preventing
cybercrime. The failure to rely on ISPs to prevent cybercrime
threatens enforcement of the law. Because cybercriminals can
coordinate simultaneous attacks and overwhelm traditional law
enforcement, ISP participation is often necessary. This dilemma is an
example of Larry Lessig's claim that "a difference in degree [can]
ripen into [a] difference in kind."260  While Lessig does not fully
explicate his claim, cybercrime illustrates it well. Computer attacks
come not in single instances, but in great numbers, and all at once.
To prevent crime on the net, law enforcement will need to harness
private self-help measures, such as firewalls, to create a responsive,
quasi-living network that permits private actors to band together and
stop attacks through architectural and cost-based solutions. Law faces
259 Hackers do not hack only into an ISP's computers, and viruses do not simply
spread among an ISP's subscriber base. Therefore, the benefits of ISP prevention do
not inhere only to the ISP, whereas the costs (such as higher access fees, slower
response times, etc.) are foisted on subscribers.
260 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 21.
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a difficult task in trying to encourage enough third-party precaution
to prevent cybercrime, but not so much that the benefits of the net
are undermined.
2. Credit Card Companies
Many cybercriminals use a profit model that depends on credit
card companies. To remain viable, sites that distribute pirated
software, illegal child pornography, or hackers' tools need profit. (I
intentionally place not-for-profit cybercrimes, such as the free release
of copyrighted music, to one side.) For a large number of these
crimes, credit card companies are the predominant method of
payment. This is because of the enormous transaction costs involved
with alternatives, such as sending cash through the mail (slow and
traceable) and digital cash (not really available yet, and perhaps
always traceable, depending on the code). For this reason, credit card
companies, which are currently third-party beneficiaries to these
forms of computer crime, may be a useful ally in preventing them.
The trick is to create a system that will encourage credit card
companies to refuse credit services to illegal businesses. Card
companies plead ignorance when faced with situations in which their
customers are found to be engaging in felonies. This ignorance, or
perhaps willful blindness, is widespread, and because the majority of
card companies do not have actual knowledge of their customers'
business practices, it is difficult to charge them with a criminal
violation. Instead, a simple change to the rules of payment may
provide card companies with an incentive to avoid blindness and
reduce criminals' ability to rely on card-generated profits.
The simple trick is to give credit cardholders the right to refuse to
pay for items on their bill that are illegal. Credit card companies
already investigate disputed items, such as when a vendor overcharges
a customer. The rule change would add illegality to the list of items
that require investigation. Because card companies would fear
extending credit to companies for services that might go unpaid, they
would have an incentive to investigate the business practices of each
client. The deadweight losses incurred by investigations would have to
be assessed against the cost of computer crimes; if the losses are too
great, then perhaps the rule could be modified so that only certain
forms of illegality would give cardholders a right to refuse payment,
thereby reducing the frequency, extent, and cost of card company
investigations. Good faith investigations and monitoring by card
companies could also serve to nullify a customer's refusal to pay. The
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method would reduce the gain to offenders by steering crime into less
efficient modes, requiring greater investments to receive profit from
customers. This is one example of using civil regulation on
noncriminals to alter a variable that deters crime: perpetration costs.
3. Software and Hardware Manufacturers
In addition to interfering with payment, the government can
induce software and hardware manufacturers to employ architectural
strategies that further deter cybercrime. For example, the
government could require that hardware routers be modified to
detect and eliminate suspicious traffic. Government could also
require software manufacturers to remove trap doors or to provide
accurate information about their existence. Or the government
might regulate the net more directly by encouraging or requiring the
installation of more secure code, such as Internet Protocol Version
Six.262
In general, regulating software programmers will reduce
enforcement costs (as compared to regulating end users) because
there are fewer programmers than end users. A single enforcement
action against Napster, for example, might deter more copyright theft
than prosecuting hundreds of individual users (particularly when
programmers as sophisticated repeat players may be more responsive
to legal risks than are individuals). The technique of product
regulation as crime control is sometimes available in realspace, such as
when the government regulates the sale of harmful products like
firearms and thieves' tools because they may be used to commit
crimes. At times, government's realspace strategies are subtle-such
261 See Internet Denial of Service Attacks and the Federal Response: Joint Hearing Before the
Crime Subcomm. of the House Judiciary Comm. and the CriminalJustice Oversight Subcomm. of
the S.Judiciay Comm., 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Charles Giancarlo, Senior Vice
President, Cisco Systems, Inc.), 2000 WL 234739 [hereinafter Cyberattack, Giancarlo]
(stating that internet switches and routers "can be equipped with a variety of filters and
security devices that detect suspicious patterns in the information traffic at a site," and
that such "equipment can be configured to limit or entirely block out data that
appears suspicious" and "can be... configured to sniff out these phony addresses and
break off contact before a trafficjam results").
262 This protocol, which is nearly complete, would revamp the old web protocol
codes by requiring each data packet to "carry its own authentication and encryption."
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., Some Things Are Worse Than a Woolly Web, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16,
2000, at A27. Thus, it would foil DDOS attacks as well as carry the possibility of
enhancing law enforcement's ability to trace criminals who use the internet in
furtherance of their crimes.
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as changing highway patterns to foil certain crimes.2 These are all
methods that employ cost deterrence principles by making it
expensive for a criminal to pursue illegal activity.
Direct government regulation of hardware and software will not
generally create an asymmetric incentive problem in the way reliance
on ISPs and victims does. This is, in part, because government
strategies will not rely on unknown quantities of civil liability.
Obviously, if an e-mail company could be held financially responsible
for the spread of a virus, or an internet browser company could be
found liable for a virus spread through its product, the result could be
to close down these businesses and stymie future innovation. For that
reason, government may forgo civil liability and regulate certain basic
forms of security measures by making the failure to follow them
subject to low, not open-ended, administrative fines.
The problem with such a strategy is that the government often
lacks data about necessary security protocols and is even more
unfamiliar with their costs.'" The government has a natural tendency
to favor security over operability (a different type of asymmetric
incentive problem). For that reason, government must make its code
regulations available to industry ahead of time, so that industry has an
adequate chance for notice and comment. The trouble with following
this procedure is that notice might tip off criminals, who can use the
time to develop countermeasures to bypass the proposed security
protocols. Security and operability thus may be, in reality, mutually
exclusive goals.
This tension between security and operability is a difficult one to
accommodate and a third factor must be considered as well:
transparency. Hardware and software protocols are embedded, often
invisibly, in computers. Larry Lessig has argued that it is difficult for
the public to hold government accountable for regulations it imposes
on manufacturers. Law enforcement has the obvious goal of avoiding
giving criminals open access to its designs, but pursuing this goal,
Se" supra text accompanying notes 13, 98-107 (discussing realspace strategies for
crime control, such as increasing perpetration costs or modifying architecture).
See supra text accompanying notes 200-01 (indicating that investigating and
prosecuting each and every of the millions of cybercrimes committed is not an
economically viable option). There are times, however, when the government might
be ahead of the private sector in developing softwrare to forestall attacks. For example,
the FBI developed a software measure that could detect DDOS agents and masters on
operating sys tems. It made the detection tool available on its web site, and it has been
downloaded "tens of thousands of times," preventing many such attacks. Cyberattack,
Vatis, supra note 25.
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Lessig contends, can strip necessary information from the law-abiding
public as well. Citizens cannot vote with their purchases if their
purchases contain secret code. And even if they know of the code's
existence, they will not know whether the manufacturer or the head of
the FBI insisted on it. Thus far, we live in a system in which abuses by
prosecutors and police are generally checked by the electorate; if you
do not like what district attorney Robert Morgenthau is doing you can
vote him out.115 But the regulation of code in cyberspace, Lessig
claims, threatens this structure of accountability and also creates the
potential for public paranoia about law enforcement on the net.
There are some flaws with this explanation. After all, law
enforcement in realspace does not have transparency either. Think of
informants, undercover cops, and many secret law enforcement
techniques such as interrogation methods. (Indeed, many regulations
that govern realspace in the administrative state are made by largely
unaccountable agencies as well, in matters of crime control as well as
numerous other areas.) It is at least debatable as to whether
government regulation of software and hardware would be less
transparent than these realspace regulations.' 66
Perhaps the largest flaw with the transparency argument against
government regulation is that it confuses the causality; government
regulation may actually solve the transparency problem rather than
cause it. Code, after all, is largely written by private entities. The
choices made by programmers have policy implications, e-mail
programs can be configured to turn sensitive information over to
265 LESSIG, supra note 4, at 98 ("The state has no right to hide its agenda. In a
constitutional democracy its regulations should be public. And thus, one issue raised
by the practice of indirect regulation is the general issue of publicity. Should the state
be permitted to use non-transparent means when transparent means are available?");
see also id. at 7, 18, 44; Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What CyberLaw Alight
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 541-43 (1999) (contending that secret regulation of
code would diminish political accountability and enable the government to "avoid the
political consequences of its choices").
A different argument against over-reliance on code-based regulation emphasizes
trust. An emerging body of empirical evidence suggests that cooperation can be
enhanced by institutions that foster and support trust rather than rely solely on overt
regulation. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). If the
architecture of the internet shifts to one in which users are presumed to be
nontrustworthy, its presumptions could prove self-fulfilling.
266 One difference is that these structures of constraint generally only target
lawbreakers, whereas certain forms of code regulate everyone. But this difference may
cut the other way; greater accountability may inhere to those regulations that govern
lawabiders and lawbreakers alike.
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government agents and private detectives, web pages can secretly
collect information about users and distribute it to commercial
entities, and so on. Transparency is not a concern acute to
government regulation; private code too has such drawbacks. Viewed
from this perspective, government regulation of source code might
actually further transparency goals. Government regulations are
required to be public, placed in the United States Code and the
Federal Register. And the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is a
broad weapon to counter any indirect government mechanisms to
regulate cyberspace. Through public rules and FOIA, government
regulation can shed sunlight on private code. (Other mechanisms,
such as open hearings, notice and comment proceedings, open votes
in Congress, and public trials shed further light as well.)
For government regulation to further transparency goals, the
regulations themselves-but not necessarily the precise source code-
must be made public. There are ways to structure a system that would
further enhance accountability, such as by insisting that any
government regulation be placed in the United States Code, rather
than in an agency regulation, and devising a substitution procedure
that permits the public to be on notice of a regulation's effect, without
providing the technical details of the code. ' Alternatively, a panel of
private experts could be given the underlying source code if the
details were truly necessary to evaluate the system. Open regulations
could also make it easier for industry to participate in their
fonnulation and thereby assist the government in devising an optimal
policy. -"
The transparency problems with direct government regulation
,- 7The substitution proposal could be modeled on § 6(c) of the Classified
Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C.S. App. § 6(c) (Lexis 2000).
- Legal scholars generally think of administrative and criminal law as separate
spheres, but there are a host of regulations that intersect these two areas. Sometimes
the safety component of these regulations is not always apparent from the plain text
(for example, a rule requiring lighting around taverns). Instead of regulating software
and hardware manufacturers, for instance, government could devise security standards
that insurance companies should use when devising liability policies. These companies
would be free to depart from such standards if they deemed them over- or
underinclusive, and this practice might lead to a more efficient result than simple
regulation. "Cyberinsurance is the hottest sector in the insurance industry" right now.
Banham, supra note 1; see also Cyberattack, Giancarlo, supra note 261 ("In the 'bricks and
mortar' world, retail businesses take advantage of lower insurance rates if their stores
are adequately protected .Nith locks and alarm systems."). These companies have a
profit incentive and may be best situated to adapt to changing technology.
Alternatively, government may provide tax breaks for internet companies that
undertake certain security measures.
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have been overstated and the severe change the computer has
wrought in the ease of crime may force consideration of such
solutions. Regulating a few software manufacturers will often prove
easier than regulating one hundred million users. If browsers could
not pirate music, for example, the cost of engaging in piracy would be
much higher to individuals (yet another example of cost
deterrence).269 Even if individuals did not know that code was
constraining their activity, they would inevitably be affected by the
software protocols that the code writers developed and their tastes
may be shaped away from illegal conduct by the unavailability of
pirating software.270 Of course, government must be sensitive to its
institutional weaknesses and avoid using fiat in ways that create
inefficiencies. Nevertheless, regulating code provides the government
a new, and important, mechanism for deterring criminal activity. '
4. Public Enforcement of Social Norms
Thus far, we have seen how third parties can control crime
through increasing the probability of detection by law enforcement,
269 This is what the law has currently attempted to do by forbidding rewritable CD
players that can make copies of copies. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1994).
270 See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text (discussing adaptive preferences
and how they affect the development of crime on the internet). However, the use of
code must be attentive to constitutional constraints, constraints that are beyond the
scope of this Article.
271 If a secure code is necessary to prevent crime, it may follow that some forms of
computer crime may generate utility. Computer crimes such as launching viruses and
hacking can test the limits of security; these actions may at times contribute to the
general welfare. For this reason, the estimates that the ILoveYou worm caused more
than $10 billion in damages are overstated. The episode revealed the security
weaknesses in the popular Microsoft Outlook program and underscored the fact that
the cookie-cutter software programs that run on most of the world's PCs are fraught
with homogeneity. If there were greater variety in e-mail programs, for instance, the
virus could not have spread nearly as rapidly as it did. But because virtually everyone
(for now, at least) uses Outlook, the virus spread from Manila to Milan in minutes. As
any farmer knows, genetic variety is vital in protecting against the spread of crop
disease. The Irish potato blight of the 1840s was caused, after all, by a monoculture
which permitted the disease to spread like wildfire. Harold J. Morowitz, Balancing
Species Preservation and Economic Considerations, 253 SCIENCE 752, 753 (1991). Just as
variety in DNA codes is important, so too is variety in computer software codes. Like
an infection in realspace, the upshot of the ILoveYou worm may be to bring about a
stronger immunity for our computers in times to come. This is not to say that such
behavior is forgivable or even a good idea, only that there are complicated effects
stemming from these forms of computer crime. Optimal third-party strategies must
bear in mind that, just as the social costs of prevention tend to be underestimated, so
too the costs of computer crime tend to be exaggerated.
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increasing perpetration costs, and modifying architecture. We now
take up the matter of whether it is possible to use the general
populace-a diffuse third party-to enforce social norms against
crime.
In realspace, norm-based strategies are promising because crime is
almost always visible. The perpetrator must come to the scene of the
crime (say, in a car), the victim and other witnesses may see the
perpetrator (a man holding a large wrench near a windshield), the
commission of the crime itself is visible (the man putting the wrench
through the windshield), and the after-effects of the crime are visible
(the smashed glass, the stolen car). The architecture of cyberspace,
however, alters these parameters. The criminal may be thousands of
miles away, no witnesses may observe the criminal's presence, the
crime itself may be masked by layers of code, and the after-effects of
the crime may take months or years to even discover. All of this poses
challenges to the realspace model of law enforcement.
a. The Influence of Social Norms
In realspace, crime is controlled not merely through the threat of
police sanction, but also through the development of social norms
that constrain lawbreaking. The police cannot be present to prevent
every crime (nor would we want them to be). Instead, effective law
enforcement requires the internalization of the lessons of the law by a
large majority of the population, even in circumstances in which the
police are not near. Social norms have two aspects: they prevent
people from engaging in criminal activity through the development of
conscience and they embody a system of values that society enforces.
These values transform individual citizens into projectors of
conscientiousness for others. In short, the law helps social norms
develop, and these social norms constrain criminal activity.
Larry Lessig has suggested that the lack of physical presence and
concrete identity hamper the efficacy of regulation through social
norms in cyberspace.2- Because people can change their identities at
will and are not necessarily who they say they are, it is quite difficult to
hold them accountable for their past actions on the net.
Ou LEssiG, supra note 4, at 15-17. The lack of norms in cyberspace may also be an
outgrowth of the newness of cyberspace. The codes of conduct that govern realspace
have evolved over decades, if not centuries. In contrast, there is no consensus
regarding what counts as good conduct on the internet. See Rasch, supra note 18, at
145.
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Furthermore, the ethic of cyberspace, which encourages roleplaying
and alternative characters, facilitates the erasure of norms. When only
a few people owned computers, and when even fewer of these owners
were hackers, codes of conduct evolved to constrain much cybercrime.
However, just as regulation by social norms becomes ineffectual in
vast, anonymous metropolises, so too the vast expansion of the net has
eroded these codes.7
On the other hand, while much has been made about the lack of
norms in cyberspace, it is worth asking why more cybercrime does not
take place. It is not difficult to break into a computer, but the
majority of people refrain from doing this. One reason for such
restraint is because they think such behavior is immoral.274 If so, an
understanding of how morality and conscience act as constraints in
the invisible world of cyberspace must be developed. This
understanding would start with the fact that no crime can be
committed purely in cyberspace; every crime requires some user who
lives and breathes in the physical world. And it is here that the role of
social norms emerges.
Because crimes committed in cyberspace still require a user to be
in realspace, law can bring realspace institutions to bear in preventing
cybercrime. By helping citizens act as norm enforcers, law can
contribute to private prevention efforts while simultaneously working
to entrench certain norms into the conscience of individuals.
Computer criminals may be observable while committing a crime, and
2 There is strong evidence that this is the case, from the rise of hate mail on the
internet to the number of online affairs and other behavior typically constrained by
norms in realspace. See, e.g., Chris Brooke, I'm Losing My Man to an American He Met on
the Intenet, DAILY MAIL, June 21, 2000, at 29; Libby Copeland, Cyber-Snooping into a
Cheating Heart, WASH. PosT, Aug. 8, 2000, at Cl (describing the unraveling of a
marriage due to an online romance); John Markoff, Staking a Claim on the Virtual
Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, at E5 ("I'm in mourning.... We once had our own
code of honor. Now there's a land grab going on in cyberspace. I'll just have to put
up bigger walls and get better alarms.").
2 4 [T] he behavior of people in cyberspace is strongly bound by social norms,
albeit perhaps not so much as in [realspace].... Technically knowledgeable
friends of mine have assured me ... that even those systems rated as secure
against crackers are far more vulnerable than they ought to be. Cracking tools
are widely available. The recent Denial of Service attacks on Yahoo and others
now appear to have been carried out by someone whose technical competence
was meager. And so it would appear that the same sort of social pressure that
makes it reasonably safe to walk around in a city full of bricks, makes it
reasonably safe to have computers on an Internet infested with crackers.
E-mail from Neal Stephenson, Author, to Neal Katyal, Associate Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center (Apr. 28, 2000, 01:07 EST) (on file with author).
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they are certainly observable afterward. Strategies that teach children
about the evils of cybercrime might therefore function well, not only
because children may internalize the lessons and believe that
cybercrime is wrong, but also because they may listen enough to feel
guilty after committing one. This guilt is likely to emerge when seeing
parents and peers.
Lawmakers can capitalize on the deterrent effect of social norms
in several ways. Low technology techniques such as placing computers
in visible locations can also reinforce the visibility of the user and
computer screen and thus cut down on cybercrime. (Perhaps the law
could require internet cafes and other vendors to place kiosks in
visible areas.) In addition, technologies might be developed to
transmit authentic facial displays between users as a way of mirroring
transactions in realspace. Again, the idea is to harness the realspace
elements that exist in any cybercrime and to bring the social norms
that constrain crime to bear on those elements.
Law enforcement cannot simply see its task as prosecuting crime
as it happens. Rather, it must proactively educate citizens about the
dangers of cybercrime and try to facilitate the use of social norms as a
constraint. Because the architecture of the net enables relative
invisibility and pseudonymity, such a task is not easy. But using the
realspace monitoring and inculcation provided by parents, peers, and
others may prevent some crime on the net. While such strategies will
not be completely effective, they may aid in deterring a segment of the
offending population-a segment that may not be as responsive to
legal sanctions or monetary prices.
b. Broken Windows in Cyberspace
Forgive the linguistic play, for "broken windows" refers not only to
the theory of policing developed by James Q. Wilson and George L.
Kelling, 7"' but also to what happens to a computer after being exposed
to a strong computer virus that disables the Microsoft operating
system. Apart from this verbal coincidence, what does Wilson and
Kelling's theory tell us about criminal law in cyberspace? At first
glance, one is tempted to answer "nothing at all." After all, unlike
crimes in realspace, those in cyberspace are almost always invisible.
There are no bars on the windows to glimpse and no loiterers and
panhandlers to avoid. Broken windows is a metaphor for realspace
i47 SeeJames Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, AT. MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29.
20011 1109
1110 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1003
policing, not one for the invisible world of computer-created space.
But this impulse is wrong. The idea behind the broken windows
theory is one about the complementarity of crime, that visible
disorders should be punished because they breed further disorder.2"'
The insight of Wilson and Kelling was that these disorders are not
always the most serious crimes like murder and rape, but instead
could be as trivial as loitering and littering. Wilson and Kelling thus
inverted the standard thinking about enforcement and suggested that
it was more profitable to focus on low-level crime. The reason for this
shift in focus, however, was the idea of complementarity between
crimes. As crimes become more common, the norms that constrain
crime erode, and more crimes take place as a result of that erosion.
A theory that adapts broken windows to cyberspace, therefore,
would begin by asking what types of computer crime produce
complementarity. It turns out that most of the widely reported and
publicly known computer crimes, such as Robert Morris's worm and
the recent ILoveYou bug, prompted rashes of copycat crimes.77 To
avoid copycat crimes, law enforcement must punish, rapidly and
powerfully, those crimes that produce the most visible social disorder
in cyberspace. While this sounds intuitive, it has some perverse
results. It may mean, for instance, that government should not expose
some criminal activity to public view and ought to maintain the
invisibility of such crimes.
Many corporate victims do not report cybercrime to the police
because they fear alerting customers and shareholders to the lack of
security.27 Because only the corporation has the data revealing the
276 See id. at 31 ("[O~ne unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares,
and so breaking more windows costs nothing.").
277 See Internet Integriy and Critical Infrastructure Act: Hearing Before S. Comm. an the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000), LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House (statement of
James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division)
("Frighteningly, the 'I Love You' virus was followed almost immediately by copycat
variants. [Among the] almost 30 ... variants that... followed... [was] the New Love
virus, a virus that self-replicated, mutated in name and size, and destroyed the
computer systems affected by it."); Pamela Samuelson, Computer Viruses and Worms:
Wrong, Crime, or Both?, in COMPUTERS UNDER ATTAcK, supra note 55, at 479, 484
(mentioning reports of copycat activity following publicity of Morris's worm).
WilliamJ. Cook, who authored the DOJ's computer prosecution manual, states
that "[o]rganizations often swallow losses quietly rather than notifying the authorities
and advertising their vulnerability to shareholders and clients." Michael Lee et al.,
Comment, Electronic Commerce, Hackers, and the Search for Legitimacy: A Regulatoy
Proposal, 14 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 839, 844-45 (1999) (citation omitted); see also
Cyberthreats, Cerf, supra note 23 ("Companies are concerned that revealing and
admitting past mistakes, shortcomings, negative experiences or incidents can open
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crime, no one else is likely to discover it. Government might want to
keep some forms of crime invisible-not only in order to encourage
victims to come forward, but also to prevent social disorder wrought
279by complementary crimes. Since these crimes may only affect
individual entities (putting to one side situations in which viruses
replicate and spread to other computers), prosecution of these cases
should be a low priority because they do not create harmful
complementarity. Building on the experience of victims, the
government could occasionally release reports about how to maintain
effective computer security. Therefore, government may want to
create mechanisms to permit victims of crime to inform the
government so that investigators can conduct adequate studies about
them, but also guarantee the secrecy of the victims.
Traditional broken windows theory suffers another dissimilarity
with cyberspace: geography. Underlying Wilson and Kelling's theory
is a second idea stemming from Wilson's earlier work, that law-abiding
residents move out of high crime areas and thus leave them for
criminals to plunder.s One goal of criminal law should be to
encourage good neighbors to live on every street corner. Broken
windows policing accomplished this by cutting down on visible
problems, thus making law abiders feel secure. In cyberspace,
however, there are no geographic areas or boundaries. Instead, law
must encourage the equivalent of good neighbors to flourish by
punishing even those minor computer pranks that achieve high
visibility. The Morris worm, for example, did not destroy any data.
Nevertheless, it scared off a whole group of people from using
computers, and may have even stymied the growth of the net. The
more law-abiding people that exist on and off the net, the greater the
power of norm-based regulation.
them up for [public] criticism [or potential legal liability].... [C]ompanies are [also]
loath to share proprietary or privileged corporate information. Additionally, firms run
the risk of eroding consumer, customer, partner and investor confidence.").
17- There may be instances in which the government needs to disseminate
intormation quickly about a particular crime to permit other users to take
countermeasures against a specific form of attack. While publication of these methods
often carries the cost of teaching other criminals how to carry out the crime, law
enforcement generally issues the warnings. See PARKER, supra note 18, at 39 ("The FBI,
Scotland Yard, and many other police agencies publish criminal records. The
justification is that a net benefit results from forewarning potential victims so that they
may defend themselves, even though the enemy may be aided as well."). Such
warnings are generally appropriate if they do not jeopardize the flow of information
between law enforcement and individual victims.14- SeeJAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 20-37 (1975).
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CONCLUSION
For several years, the dreams of technological promise and the
specter of technology-driven disaster have threatened to collide. The
net is becoming an engine of personal, professional, and economic
growth, but, because of this growth, new dangers loom. The first
months of the new millennium aptly demonstrated these dangers; two
crimes that imposed some of the largest economic losses from crime
in history were launched from a few private computers. Ironically,
these attacks took advantage of what all of us like about computers:
their speed, efficiency, trustworthiness, and low startup costs. As
criminals become more sophisticated about such attacks, the
incidence of these crimes will rise and criminals' escapes will multiply.
Law must counter this trend by embracing new strategies that harness
the legal and nonlegal constraints on crime.
This Article has suggested four such strategies, although many
more are possible. First, law must recognize that an unintended
byproduct of computers is that they serve as substitutes for
conspirators. Because conspirators sometimes provide benefits to law
enforcement, by becoming informants or cooperating witnesses, the
government must devise strategies that recognize the fact that these
benefits are lost when this substitution occurs. One such strategy, as I
have explained, is to treat computers as quasi-conspirators.
Second, law should recognize that certain technologies, such as
encryption and anonymity, have dual purposes. Rather than
postulating that they are entirely deleterious and punishing them
wholesale, society must understand that these technologies can be
used for both good and bad ends. To accomplish this balance, the law
should develop sophisticated sentencing enhancements and other
nuanced strategies such as specific exclusions, and forgo the blunt
sword of total prohibition.
Third, the government must increase the financial cost of crime,
and the skills necessary to commit it, by placing some responsibility on
third parties, such as ISPs, and even on victims. But the government
should also recognize that while victims and ISPs might be cheapest
crime avoiders, able to prevent crime more cheaply than other actors,
their prevention strategies may carry broad, systemic costs, such as
balkanization of the net via systems of passwords and other methods
that limit access. Law enforcement must have a strong presence on
the net to steer victims and ISPs away from suboptimal self-help
strategies; yet at the same time, the police must stress that these
entities have a duty to take self-help measures.
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Fourth, instead of treating all crime as equal, law enforcement
should attempt to inflict disproportionately heavy punishments upon
those crimes that create the most visible, or otherwise evident, social
disorder in cyberspace. Doing so will avoid complementarity
problems, such as copycat crimes or crimes committed because
hackers' tools are easily accessible, and will help reassure the public
and industry that cyberspace is safe.
These four strategies are calculated to help set up incentives that
make crime too expensive to carry out, preserve the benefits of the
net, and provide computer users with the assurance that the net is at
least as safe as realspace. Yet the strategies do run risks, from
trenching on privacy and freedom of speech to poisoning the free
flow of ideas. Those risks cannot properly be addressed in this initial
Article, but doing so is a requisite component of an effective plan to
combat cybercrime.
Although cyberspace has unique particularities, the lessons we
have learned are not confined only to the electronic world. A central
theme of this Article, for instance, is that a crucial variable for
preventing crime is perpetration cost. Law can and should develop
strategies to make crimes more expensive. The government currently
relies on the speculative risk of imprisonment to deter wrongdoing,
but a strategy focused on raising certain costs associated with the
wrongdoing itself may be more effective. If the majority of criminals
are gamblers, or are at least less risk-averse than others, then the law
should focus on raising the fixed, ex ante monetary costs that these
criminals will pay to perpetrate a crime, not on merely enhancing
probabilities ofjail time that criminals will tend to ignore. Deterrence
may be better served by increased monetary costs on all lawbreakers
rather than by traditional strategies such as raised penalties for the few
criminals unlucky enough to be caught.
This Article has also noted the need for a more nuanced solution
to the problem of dual-use activities and has suggested that sentencing
enhancements can preserve the positive uses of a given act while
attacking its negative uses. This theory of regulation applies generally,
although it may be particularly useful in the area of cybercrime, the
hallmark of which may be a preponderance of dual-use activities. The
Article has also analyzed the benefits of other forms of regulation,
such as licensing and specific exclusions. The full range of novel
government tactics-from pledges to warnings, from forfeiture to
suspended sentences-may also be applied profitably outside the area
of cybercrime. So too, the benefits and drawbacks of using second
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and third parties as cheapest crime avoiders are not limited to
cybercrime but, rather, inform criminal law generally.
At issue in this treatment of cybercrime is a view of deterrence
that differs substantially from that offered by economists and
sociologists, one that is not fully focused on the mind of the offender
at the last minute before she commits a crime. My account stresses
the way in which legal rules promote deterrence in other ways, such as
by encouraging products that prevent crime, building architecture
that makes crime more costly to criminals, and harnessing individual
conscience and public values in ways that make crime look less
attractive. By manipulating variables besides legal sanctions, crime
may be prevented even when criminals are not that responsive to legal
sanctions.
Both realspace and cyberspace are rapidly evolving, and the way
criminal law approaches these spheres today may soon be
anachronistic. Still, while the approaches may need to be updated
over time, the fundamental building blocks of successful anticrime
strategies will remain constant. Law must strive to prevent great harm
at cheap cost, and it must define costs broadly enough to include all
of the negative effects of crime prevention (substitution effects, the
social costs of suboptimal self-help strategies, and so on). Our system
of criminal law should attempt to raise the perpetration costs of
engaging in crime and should also provide enough enforcement to
create the conditions under which trust flourishes and networks
develop. At the same time, the government must avoid creating
disincentives to utility-producing activities and must strive to surgically
target harmful acts. These building blocks of criminal law apply to the
brick-and-mortar world, as they do to cyberspace.
